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Ordeal by Trial: Judicial References to the          
Nightmare World of Franz Kafka 
PARKER B. POTTER, JR.∗ 
Franz Kafka’s novel The Trial is firmly entrenched in the modern con-
sciousness as an exemplar of judicial indifference to the most basic rights 
of citizens to understand the nature of criminal proceedings directed 
against them.  Yet, Kafka was not mentioned in an American judicial opin-
ion until forty years after his death in 1924.  Since the mid 1970s, however, 
Kafka’s name has appeared in more than 400 opinions written by Ameri-
can state and federal judges.  Judges have used Kafka to criticize bureau-
cratic absurdity, unfair tribunals of all sorts, and even their own col-
leagues on the other side of an appellate decision, and to empathize with 
litigants.  Some judges referring to Kafka have taken great pains to explain 
their understanding of Kafka and the application of his fiction to the case 
being decided, while others have exercised considerable creativity, linking 
Kafka to other literary figures such as George Orwell, using Kafka as a 
character in their opinions, or seeing the facts of a particular case as be-
longing in Kafka’s fictional world.  Kafka’s name has such power that at 
least four lines of cases have coalesced around particularly well-phrased 
references to Kafka. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the last twenty-five years, Franz Kafka’s place in the American 
judicial canon has undergone a dramatic metamorphosis: once a seldom-
cited popgun whose name rarely appeared in judicial opinions, Kafka has 
become a rhetorical howitzer.1  To date, more than 400 judicial opinions 
contain references to the celebrated Czech author.2  The first of those opin-
  
    ∗   The author is a law clerk to the Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, Chief Judge, United States District 
Judge for the District of New Hampshire.  Potter is also an Adjunct Professor at Franklin Pierce Law 
Center in Concord, New Hampshire, from which he holds a J.D. 
 1. Douglas E. Litowitz, Franz Kafka’s Outsider Jurisprudence, 27 L. & Soc. Inquiry 103, 104 
(2002) (citing Christine Bell, Teaching Law as Kafkaesque, in In Tall Stories? Reading Law and Lit-
erature 11 (John Morison & Christine Bell eds., Dartmouth Press 1996)) (“Kafka is already safely 
ensconced in the ‘canon’ of law and literature.”). 
 2. On March 12, 2004, a Westlaw search of the ALLCASES database using the search term 
“Kafka!” yielded an astonishing 961 hits.  Even after filtering out cases in which the Kafka that trig-
gered the hit was an attorney or a party, there remained well over 400 cases in which a writing judge 
referred to Franz Kafka the Czech author.  (As for the Kafka hits not involving the author, in nearly 100 
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ions was written in 1963,3 nearly forty years after Kafka’s death, and the 
tenth did not appear until 1972,4 but after that tentative beginning, judicial 
interest in Kafka picked up quickly and has continued unabated; since 
January 1, 2000, more than eighty judicial opinions containing references 
to Kafka have been issued by federal and state courts in the United States.  
This article surveys judicial references to Franz Kafka from 1963 to the 
present.  Its basic purpose is to showcase those opinions in which judges 
have been particularly thoughtful or creative in their invocations of Kafka 
and his writing.  In other words, my focus is more on striking legal writing 
than on profound legal or literary analysis.5  Thus, this article is like a 
scoop of tuna salad; I have written the mayonnaise that holds together a 
generous helping of judicial albacore.  In addition to spotlighting sparkling 
writing, I cannot help but tell a few terrific tales; some of the real-world 
stories that have inspired judges to turn to Kafka demonstrate the adage 
that truth can sometimes be stranger than fiction. 
Part II is a brief introduction to Kafka’s life and literary work, from a 
legal perspective.  Part III reviews the first ten judicial references to Kafka.  
Part IV examines some of the ways in which judges have referred to Kafka 
in their opinions.  Part V explores four lines of cases, each of which fea-
tures the same felicitously phrased reference to Kafka. 
  
cases from 1952 through 1982, a party was represented by attorney Anne G. Kafka, first of New York 
City, later of Mineola, and finally, of Patchogue.  The next most prolific Kafka attorney, Gerald A., has 
been the attorney in a mere twenty-six reported cases.). 
  While a detailed geographical analysis of judicial references to Kafka lies beyond the scope of 
this article, several trends deserve brief mention.  Of the dozens of federal and state courts that have 
issued opinions containing references to Kafka, none has been more prolific than the California Court 
of Appeals which has published more than twenty-five Kafka opinions, authored by nearly twenty 
different justices.  The Connecticut Court of Appeals runs a distant second, with an even dozen Kafka 
opinions, all in a single line of cases (see infra pt. V(C)).  The New York Supreme Court checks in 
next, with eleven Kafka opinions.  (However, when considered in sum, the lower courts of New York 
(the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court Appellate Division, the Family Court, the New York City Civil 
Court, and the Surrogate’s Court) account for a total of twenty Kafka references).  Among state su-
preme courts, California is the clear Kafka leader, with ten opinions.  On the federal side, the Southern 
District of New York leads the way, with twenty Kafka opinions, written by nineteen different judges.  
The District of the District of Columbia is second, with fifteen Kafka opinions by eight judges, fol-
lowed by the Northern District of Illinois, with ten Kafka opinions by six judges.  (And the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois has contributed another seven Kafka opinions, by only three 
judges.  See infra pt. V(B)).  In the Circuits, the D.C. Circuit heads the list with seventeen Kafka opin-
ions by twelve judges, followed by the Second Circuit, with sixteen opinions by thirteen judges, and 
the Ninth Circuit, with fourteen opinions by twelve judges.  While it seems understandable that Kafka 
is big in Washington, New York, and Chicago, it is somewhat surprising, if not alarming, that he has 
found so much favor in the Golden State. 
 3. U.S. v. Hughes, 223 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).  It is not surprising that the first reported 
opinion with a reference to Kafka was written by a judge from the Southern District of New York, 
given that court’s history of prolific Kafka citation. 
 4. State v. Blake, 495 P.2d 905, 909 (Kan. 1972). 
 5. For a more analytical view of judicial uses of Kafka, see Scott Finet, Franz Kafka’s Trial as 
Symbol in Judicial Opinions, 12 Leg. Stud. Forum 23 (1988). 
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II.  FROM KAFKA TO KAFKAESQUE 
Franz Kafka was born in 18836 and was a lifelong resident of Prague,7 
where he died of tuberculosis in 1924, one month shy of his forty-first 
birthday.8  After a brief attempt at studying chemistry at the Royal and 
Imperial German Karl-Ferdinand University in Prague,9 Kafka switched 
from chemistry to law, “completed the eight-semester program in due 
course and received his doctorate in law on June 18, 1906, at the age of 
twenty-two.”10  After receiving his degree, Kafka accepted a non-legal 
position with an insurance company,11 and within months, he embarked on 
a fourteen-year career as “an attorney for the state agency responsible for 
administering the workers’ compensation scheme in Prague,”12 known as 
the Workers Accident Insurance Institute for the Kingdom of Bohemia.13  
Kafka retired from the Institute in 1922 on disability, and died two years 
later. 14 
While Kafka toiled by day at the Institute, he wrote in the afternoons 
and evenings, often long into the night.15  He “holds a special fascination 
for legal scholars because he was a practicing lawyer who often wrote 
about law and legal systems.”16  Among Kafka’s most important works on 
legal subjects are his novel, The Trial, and his short story, “In the Penal 
Colony.”17  The Trial “is the story of the arrest, trial, and execution of Josef 
K., the chief clerk of a large bank, who never learns the nature of the 
charges leveled against him nor the identity of the accusatory body.”18  “In 
the Penal Colony” recounts an explorer’s visit to a tropical penal colony to 
witness an execution carried out with an apparatus called “the harrow,” 
which used needles to physically engrave a convicted person’s sentence 
onto his or her body over the course of twelve hours.19 
  
 6. Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations 700 (Justin Kaplan, ed., 17th ed., Little, Brown & Co. 2002). 
 7. Litowitz, supra n. 1, at 106. 
 8. Id. at 109. 
 9. Id. at 108; Samuel Wolff & Kenneth Rivkin, The Legal Education of Franz Kafka, 22 Colum.-
VLA J.L. & Arts 407, 407 (1998). 
 10. Wolff & Rivkin, supra n. 9, at 408. 
 11. Litowitz, supra n. 1, at 106.  In City of Burlington v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 332 F.3d 38, 48 
n. 8 (2d Cir. 2003), Judge Calabresi noted that it should not be assumed that “insurance policy writers 
[do not] spend their evenings contemplating quantum mechanics or, for that matter, Shakespeare . . . 
given such distinguished toilers in the insurance industry as Franz Kafka, Charles Ives, Wallace Ste-
vens and Benjamin Whorf.” 
 12. Litowitz, supra n. 1, at 104 (citations omitted). 
 13. Id. at 109. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Wolff & Rivkin, supra n. 9, at 411 (citing Ernst Pawel, The Nightmare of Reason 270 (1984)). 
 16. Litowitz, supra n. 1, at 104. 
 17. See generally id. at 115-27. 
 18. Id. at 117. 
 19. Id. at 122. 
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Relatively few of Kafka’s works were published before his death;20 
thus both publication and fame came to him posthumously.21  Kafka, how-
ever, has grown into “an important cultural icon,”22 and now, eighty years 
after his death, he “is widely recognized throughout Western culture as a 
‘representative man’ who captured the anxieties of the modern age and 
heralded the emergence of postmodernism.”23  Substantively, Kafka is 
known for “his harrowing portraits of legal outsiders,”24 “victims who seek 
the law as if it were a symbol of protection, order, and acceptance”25 but 
who are sent “shuffling between doorkeepers and administrators”26 in “an 
exhausting process of endless delay”27 only to find “that the law is a disap-
pointing mess of elusive rules endlessly administered by petty bureau-
crats.”28  Kafka’s vivid portrayals of faceless, absurd bureaucratic institu-
tions have resonated so deeply that his name has become an adjective, 
“Kafkaesque,” which has been defined as “marked by surreal distortion 
and often a sense of impending danger”29 and as “refer[ring] to the terrible 
and absurd power of nameless, inscrutable bureaucracies.”30  With respect 
to proper usage of the term,  
the noted poet and critic W.H. Auden [once] said, “Sometimes in 
real life one meets a character and thinks, ‘This man comes 
straight out of Shakespeare or Dickens,’ but nobody ever met a 
Kafka character.  On the other hand, one can have experiences 
which one recognizes as Kafkaesque, while one would never call 
an experience of one’s own Dickensian or Shakespearian.”31 
  
 20. Id. at 115. 
 21. Wolff & Rivkin, supra n. 9, at 412. 
 22. Litowitz, supra n. 1, at 103. 
 23. Id. at 104. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 106. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 952 (4th ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 
2000). 
 30. Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 
47 Stan. L. Rev. 39, 56 n. 65 (1994) (citing Franz Kafka, The Trial (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1992) 
(“A detached observer might sometimes fancy that the whole case had been forgotten . . . .  No one 
really acquainted with the Court would think such a thing.  No document is ever lost, the Court never 
forgets anything.”)). 
 31. Litowitz, supra n. 1, at 128 (quoting W.H. Auden, The Dyer’s Hand and Other Essays 160 
(Random House 1956)).  
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Not only has Kafka entered the popular consciousness, his works have 
been cited by hundreds of judges.32  Kafka did not have an immediate im-
pact on the American judiciary; the first judicial citation of Kafka came 
nearly four decades after his death.  Only three more references to Kafka 
appeared in the 1960s.  The 1970s saw forty-two more.  That number more 
than tripled in the 1980s, when 142 judicial opinions referred to Franz 
Kafka.33  The trend continued in the 1990s with 161 more judicial refer-
ences to Kafka.  And, as noted above, the first decade of the twenty-first 
century is off to a fast start; no fewer than eighty-five judicial opinions 
have mentioned Franz Kafka since January 1, 2000.  Perhaps more inter-
estingly, of the approximately 430 Kafka references I have identified, more 
than 300 use the adjective Kafkaesque while another dozen or so use the 
adjective “Kafka-like.”34 
  
 32. Kafka is so well-ingrained in the contemporary consciousness that fewer than ten percent of the 
judicial opinions that refer to Kafka actually provide a formal citation to one of his novels or short 
stories. 
 33. By the late 1980s, judicial invocations of Kafka had become widespread enough to inspire 
academic comment.  See e.g. Finet, supra n. 5. 
 34. Extensive use of the word “Kafkaesque” is in keeping with another trend: of Kafka’s works, the 
most heavily cited, by far, is his novel The Trial, which is, in all likelihood, the work that inspired some 
wordsmith to coin the adjective form of Kafka’s name. 
  According to my survey, Kafka’s short story “The Metamorphosis” has been referred to four 
times.  U.S. v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985, 990 (2d Cir. 1980) (“If, as the dissent suggests, there is any-
thing ‘Kafkaesque’ about this case it is the complete ‘metamorphosis’ in appellant’s legal argument 
between trial and appeal a change so great as to make it questionable whether Arboleda should even be 
heard on the contention with respect to the illegality of Bisbee’s presence on the ledge that is now 
mainly pressed.”); Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Susan Wassell’s counsel 
argues that the jury’s verdict ‘reflected a chastened, hardened, urban mentality – that lurking behind 
every door is evil and danger, even if the guest is from a small town unfamiliar with the area.’  He takes 
umbrage at the defendants’ argument that Susan’s ‘antennae’ should have been alerted when she didn’t 
see anyone through the peephole.  He rejects the metaphor, remarking unexceptionably that human 
beings do not have antennae and that this case is not a Kafka story about a person who turned into an 
insect (i.e., is not The Metamorphosis).”); Glenn v. Sec. of HHS, 814 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(“The regulations provide some guidance in performing this unavoidably arbitrary task of classifica-
tion.  They make clear that to be deemed literate you need only be able to read and write well enough to 
be able to hold simple, unskilled jobs.  This is not everyone’s idea of literacy; it would not satisfy the 
distinguished literary critic who said that ‘He who has read Kafka’s Metamorphosis [the story about a 
man who wakes up one morning to find that he’s a giant bug] and can look into his mirror unflinching 
may technically be able to read print, but is illiterate in the only sense that matters.’ ”) (quoting George 
Steiner, Literacy, in Language and Silence: Essays on Language, Literature, and the Inhuman 3, 11 
(1974)); Wertz v. U.S., 51 Fed. Cl. 443, 449 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (“But, there is no indication, either in the 
statute or its legislative history, that Congress intended the late filing of a tax return to have such a 
Kafkaesque metamorphic impact.”). 
  Kafka’s novel The Castle has been referred to three times.  Grant Ctr. Hosp. v. Health Group of 
Jackson, Inc., 528 So. 2d 804, 809 (Miss. 1988) (“Grant Center argues that this phrase [‘the most 
current state health plan’] must necessarily mean the most current state health plan in effect at the time 
the proposal is submitted or else delays in the administrative process would mire applicants in a 
kafkaesque struggle to reach an ever receding castle – this particularly where there is opposition and 
judicial review and where state plans are revised more frequently than applications may be proc-
essed.”); Nitti v. Credit Bureau of Rochester, Inc., 375 N.Y.S.2d 817, 822 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Monroe 
County 1975) (“Time and again plaintiff came to the defendant’s office and went over the same credit 
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III.  THE FIRST TEN KAFKA REFERENCES 
In 2005, a judicial reference to Franz Kafka hardly causes a blip on the 
“law and literature” radar screen.  But in the 1960s and 70s, such refer-
ences were on the cutting edge.  This section focuses on ten pioneering 
opinions that established the Kafka beachhead in American judicial writ-
ing. 
On December 12, 1960, Paul Hughes pled not guilty, in the Southern 
District of New York, to thirty-two counts of a criminal indictment filed on 
November 18, 1960.35  Subsequently, he retained counsel.36  With the ad-
vice of counsel, he pled guilty to conspiracy, one of the thirty-two counts 
against him.37  Approximately two years later, Hughes moved for leave to 
withdraw his guilty plea and to plead not guilty to the conspiracy count.38  
Hughes’ change of heart resulted from disputes over: (1) the nature and 
scope of the cooperation he was obligated to provide the government;39 and 
(2) the leeway he would be given to avoid being sentenced by “one or two 
judges whose alleged reputation for severity made them undesirable from 
[his] point of view.”40  At the hearing on Hughes’ motion to withdraw his 
plea, his counsel argued: 
[E]ven “if there had never been made any representations to the 
defendant,” the defendant should be allowed to withdraw his plea 
“solely because at the time at which he made his plea (of guilty) he 
could not conceivably anticipate that in some way an unmentioned 
something would be demanded of him as a token of cooperation; * 
* * that at that time (when he pleaded guilty) nobody could antici-
  
information with the defendant’s employees, pointing out the errors, all to no purpose.  Time and again 
he tried to have the defendant update and correct its report of him; he pleaded, he lost his temper, all to 
no avail.  Like a character in Kafka, he was totally powerless to move or penetrate the implacable 
presence brooding, like some stone moloch, within the castle.  It was this very kind of contumacious 
conduct that Congress sought to correct.”); State v. Hurd, 734 N.E.2d 365, 366-67 (Ohio 2000) (“It 
may seem that we are mired in a Borgesian Labyrinth or Kafkaesque Castle, where there is a wrongdo-
ing and yet no way to punish the perpetrator.”). 
  Kafka’s short story “In the Penal Colony” has also been referred to, but only once.  Larijani v. 
Georgetown U., 791 A.2d 41, 45 (D.C. 2002) (Farrell, J., dissenting) (“The majority seems to agree, 
though I am not sure, that if the foot-length ‘noise makers’ in this case were the conventional sort of 
‘husher’ or ‘white noise’ maker employed in most courtrooms of the Superior Court, this suit would be 
meritless.  But apparently because the devices might have been of a different, diabolical sort capable of 
inflicting ‘acoustical torture’ over time – maybe a relic from Kafka’s penal colony – the suit is allowed 
to go forward.”). 
 35. Hughes, 223 F. Supp. at 478. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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pate that some such vague thing might come up. * * * if the defen-
dant at the time that he made his plea could merely have guessed 
that some such thing would develop in later years, he would not 
have pleaded guilty * * * it is just terribly unfair to a defendant af-
ter securing his cooperation in a long and difficult case to trot out 
this Kafkaesque suggestion. * * * it is an undefined suspicion of 
cooperation about an undefined something. * * * the unfair con-
duct of the Government, even assuming that no repudiation was 
made, or no representations were made. * * * Unfairness in the 
sense of first securing from the defendant the cooperation in a long 
trial, arousing in the defendant the expectation that this coopera-
tion would redound to his benefit, thereby assuring that the defen-
dant would not move for immediate sentence, and then using 
something that no one could have anticipated at the time the plea 
was changed to guilty in some way to reflect on the defendant and 
to make his position worse in a manner which he couldn’t rea-
sonably anticipate. * * * Meaning to use that incident to attempt to 
secure a harsher sentence than which he might ordinarily have re-
ceived. * * * they (the Government) refuse to define the matter. * * 
* it is impossible for him to comply with such a request of the 
Government. * * * (a request that is) unanticipated and impossible. 
* * * In an impossible predicament.”41 
Hughes’ counsel evidently failed to persuade Judge Herlands that his client 
had been subjected to anything all that Kafkaesque; the motion to with-
draw his guilty plea was denied.42  However, Hughes represents an impor-
tant genre of opinions that refer to Kafka, those in which Kafka is invoked 
not by the court itself, but in an argument or brief quoted by the court.43 
The second reported reference to Kafka is not rhetorical.  In Zeitlin v. 
Arnebergh, the California Supreme Court, like many other courts at that 
time, was called upon to determine whether Henry Miller’s novel Tropic of 
Cancer was obscene.44  Writing for a court that unanimously held that the 
book was not obscene, Justice Tobriner characterized the book as “ex-
press[ing] the writer’s thoughts in their most primitive aspect, often violent 
  
 41. Id. at 480-81 (quoting the hearing record) (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. at 488. 
 43. See infra pt. IV(F)(2). 
 44. 383 P.2d 152, 154 (Cal. 1963).  Prior to Zeitlin, at least four courts had held Tropic of Cancer 
not to be obscene, see Haiman v. Morris, No. 61 S 19718 (Ill. Cook County Super. Ct. 1962); Atty. 
Gen. v. Book Named “Tropic of Cancer”, 184 N.E.2d 328 (Mass. 1962); People v. Fritch, 236 
N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1963); McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 121 N.W.2d 545 
(Wis. 1963), while at least three other courts had gone the other way, holding that the book was ob-
scene, see Besig v. U.S., 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953); State v. Huntington, No. 24657 (Conn. Hartford 
County Super. Ct. 1962); Cmmw. v. Robin, No. 3177 (Pa. Phila. County Ct. of C.P. 1962). 
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and repulsive, and constantly in four-letter words.”45  He went on to call 
the book “a kind of grotesque, unorthodox art-form,”46 and then validated 
that form of art by quoting an art historian who had described modern art 
as “fundamentally ‘ugly’ foregoing the euphony, the fascinating forms, 
tones and colours of impressionism,”47 and who had written about “the 
fight against all voluptuous and hedonistic feelings, hence the gloom, de-
pression and torment in the works of Picasso, Kafka, and Joyce.”48  While 
such references to Kafka are rare, several other judges have discussed or 
mentioned Kafka in an artistic context, rather than in a purely rhetorical 
way.49 
Judicial use of Kafka started to come into its own three years later in 
United States v. Desist.50  In Desist, Nebbia, a criminal defendant who did 
not speak English, asked for a translator to assist him at trial, at govern-
ment expense.51  Based upon Nebbia’s ability to post bail in the amount of 
$100,000 shortly after his arrest, the trial court determined that Nebbia was 
not indigent and denied his request.52  On appeal to the Second Circuit, 
Nebbia argued “that he was denied due process and a fair trial, as well as 
the rights of confrontation, presence at his trial, and effective assistance of 
counsel, by the trial judge’s refusal to provide him at government expense 
with a court-appointed interpreter to render simultaneous translation of the 
proceedings.”53  As framed by the court of appeals, the question before it 
was “whether a [criminal] defendant has an absolute right to a free simul-
taneous translator.”54  In announcing the court’s decision that the Constitu-
tion guarantees no such right, Judge Feinberg noted that the court was 
“aware that trying a defendant in a language he does not understand has a 
Kafka-like quality, but Nebbia’s ability to remedy that situation dissipates 
substantially–perhaps completely–any feeling of unease.”55  The issue 
raised in Desist, trying a criminal defendant in a language he or she does 
not understand, is a mainstay of subsequent Kafka jurisprudence.56 
  
 45. Zeitlin, 383 P.2d at 165. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 166 n. 27 (quoting Hauser, The Social History of Art 230-31 (1958)). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See e.g. Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 169 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Rostow, The Democratic 
Character of Judicial Review, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1952), is about as far removed from R. Berger, 
Government by Judiciary (1977), as Ralph Waldo Emerson is from Franz Kafka.”). 
 50. 384 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1967). 
 51. Id. at 901. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 54. Id. (citing Ex parte Roelker, 20 F. Cas. 1092 (D. Mass. 1854)). 
 55. Id. at 902. 
 56. See infra pt. V(D). 
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In People v. Colletti, two criminal defendants appealed their convic-
tions for robbery and burglary, arguing, inter alia, that they were denied 
due process by the State’s failure to record the grand jury testimony that 
led to their indictment.57  Explaining that the State had no “duty to insure 
that the testimony of witnesses before the Grand Jury will be recorded for 
the later use of the defendant,”58 Justice Moran of the Illinois Court of Ap-
peals observed that the defendant’s position, positing such a duty, “must 
inevitably lead to a Kafka-like dream in which police departments and 
prosecutors’ offices become mere clerical centers for the recording and 
transcription of witnesses’ statements to be turned over to the defense.”59  
This is an especially curious reference to Kafka.  Several opinions have 
characterized some particular situation as a “Kafkaesque nightmare” as a 
prelude to using, or trying to use, the power of the court to make the 
nightmare go away.60  But here, by contrast, Justice Moran characterized 
  
 57. 242 N.E.2d 63, 63, 65-66 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1968). 
 58. Id. at 66. 
 59. Id. at 66-67. 
 60. See e.g. Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A police department has an 
undeniable interest in discouraging unofficial internal investigations.  If personal investigations were 
the usual way for an officer to check out suspicious activities of a fellow officer, the effect on effi-
ciency and morale could be very disrupting, and the effectiveness of the police force might deteriorate.  
Instead of concentrating on their traditional duties in the community, officers with personal hostilities 
could become preoccupied with personal investigations of one another.  Esprit de corps could collapse 
into a kafkaesque nightmare of improper investigations into the impropriety of improper investiga-
tions.”); Holloway v. Frey, 202 S.E.2d 845, 847 (Ga. App. 1973) (“If this [allowing actual notice of a 
suit to substitute for proper service of process] were the law, of course, there would be no such thing as 
service of process, but all that would be necessary to obtain judgment and levy on a man’s property and 
possessions would be to inform him by whatever means that there was in fact a suit pending against 
him, and throw the burden on him of checking out the rumor, a situation that would indeed lead to the 
nightmare situations envisioned by Kafka in The Trial.”); Rural Water Sys. # 1 v. City of Sioux Center, 
38 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1069 n. 6 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (“To permit such belated ‘clarification’ would have 
the unacceptable effect of turning this fee litigation into precisely the sort of ‘Kafkaesque nightmare’ or 
‘second major litigation’ over fees – involving endless submissions, revised submissions, and counter 
submissions – that courts abhor”) (citations omitted); Evans v. State, 441 So. 2d 520, 526 (Miss. 1983) 
(Robertson, J., dissenting) (“The majority would have Evans die, not because the proceedings at trial 
and on direct appeal were fundamentally fair or constitutionally adequate, but because his lawyer 
goofed . . . Connie Ray Evans, the center and subject of this kafkaesque nightmare, no doubt has not 
the slightest comprehension of his lawyer’s inaction at trial or our action here.  Decisions that life be 
taken should be made of more solid stuff.”); Ferber v. City of Phila., 661 A.2d 470, 472 (Pa. Commw. 
1995) (quoting the “well-reasoned and thorough opinion” of the trial court.  “Factually, this case pre-
sents a Kafkaesque nightmare of the sort which we normally would characterize as being representative 
of the so-called justice system of a totalitarian state.  Unfortunately, and shamefully, as the trial evi-
dence showed, it happened here in Philadelphia.”); see also F.T.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 921-
22 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (quoting appellee’s claim that “[s]uch a result would create 
bureaucratic competition having the characteristics of a Kafka nightmare in which no response to an 
agency is ever sufficient because the of needs of a competing agency to show the insufficiency of a 
prior response to the former agency”); People v. Privitera, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764, 766, 784 (Cal. App. 4th 
Dist. 1977) (holding that enforcement of California statute to deny laetrile to cancer patients “take[s] on 
a Kafkaesque, a nightmare, quality.”); Beegle v. Ted Bolle Millwork, Inc., 1994 WL 1631040 at *1 
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 4, 1994) (“To state that the captioned cause represents a procedural nightmare of 
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the court as avoiding a Kafka-like dream,61 rather than a Kafkaesque 
nightmare, and thus, he stands alone in taking credit for avoiding a 
Kafkaesque situation in a ruling that went against a criminal defendant. 
United States ex rel. Negron v. New York addressed the issue raised in 
Desist, namely the unfairness of submitting a criminal defendant to a trial 
in a language he or she does not understand without the benefit of an inter-
  
Kafka-esque proportions is egregiously to understate the reality of the situation of an arbitration gone 
awry.”). 
  Sometimes, however, a court is powerless to chase away the nightmare.  In Coldiron v. United 
States Deparment of Justice., Judge Kennedy of the District of D.C. explained: 
 
The words “Kafka-esque nightmare” may well describe Coldiron’s ongoing employment re-
lationship with the INS.  It is undisputed that the INS suspended her security clearance, de-
manded that she explain herself, and invoked (through the FBI) FOIA [Freedom of Informa-
tion Act] Exemption 1 to bar access to the very information upon which INS based its deci-
sion to suspend Coldiron.  But because it appears that the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 1 
is proper, Coldiron may not access portions of the documents which would allow her to de-
fend herself against the INS’s claims. 
 
310 F. Supp. 2d 44, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2004). 
  Finally, not only do the cases mention Kafkaesque nightmares, they also mention Kafkaesque 
judicial nightmares, see e.g. Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 729 F.2d 801, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which are 
discussed infra pt. V(A). 
 61. Judge Moran is not, however, the only jurist link to Kafka to a dream rather than a nightmare.   
  In 1983, at the Annual Judicial Conference of the Second Judicial Circuit, Professor Arthur 
Miller, in his capacity as reporter for the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules, offered the follow-
ing commentary on Rule 26: 
 
But I would like to admit that I have a recurrent Kafkaesque dream; it goes something like 
this: 
 
A lawyer seeks discovery under one of the rules.  It is followed by a motion to sanction un-
der Rule 26(g) on the ground that the discovery request was beyond the standard set up in 
Rule 26 for legitimate discovery. 
 
So there is a sanction hearing, at the end of which the judge says, “It was a tough discovery 
request, it was a demanding request, but I don’t think it violated the certification obligation 
of Rule 26(g).  Sanction motion denied.” 
 
At which point the other lawyer pops up and says, “I hereby move to sanction the sanction 
motion.” 
 
As Kurt Vonnegut would say, “And so it goes.”  Thank you.  (Applause.)  
 
101 F.R.D. 161, 200 (1984). 
  Professor Miller’s reference to Kafka was picked up in a short line of cases. McMahon v. Shear-
son/Am. Ex., Inc., 896 F.2d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 1990); Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 
646, 654 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The Rule 11 drafters’ nightmare has become a reality.”); Golden Eagle 
Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir. 1986); Ophir v. Goldstein, 1990 WL 
284519 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1990); True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781, 797 n. 14 
(Wyo. 1989).  Professor Miller even inspired the title of an academic commentary, Kim M. Rubin, Has 
a “Kafkaesque Dream” Come True? Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: Time for Another Amend-
ment?, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 1019 (1987). 
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preter.62  In Negron, however, the criminal defendant was successful; 
Judge Bartels of the Eastern District of New York granted Negron’s appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus, on grounds that he “was denied his 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation,”63 which, in turn, denied him “the 
basic and fundamental fairness required by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”64  The key difference between Negron’s situation 
and that of Nebbia in Desist is that, Negron, unlike Nebbia, was indigent.65  
On appeal, Judge Kaufman affirmed Judge Bartels–from the bench, no 
less66–and while Judge Kaufman did not mention Kafka in his opinion, he 
did observe that “[t]o Negron, most of the trial must have been a babble of 
voices.”67 
White v. State marks the first appearance of Kafka in a dissenting opin-
ion,68 a fairly common place for Kafka to lurk,69 and it is the first opinion 
in which the term “Kafkaesque” appeared in a judge’s own words rather 
than in a quotation from an attorney’s argument or brief.  In White, the 
plaintiff sued the State of California, alleging that certain of its employees 
in the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation “negligently 
posted to plaintiff’s record, and negligently disseminated and published 
erroneous information relating to plaintiff.”70  The erroneous information 
was posted to plaintiff’s record in 1941,71 but the plaintiff did not discover 
its inclusion until 1967.72  The trial court granted the defendants a nonsuit 
on grounds of both absolute and conditional privilege.73  The California 
Court of Appeals held “that the trial court erred in granting nonsuit on the 
theory that defendants’ publications were absolutely privileged,”74 but 
went on to hold that “publication of such material was conditionally privi-
leged.”75  Justice Friedman concurred in the affirmance of the nonsuit 
granted to an individual defendant, one Mr. Coffey, but dissented from 
affirmance of the nonsuit granted to the State of California,76 observing 
that “[o]ur nation’s current social developments harbor insidious evolu-
  
 62. 310 F. Supp. 1304, 1305 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 63. Id. at 1309. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1307 (quoting Desist, 384 F.2d at 902). 
 66. U.S. ex rel. Negron v. N.Y., 434 F.2d 386, 387 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 67. Id. at 388. 
 68. 95 Cal. Rptr. 175, 184 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1971). 
 69. See infra pt. IV(A)(1)(b). 
 70. White, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 176. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 177. 
 73. Id. at 179. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 181. 
 76. Id. at 185. 
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tionary forces which propel us toward a collective, Orwellian society,”77 
one feature of which is “the utter destruction of privacy, the individual’s 
complete exposure to the all-seeing, all-powerful police state.”78  In a dis-
cussion of malice, which had to be proven to defeat the defendants’ claim 
of privilege, Justice Friedman wrote: 
While mere negligence does not amount to malice, the latter ap-
pears when the statement was made with willful disregard for ac-
curacy.  Were libel plaintiff’s sole theory of recovery, it would be 
necessary that he satisfy the jury that the Bureau acted with willful 
disregard of the harm emanating from an untrue report of crime.  
Its unrealistic advice that plaintiff solicit the benevolence of the lo-
cal police department which, a quarter-century earlier, had origi-
nated the error, was a bland cloak for official indifference, shunt-
ing the citizen in Kafkaesque fashion from agency to agency.  
Willful disregard lay not so much in the Bureau’s communications 
of the record as in its willful immobility when the victim sought 
correction.79 
The situation sketched by Justice Friedman would certainly have been fa-
miliar to Kafka’s Josef K. 
In United States v. Dockery, Judge Wright of the D.C. Circuit dis-
sented from an opinion holding that the district court did not violate a 
criminal defendant’s right to due process when it denied her request for 
disclosure of a probation officer’s pre-sentence report.80  In his dissent, 
Judge Wright noted that “[a]n individual’s interest in knowing and meeting 
official evidence to be used at an adjudicative hearing is . . . generally ac-
corded great weight in our legal system”81 as a way of both “honor[ing] our 
due process commitment to truth seeking in the administration of the 
law”82 and “respect[ing] . . . individual dignity in the criminal process.”83  
In Judge Wright’s view, those two principles “insure that the defendant is 
treated as a citizen entitled to know what is happening to him and why and 
  
 77. Id. at 181.  Justice Friedman was the first judge, but hardly the last, to pair up Franz Kafka and 
George Orwell.  See infra pt. IV(C)(1). 
 78. White, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 181. 
 79. Id. at 184 (citing A.B.C. Needlecraft Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 245 F.2d 775, 777 (2d Cir. 
1957)). 
 80. 447 F.2d 1178, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 81. Id. at 1191. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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how it is happening – not as a Kafkaesque victim of Star Chamber secret 
proceedings.”84 
In Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District the issue litigated 
was a school’s attempt to regulate the content and distribution of “SPACE 
CITY!, a newspaper in general circulation in Harris County.”85  The 
School District’s regulations required, among other things, prior review by 
the school principal before the publication could be distributed.86  The 
School District defended that particular regulation on grounds of its duty to 
prevent the publication of obscene language,87 and cited, as an example, a 
letter to the editor printed in SPACE CITY! bearing the caption “High 
Skool is Fucked.”88  By way of explaining the unusual spelling of the word 
“school,” Judge Seals observed that “[t]he substitution of ‘k’ for ‘c’ and 
‘ch’ (e.g. ‘Amerika’) is widely current among publications of the New 
Left, and is believed to derive from the writings of Franz Kafka.”89  Not 
surprisingly, given the aforementioned familiarity with Kafka and the New 
Left, Judge Seals ruled that “High Skool is Fucked” was not obscene be-
cause its use of the word “fuck” did not appeal to a prurient interest in 
sex,90 and he criticized the School District for misapplying the legal test for 
obscenity by failing to consider the offending letter to the editor in the con-
text of the newspaper as a whole,91 and for “fail[ing] to apply correctly 
another part of the obscenity test, the definition of ‘common community 
standard’ by which a work must be judged to determine its obscenity.”92 
Bangor Punta Corp. v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., involved “the bit-
ter struggle between [Bangor Punta and Chris-Craft] for control of Piper 
Aircraft Corporation.”93  Bangor-Punta won the battle, Chris-Craft sued, 
and Bangor-Punta “countered by charging, in essence, that because of the 
wrongful acts of Chris-Craft it paid more than it would otherwise have paid 
to acquire control of Piper.”94  Bangor-Punta is another case in which the 
writing judge fingered one of the parties for citing Kafka: “Chris-Craft’s 
response to Bangor Punta’s charges is to label Bangor Punta’s case as 
  
 84. Id.  Several other judges have included references to both Kafka and the Star Chamber in a 
single opinion.  See infra pt. IV(C)(3). 
 85. 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1155 (S.D. Tex. 1971). 
 86. Id. at 1154 n. 3. 
 87. Id. at 1162-63. 
 88. Id. at 1163. 
 89. Id. at 1163 n. 15. 
 90. Id. at 1165. 
 91. Id. at 1164. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 337 F. Supp. 1147, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 94. Id. 
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‘sheer fantasy’ and its inferences as ‘Kafkaesque logic.’ ”95  While Bangor 
Punta’s position may have been illogical, or even absurd, Judge Pollock 
clearly recognized the incongruity of a reference to Kafka in a battle be-
tween two well-heeled corporations: 
Chris-Craft’s attacks on the evidentiary underpinning and legal 
support of Bangor Punta’s case would require a minute considera-
tion of the record and of precedents cited were this Court to accord 
to Bangor Punta the status of damaged innocent which it claims for 
itself. 
But Bangor Punta cannot wear that mantle.  It was the willing 
and winning contestant in a hard fought and (for both sides) 
enormously expensive struggle for control.96 
Judge Pollock went on to remind the parties that “this Court made it clear 
that it would not, at the behest of a disappointed contender in a battle for 
corporate control, necessarily take the same view of the requirements of 
the securities laws and rules as it does in cases of claimed injury to the 
average public investor.”97  A defrauded individual investor unable to gain 
satisfaction from the courts would seem to be a much more Kafkaesque 
protagonist than either of the parties in Bangor Punta.98 
  
 95. Id. at 1152.  Other courts have come out against Kafkaesque logic.  Santiago Negron v. Castro-
Davila, 865 F.2d 431, 437 (1st Cir. 1989) (“We reject this Kafka-like logic.”); Williams v. Sullivan, 779 
F. Supp. 471, 472 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (rejecting the Secretary of Health & Human Services’ argument 
that he was not required to provide a Social Security claimant a transcript of the proceeding dismissing 
her claim, on grounds that dismissal was not a final decision, and stating: “This Court finds such 
Kafkaesque reasoning remarkable.”); Cole v. State, 608 So. 2d 1313, 1330-31 (Miss. 1992) (Banks, J., 
dissenting) (“I find the net effect of the logic propounded by the trial court and embraced by the major-
ity regarding the application of a three-year time bar to be truly Kafkaesque: for Cole to avoid the time 
bar, he must show he is incompetent and thus qualify for a time extension, yet Cole has been denied the 
opportunity to make such a showing on the grounds that he has failed to comply with the time bar.  In 
this sense, this is not a case where the door is locked and the petitioner may not enter.  This is a case 
where there is no door at all.”); In re Jennifer G., 695 N.Y.S.2d 871, 884 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999) (“Hy-
pocrisy and ‘kafkaesque’ reasoning, it appears, are not strangers to masking the neglect of PINS [per-
son in need of supervision] children under the guise of legislative policy in order to conserve and build 
upon the public purse.”); In re Eric E., 475 N.Y.S.2d 759, 761 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984) (“Such absurd 
‘Kafkaesque’ reasoning results from a misreading of CPL §§ 710.20 and 710.30(1).”). 
 96. Bangor Punta Corp., 337 F. Supp. at 1152. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Similarly unavailing as a Kafkaesque victim is the corporate defendant in Coltec Industries, Inc. 
v. Zurich Insurance Co., 2004 WL 413304 at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2004), “a sophisticated contracting 
party” that “could [have] easily avoid[ed] this Kafkaesque scenario by including a choice-of-law provi-
sion in its policies.”  In like fashion, Justice Rehnquist seems to have reversed the traditional 
Kafkaesque roles in an opinion in which a power company and a federal agency were portrayed as the 
victims of a nearly Kafkaesque decision of the court of appeals in favor of an environmental group.  Vt. 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, 435 U.S. 518, 557 (1978).  One wonders 
whether Kafka himself could have possibly contemplated the idea of the government being the victim 
rather than the perpetrator of anything worthy of being called Kafkaesque. 
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State v. Blake returned to the familiar ground of criminal trials.99  Rich-
ard Blake was charged with first degree murder, and, after pleading insan-
ity, was convicted of second degree murder in the shooting death of his 
young daughter.100  On appeal, he argued, inter alia, that “his amnesia cov-
ering the period surrounding the homicide rendered him incompetent to 
stand trial.”101  “[F]aced with the question of whether [a claim of] amnesia, 
standing alone, renders a defendant incompetent to stand trial,” the Kansas 
Supreme Court held that it did not.102  In so holding, the court rejected the 
defendant’s contention that “memory [i]s an essential element, per se, of 
competency to stand trial”103 and his claim that, because of his amnesia, it 
was “very much as though he were tried in absentia notwithstanding his 
physical presence at the time of trial.”104  Writing for the court, Commis-
sioner Foth observed that “defendant’s memory is unimpaired until a time 
moments before the shooting, and picks up again shortly thereafter; the 
  
  There is, however, at least one case involving large corporate defendants in which the term 
Kafkaesque may actually be appropriate.  The issue in Irish National Insurance Co. v. Aer Lingus 
Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984), was the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  
Judge Van Graafeiland began his opinion: 
 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens ostensibly is invoked to determine in which of two 
jurisdictions a case should be tried.  In some instances, however, invocation of the doctrine 
will send the case to a jurisdiction which has imposed such severe monetary limitations on 
recovery as to eliminate the likelihood that the case will be tried.  When it is obvious that 
this will occur, discussion of convenience of witnesses takes on a Kafkaesque quality – eve-
ryone knows that no witnesses ever will be called to testify.  This appears to be such a case. 
 
Id. at 91.  Unlike Bangor-Punta and Coltec Industries, which involved corporate defendants claiming 
to be Kafkaesque victims, Aer Lingus involved a legal argument that was absurd to the point of being 
Kafkaesque.  Judge Van Graafeiland’s opinion was so persuasive it has inspired an entire line of cases.  
See Rudetsky v. O’Dowd, 660 F. Supp. 341, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting Aer Lingus, 739 F.2d at 91) 
(declining to rule that lack of a contingency fee system in England is a per se bar to dismissal on 
grounds of forum non conveniens, but denying defendant’s motion to dismiss); Carlenstolpe v. Merck 
& Co., 638 F. Supp. 901, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting Aer Lingus, 739 F.2d at 91) (rejecting plain-
tiff’s argument that Sweden does not provide an adequate alternative forum for products liability action 
but denying defendant’s motion to dismiss on other grounds); Picketts v. Intl. Playtex, Inc., 576 A.2d 
518, 527 (Conn. 1990) (quoting Aer Lingus, 739 F.2d at 91) (declining to decide whether Canadian 
discovery rules render British Columbia an inadequate forum for plaintiff’s products liability case but 
reversing trial court’s grant of dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens); Dow Chem. Co. v. 
Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 683 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., concurring) (legislature abolished forum 
non conveniens); see also Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1409 (8th Cir. 1991) (Timbers, J., 
dissenting) (“The majority’s reliance on . . . Aer Lingus . . . also strikes me as misplaced. . . .  By cull-
ing that proposition [that a court deciding a forum non conveniens issue may consider severe monetary 
limitations on the recovery available in an alternative forum] from a passing reference made by the 
court in Aer Lingus, the majority has misconstrued the holding in that case.”). 
 99. 495 P.2d 905. 
 100. Id. at 906. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 908-09. 
 103. Id. at 909. 
 104. Id. (quoting Wilson v. U.S., 391 F.2d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Fahy, J., dissenting)). 
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obliterated period is a very short one.”105  On that basis, Commissioner 
Foth concluded that Blake was not “a Kafkaesque defendant, on trial for he 
knows not what.”106 
Generally speaking, the first ten judicial opinions with references to 
Kafka offer a pretty fair introduction to the more than 400 that have fol-
lowed.  Seven of the opinions are in criminal cases, two involve literal 
rather than metaphorical citations of Kafka, and only one is in a civil case.  
In two of the ten, the court noted, but did not accept, one party’s claim that 
something was Kafkaesque, and in another two of the ten, the judge refer-
ring to Kafka was writing in dissent. 
IV.  HOW KAFKA HAS BEEN DEPLOYED 
Given the sheer number of time that judges have referred to Franz 
Kafka and his literary works, it should come as no surprise that judges 
have framed their references in a variety of different ways.  This part be-
gins by examining various nouns and, by extension, various legal situa-
tions, to which the adjective “Kafkaesque” has been applied.  It then dis-
cusses the opinions of several judges who have gone beyond the mere in-
cantation of the word Kafkaesque either by quoting from Kafka’s work or 
by offering an extended explanation of how Kafka’s work applies to a par-
ticular legal situation.  Next, I explore some of the other literary references 
that have been “bundled” with references to Kafka.  I continue with a dis-
cussion of opinions in which Kafka himself has been made a hypothetical 
character.  Then I turn to opinions in which judges do not pull Kafka into 
their cases, but, rather, see their cases as belonging in the world of Kafka’s 
fiction.  The part concludes with Kafka references that do not fit neatly into 
any other category, but are just too well-written to leave out. 
A. Kafkaesque 
The simplest way to invoke Kafka is to call something “Kafkaesque.”  
Adjectival use of Kafka’s name is by far the most common way in which 
judges have referred to Kafka, and eight of the first ten judicial references 
to Kafka were of this type, using either the word “Kafkaesque” or “Kafka-
like.”  This section focuses on a specific subset of the adjectival invoca-
tions of Kafka, those in which the writer’s selection of the noun that was 
modified demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of Kafka’s work. 
  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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Thus, I am not particularly interested in bare declarations like: “[s]uch 
a Kafkaesque situation cannot be permitted,”107 “[t]his is Kafkaesque,”108 
or “[t]hat is really Kafkaesque.”109  I am twice as disinterested in those 
opinions in which a judge has opted for a half measure, referring to “some-
thing slightly Kafkaesque,”110 or something that “seems to me almost 
Kafkaesque,”111 or to “a somewhat Kafkaesque development,”112 an “al-
  
 107. Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 1986) (holding that defendant’s failure to appear for 
sentencing does not allow trial court to sentence defendant outside state sentencing guidelines). 
 108. U.S. v. Ramirez, 2002 WL 31016657 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2002) (decrying the enhancement 
provisions of the federal sentencing guidelines) (quoted in U.S. v. Caicedo-Cuero, 312 F.3d 697, 709 
(5th Cir. 2002)). 
 109. Blanca P. v. Super. Ct, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 696 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1996) (explaining that “it 
is an outrageous injustice to use the fact parents deny they have committed a horrible act as proof that 
they did it”); see also In re Juan P., 2001 WL 1600768 at *1 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Dec. 14, 2001) (“This 
is the sequel to Blanca P. v. Superior Court.”). 
 110. State v. Garcia, 975 P.2d 793, 800 (Idaho App. 1999) (Schwartzman, J., concurring) (emphasis 
in the original) (observing that indigent inmate, incarcerated out of state, was denied the opportunity to 
appear telephonically at child support hearing then had his failure to appear used against him by the 
Bureau of Child Support Services). 
 111. U.S. v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (Oakes, J., dissenting) (objecting to major-
ity’s rule under which “a defendant in a suppression hearing, even after establishing clearly that he was 
arrested in his home and that there was no arrest warrant for him or search warrant for the premises, has 
a further burden of asking whether the arresting officers had an arrest warrant for any third party”); see 
also U.S. v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 175 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J., dissenting) (“The panel majority 
affirming the appellant’s convictions adopted an entirely new rule of law that so far as I know stands 
without precedent in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence.  The panel majority’s sanction of 
the trial of a defendant in a criminal prosecution before an anonymous petit jury, without disclosure of 
even the approximate community or neighborhood in which the jurors reside and absent requested 
inquiry into ethnic and religious backgrounds (much of which would be revealed by the usual name and 
address), strikes a Vermont judge as bizarre, almost Kafka-esque.  It makes peremptory challenges for 
all practical purposes worthless, to me a sorry state of affairs.”) (citation omitted); Davis v. Dalton, 929 
F. Supp. 467, 468 (D.D.C. 1996) (“Although Commander Davis was ultimately cleared of these 
charges [security violations, sexual harassment, reverse discrimination, and voyeurism] in a special 
court martial, the allegations set off an almost ‘kafkaesque’ series of events which included: (1) invol-
untary confinement in a mental hospital for three weeks; (2) revocation of plaintiff’s security clear-
ances; (3) removal of plaintiff from his position of command; (4) initiation of ‘detachment for cause’ 
proceedings against plaintiff; and (5) institution of a Medical Board against plaintiff.  Ultimately, 
plaintiff was denied promotion to Captain and was involuntarily retired from the Navy he had served so 
well.”); Singh v. Atty. Gen., 510 F. Supp. 351, 357 (D.D.C. 1980) (“in almost Kafkaesque fashion, the 
government first concedes that Singh [who the government seeks to deny permanent residency status 
under sixth preference immigration classification] is clearly qualified for the job today . . . and then 
suggests that ‘nothing prevents (her) from filing the necessary applications,’ provided she first returns 
to India.”); Hall v. N.Y. D.M.V, 745 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Monroe County 2002) (“The 
petitioner in this case is caught in a situation almost worthy of Kafka.  He is suing for restoration of his 
driver’s license, which was revoked this year by the Department of Motor Vehicles for an offense that 
took place in 2001.”); In re Terrence T., 588 N.Y.S.2d 731, 736 n. 10 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992) (“It is 
ironical that in the adult criminal justice system which is at least punitive in nature, sentencing is to be 
pronounced without unreasonable delay while in the purely rehabilitative juvenile justice system a 
particularized time constraint is imposed for disposition, violations of which it is argued and has been 
held, requires dismissal.  Such social engineering in implementation of advancing the individual and 
common good appears almost ‘Kafkaesque.’ ”) (citation omitted). 
 112. Brewster v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d 488, 493 (1st Cir. 1993) (referring to “the contentiousness surround-
ing the lawyers’ compensation [which] threatens to overshadow the main case . . . [which] furnishes the 
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most Kafkaesque” action,113 “an egregious, almost Kafkaesque, set of cir-
cumstances,”114 “procedures that verge on the Kafkaesque,”115 things that 
“border[] on the Kafkaesque,”116 or an “anomalous, perhaps even 
Kafkaesque” requirement.117  And I am also not much interested phrases 
such as “Kafkaesque suggestion”118 or “Kafka-like quality,”119 in which the 
word Kafkaesque modifies a completely generic noun. 
However, opinions that offer synonyms for Kafkaesque are somewhat 
more informative.  Examples of definition by synonym include: “bizarre 
  
sole raison d’etre for the compensation” and explaining that “fee disputes, unlike Jack’s beanstalk or 
Pinocchio’s nose, cannot be permitted to grow and grow”). 
 113. Heinmiller v. Dept. of Health, 903 P.2d 433, 442 (Wash. 1995) (Pekelis, J., concurring) (“[T]o 
discipline a person not because she knew, but because she should have known that her conduct would 
be deemed by others to constitute an act of ‘moral turpitude’ makes the Department’s action almost 
Kafkaesque.”) (emphasis added). 
 114. Truglio v. Julio, 322 S.E.2d 698, 699 (W. Va. 1984) (referring to the circumstances under which 
plaintiffs were denied a hearing on their property damage claim). 
 115. Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1085 (D. Minn. 2004) (referring to the govern-
ment’s procedures for endorsement of employment authorizations for persons granted asylum in the 
United States). 
 116. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 99 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Indeed, it borders on the Kafkaesque 
to suggest that the EEOC, acting some three years before Congress passed the FMLA, had invoked the 
authority delegated to the Secretary of Labor and written interpretations to govern an as-yet-unenacted 
statute.”); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 557 (“To then nullify that effort [to 
obtain a construction permit] seven years later because one report refers to other problems, which 
problems admittedly have been discussed at length in other reports available to the public, borders on 
the Kafkaesque.”) (quoted in County of Bergen v. Dole, 620 F. Supp. 1009, 1066 (D.N.J. 1985)); Santa 
Ana Food Mkt., Inc. v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Bd., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 523, 525, 527 (Cal. App. 
4th Dist.1999) (“Under the general rules, urged by the ABC below, the single criminal act of food 
stamp sales [by Huerta, an employee of the Market] was sufficient to justify the suspension [of the 
Market’s liquor license] because Huerta’s knowledge of her own criminal act was imputed to the Mar-
ket.  This reasoning and result border on the kafkaesque.  Using the same reasoning, the Market’s 
license would be suspended if Huerta had robbed it or embezzled from it . . . [and] the Market would 
suffer a de facto punishment for being a victim.”); Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 615 n. 11 (N.D. 
Cal. 1982) (“Conjoining the Secretary’s present interpretation that mandatory payroll deductions are 
‘income’ even when withheld, with the Vaessen ruling that the same funds are again ‘income’ if re-
funded, would result in an injustice bordering on the Kafkaesque.”) (citing Vaessen v. Woods, 182 Cal. 
Rptr. 725 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1982)); Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp. 1025, 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1975) 
(“The prosecutorial suppression of nearly all evidence concerning Deborah Kidd [a co-defendant who 
was given immunity for testifying against her fellow defendants in a murder trial] resulted in a criminal 
proceeding that bordered on the Kafkaesque, and it is this aspect of the case that the Court finds most 
disturbing.”); Kersh v. Borden Chem., 121 F.R.D. 55, 58-59 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (characterizing a civil 
plaintiff’s accusations against the court as “border[ing] on the ‘Kafkaesque,’ ” where the plaintiff 
accused the court of, among other things “depriving him of sleep by scheduling the hearing on May 
31st at 8:30 a.m.”). 
 117. AMBAC Indem. Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., 546 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 
1989) (“It would be anomalous, perhaps even Kafkaesque, to require that, in order for a client to obtain 
disqualification of an attorney where disclosure of confidential and privileged information is threat-
ened, the client must disclose that very information.”). 
 118. Hughes, 223 F. Supp. at 481. 
 119. Desist, 384 F.2d at 902. 
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and Kafkaesque,”120 “disingenuous – indeed Kafkaesque,”121 “ironic, even 
Kafkaesque,”122 “[t]his distortion of reality is Kafkaesque,”123 “so classi-
cally arbitrary and capricious as to be Kafkaesque,”124 and “[t]his 
Kafkaesque design is counterintuitive.”125 
  
 120. State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 16-17 (Minn. 1982) (discussing many adverse consequences that 
would befall victim of domestic assault if her assailant were sent to prison); see also Clontz v. Ohio 
Adult Parole Auth., 2000 WL 1033102 at *2 (Ohio App. 1st Dist. July 28, 2000) (“Any other interpre-
tation [of the phrase ‘maximum cumulative prison term’], especially that urged by [the Ohio Adult 
Parole Authority] would produce a bizarre and Kafkaesque result.”). 
 121. Petties v. Dist. of Columbia, 238 F. Supp. 2d 88, 98 (D.D.C. 2002) (characterizing defendant 
school district’s argument, in context of IDEA claim, that “the burden is on the parents first to identify 
a fundamental change in a student’s educational program in order to raise the claim that there has been 
a change in placement even though DCPS [the school district] has not provided notice to the parents of 
the nature of the proposed change”). 
 122. U.S. v. W. Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 1231, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“To claim that AT&T has no inter-
est under the [consent] decree in challenging one or more of the [Bell Operating] Company’s ‘return’ to 
the interexchange market, there to compete against AT&T with the same sort of local monopoly lever-
age that caused the government to bring suit against AT&T in the first place, has an ironic, even 
Kafkaesque, quality.”). 
  The relationship between irony and Kafka was also identified in Judge Ambro’s dissent in 
Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 2004), a habeas corpus case.  Judge Ambro began his dissent 
from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s denial of a habeas petition as follows: 
 
It is an underlying assumption of our legal system that attorneys actively pursue the best in-
terests of their clients.  All too often, attorneys make mistakes.  The sad reality is that there 
are not enough willing defense attorneys to represent competently the interests of the many 
criminal defendants who cycle through the courts.  And thus, necessarily, we afford substan-
tial leeway to attorneys when it comes to “mere ‘attorney error.’ ”  Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 
528 U.S. 470, 482 (2000). 
 
But the distinction between mistake and malfeasance is profound.  There can be little 
semblance of justice when an attorney assigned to protect a defendant ignores a blatant con-
flict of interest, and another counsel does nothing while promising more than once to protect 
the defendant’s rights.  If the facts are as Paul Schlueter has portrayed them, his trial counsel 
(George Blasco) disregarded his civil law partnership with the prosecutor (James Narlesky), 
and his appellate counsel (Philip Lauer) affirmatively misrepresented that he would timely 
file a petition for relief in order to forestall the inevitable accounting for his long-promised 
and paid-for legal services.  Irony becomes Kafkaesque when the latter act of malfeasance 
shelters from review the former act of malfeasance. 
 
Id. at 79 (footnote omitted). 
 123. In re David D., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 868 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1994) (discussing, inter alia, social 
worker’s statement to biological mother that mother “confused” her child by explaining to him that his 
current caretaker was a foster mother and that she was the child’s real mother) (quoted in In re Eliza-
beth R., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200, 212-13 (Cal App. 3d Dist. 1995)). 
 124. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Boise, 667 N.E.2d 753, 754, 756 (Ind. App. 1996) (quoting trial 
court’s conclusion of law regarding State Employees’ Appeals Commission’s refusal to apply estab-
lished standards to state employees’ request for position upgrade). 
 125. Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2003) (discussing the incongruity of applying the 
clear and convincing evidence standard to requests for discretionary stays of deportation, which “would 
result in a peculiar situation in which adjudicating a stay request would necessitate full deliberation on 
the merits of the underlying case and, in the bargain, require the alien to carry a burden of proof higher 
than she would have to carry on the merits”) (emphasis in the original). 
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Even more informative are those opinions in which a judge has added 
value to the Kafka adjective by affixing it to an equally evocative noun, 
describing something as a “Kafka-like dream”126 or characterizing a liti-
gant as “a Kafkaesque victim of Star Chamber secret proceedings.”127  
References such as those, which are the subject of this section, show not 
just that a judge knows the dictionary definition of Kafkaesque, but also 
demonstrate genuine judicial appreciation for Kafka’s work and a com-
mitment to memorable writing. 
1. Kafkaesque Proceedings 
To begin with the obvious, judges have often invoked Kafka to register 
disapproval of actions taken by some other tribunal or, in the case of appel-
late judges, disagreement with their own colleagues on the other side of a 
split decision. 
a. Accusing Other Tribunals 
Justice Levinson of the Hawaii Supreme Court once characterized the 
process by which a hospital revoked a physician’s privileges as “a 
kafkaesque ‘kangaroo court,’ called at the eleventh hour in an effort to 
comply with the hospital’s own by-laws and to rationalize a result which 
its board of trustees had already reached.”128 
In O’Brien v. Henderson, a pro se prisoner’s action for writs of man-
damus and habeas corpus, Judge Edenfield of the Northern District of 
Georgia noted “the volume of petitioner’s pleadings and the difficulty of 
determining with exactitude the scope of his claims”129 and then observed 
that “not even the most skilled of counsel, finding himself in the 
Kafkaesque situation of being deprived of his liberty by a tribunal [the 
Georgia Board of Parole] which will adduce no reasons for its decision, 
can complain concisely and clearly of his objections to such a decision.”130   
  
 126. People v. Colletti, 242 N.E.2d 63, 66 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1968). 
 127. Dockery, 447 F.2d at 1191. 
 128. Silver v. Castle Meml. Hosp., 497 P.2d 564, 575 (Haw. 1972) (Levinson, J., concurring).  A 
Westlaw search on the phrase “kangaroo court” in Westlaw’s ALLCASES directory yields approxi-
mately 350 hits.  Wow.  Some hospitals, it turns out, are not run by kangaroos.  In Bender v. Suburban 
Hospital, Inc., 758 A.2d 1090 (Md. Spec. App. 2000), the plaintiff, a physician whose clinical privi-
leges had been revoked, asserted that the hospital subjected her to “a ‘Kafkaesque process . . . designed 
to be . . . unreasonable . . . and to pervert, rather than obtain, the facts.’ ”  Id. at 1107.  The Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals disagreed, concluding, in the words of Judge Thieme, that “[w]hen examined 
in its totality, the entire multi-step fact-finding process meets or even exceeds the [Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act] standard of objective reasonableness.”  Id. at 1108. 
 129. 368 F. Supp. 7, 10 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
 130. Id. 
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In United States v. Wright, Judge Alley of the Army Court of Military 
Review wrote that “[t]hese consequences [confinement, a pending punitive 
discharge, and nearly $1,000 in forfeitures] are so disproportionate to the 
misconduct [getting drunk and causing trouble] and the management of the 
case so dilatory as to be Kafkaesque.”131 
In re Cox was a bankruptcy proceeding in which “[t]he parties con-
test[ed] the dischargeability of indebtedness resulting from transactions 
with a credit card, that boon and bane of mankind.”132  In the view of the 
credit card company, the debt was nondischargeable because it was “ob-
tained ... by ... false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud....”133  
The court ruled against the credit card company, based upon its failure to 
demonstrate reasonable reliance upon a representation by the debtor (be-
yond that contained in the initial credit card agreement) that he intended to 
pay his credit card bill – which is an essential element of fraud.134  Judge 
Queenan went on to criticize courts that have gone the other way: 
Courts purporting to require reliance ignore all these considera-
tions [including logical and mechanical impediments to finding 
reasonable reliance by the credit card company upon an implied 
representation of intent to pay].  The decisions are Kafkaesque.  
Many courts state reliance is necessary and then ignore the re-
quirement altogether in concluding fraud has been committed.  
Other courts find reliance in a fashion which pays mere lip service 
to it.  One court, for example, has said reliance by the issuer “is in-
herent in the system because a cardholder in using the credit card 
forces the issuer to honor its guarantee to the merchant.”  Confus-
ing reliance with the due care, other courts find reliance present 
because the issuer acted with ordinary diligence.  Still others ac-
knowledge that a credit card transaction is sui generis and find re-
liance from the fact charges were made under the card.  These de-
cisions attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole.  A credit card 
transaction involves no reliance upon an implied representation of 
intent to pay.135 
In Franklin v. District of Columbia, another case concerning the lan-
guage in which proceedings are conducted, Judge Green of the District of 
D.C. concluded: 
  
 131. 47 C.M.R. 309, 312 (Army Ct. Mil. Rev. 1973). 
 132. 182 B.R. 626, 627 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985). 
 133. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)). 
 134. Id. at 636. 
 135. Id. at 637 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
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Contrary to the defendant’s written “policy,” the evidence at trial 
clearly established that the actual practice within [District of Co-
lumbia Department of Corrections] correctional institutions often 
subjects [limited English proficiency] Hispanic inmates to 
Kafkaesque hearings – hearings where adjudications are made and 
their futures are affected by officials speaking a language that they 
seldom understand regarding allegations that are too infrequently 
explained to them in words they understand.136 
In a juvenile dependency action in which the petitioner sought custody 
of his own daughter, while simultaneously facing criminal charges in the 
death of his girlfriend’s daughter, Justice Rylaarsdam of the California 
Court of Appeals observed, in the context of a discovery dispute, that “as 
an involuntary participant in the pending juvenile dependency proceeding 
and as a criminal suspect [who had been denied discovery materials in the 
juvenile dependency action because they were subject to official informa-
tion privilege in his criminal case], petitioner [was] thrust headlong into a 
‘Kafkaesque’ judicial proceeding.”137 
In Nielson v. Nobart Color, Inc., an action was brought under the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), Judge Shadur of the 
Northern District of Illinois spoke disparagingly of the process given an 
employee who sought to challenge a denial of benefits: 
There is simply no excuse for the Kafkaesque nature of Nielsen’s 
“trial”: his appearance before Trustees at 10:00 a.m. in total igno-
rance of the appearance, in the same office, just a half-hour earlier, 
of two Nobart employees who had presented evidence to its Board 
of Directors as to Nielsen’s alleged competitive activity.  Exclud-
ing Nielsen from that earlier meeting, with his resultant unaware-
ness of the nature of the evidence against him, certainly “inhibited” 
the speedy and fair processing of his claim.138 
In Rodriguez-Roman v. INS the Ninth Circuit reversed the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ decision to deny the asylum petition of a Cuban 
national who faced prolonged incarceration and perhaps even death for his 
unauthorized departure from Cuba.139  In his opinion for the court, Judge 
Reinhardt criticized the Immigration Judge for writing a “Kafka-esque 
  
 136. 960 F. Supp. 394, 420 (D.D.C. 1997). 
 137. Michael P. v. Super. Ct., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11, 18 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2001) (citations omitted). 
 138. 1986 WL 15087 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1986) (footnote omitted). 
 139. 98 F.3d 416, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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decision”140 containing “stunning bureaucratic logic”141 and “analysis . . . 
too appalling to require any response.”142 
Curiously, in an order on several post-trial motions, Judge Pauley of 
the Southern District of New York referred to a trial he himself conducted 
as “often Kafka-esque,”143 but did not indicate how, precisely, the trial 
merited that label.  And finally, even if an entire judicial proceeding is not 
Kafkaesque, it might involve a Kafkaesque motion.144 
Sometimes, however, the mere fact that a proceeding is Kafkaesque is 
not enough to render it unlawful.  In Shango v. Jurich, “Illinois prison offi-
cials appeal[ed] from two preliminary injunctions entered by the district 
court [in favor of] Plaintiff [Shango], an Illinois state prisoner, [who] 
claimed that prison officials had unlawfully transferred him [from one 
prison to another].”145  In granting the injunctions, Judge Shadur of the 
Northern District of Illinois “[d]escrib[ed] both the reasons for the transfer 
and the [pre-transfer] hearing as ‘Kafkaesque,’ ”146 in part because “the 
proceedings [were] ‘totally lacking in notice and a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard.’ ”147  Writing for a unanimous panel of the Seventh Circuit, 
Judge Eshbach agreed with Judge Shadur that “[t]he transfer proceeding 
was indeed Kafkaesque [because] Shango could say nothing to refute the 
charge, for there was no charge against him.  Prison authorities were at-
tempting to rely upon their power to transfer him for no reason at all.”148  
  
 140. Id. at 420.  Specifically, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that even though Rodriguez, if 
he returned to Cuba, would  be tried for violating laws that “were, at least in part, politically moti-
vated,” id., in a prosecution that “would be tantamount to persecution for political opinion,” id. (quot-
ing the IJ’s decision), he “would not be punished for his beliefs, but for committing crimes against the 
socialist state of Cuba,” id. (quoting the IJ’s decision). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 421 n.6. 
 143. Chere Amie, Inc. v. Windstar Apparel Corp., 2003 WL 22056935 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 
2003).  Similarly, Judge Richey began his opinion in Johnson v. Secretary of Health & Human Services 
by noting: “This Court has described the procedural history of this case as ‘Kafka-esque.’  Missed 
filing deadlines have been variously attributed to negligence, Christmas vacation schedules, and bu-
reaucratic red tape.  Inadvertent misplacement of documents has been attributed by counsel for defen-
dant to ‘mysterious gremlins.’ ”  1984 WL 62854 at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 1984).  In an earlier order in 
the same case, Judge Richey stated that “[t]he history of this litigation has a Kafka-like quality to it.”  
Johnson v. Sec., Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 587 F. Supp. 1117, 1118 (D.D.C. 1984). 
 144. Anvan Realty & Mgt. Co. v. Marks, 680 F. Supp. 1245, 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (terming 
“Kafkaesque” a motion that contained a “‘laundry list’ of grounds for moving to dismiss” that “rais[ed] 
in a conclusory fashion every conceivable ground on which a RICO complaint might be defective” but 
which “failed to provide plaintiffs with any basis for determining which aspects of the complaint de-
fendants really wished to challenge”). 
 145. 681 F.2d 1091, 1092 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 146. Id. at 1096. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1103.  Judge Eshbach went on to note: “The nature of the hearing with which Shango was 
provided is a vivid illustration of the reason why the due process clause does not require a hearing 
where there is no limitation on official discretion.”  Id. 
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Shango’s Kafkaesque transfer proceeding was not unlawful, however, be-
cause, with respect to his transfer, “Shango had no liberty interest originat-
ing in the Constitution which would trigger the procedural protections of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”149  In a subsequent proceeding in the same 
case, Judge Shadur found “Kafkaesque overtones” in the prison’s decision, 
in a disciplinary proceeding, to withhold from Shango the identity of an-
other inmate he was alleged to have hired to force a third inmate to have 
sex with him.150 
b. Dissenting 
While judges have often criticized other tribunals by calling them 
Kafkaesque, the K-bomb is sometimes dropped a bit closer to home – in a 
dissenting opinion. 
Perhaps the most pointed accusation of Kafkaesque reasoning leveled 
by a dissenter is that which appears in Van Sickle v. State.151  In that case, 
the issue was the trial judge’s decision to admit, for impeachment pur-
poses, “an F.B.I. ‘rap sheet’ which stated that appellant had been convicted 
of grand larceny in Guymon, Oklahoma in January, 1975.”152  The problem 
was that while the appellant did, indeed, plead guilty to grand larceny in 
January, 1975,153 “the judgment was deferred pending the outcome of pro-
bation, . . . appellant had completed his probation, and . . . in August, 1976, 
the case was discharged without judgment of guilt and with the plea being 
expunged from the record.”154 
As to the admission of that material before the jury [i.e., the F.B.I. rap 
sheet which listed a ‘conviction’ which had subsequently been expunged], 
the majority conclude[d] that error was not preserved for appellate review, 
  
 149. Id. at 1098.  However, in Tellez v. Peters, 1997 WL 51441 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 1997), a prisoner 
(who, coincidentally, was incarcerated in one of the two prisons in which Shango had been held) suc-
cessfully challenged, on due process grounds, the conduct of a disciplinary hearing that resulted in his 
being sentenced to one year in segregation.  Id. at *9.  Because he was sentenced to one year in segre-
gation, Tellez had a constitutional right to “[a] written statement of reasons for the disciplinary action 
taken.”  Id.  What he got was a decision that stated, in full: “REASONS: Based on staff observation.  
IA [internal affairs] report ‘The identity of confidential sources is being withheld for security reason.’  
The committee finds information from the confidential source(s) to be reliable.’  Seriousness of the 
charges.  History of like behavior.”  Id. (quoting Pl.’s Ex. 23).  In Magistrate Judge Pallmeyer’s view, 
the foregoing decision was a “Kafkaesque summary [which did] not even tell Tellez what the [Adjust-
ment] Committee found he had done.”  Id.  
 150. Shango v. Jurich, 608 F. Supp. 931, 939 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 
 151. 604 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). 
 152. Id. at 97. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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and fault[ed] appellant for not presenting the necessary documentary proof 
to obtain exclusion of the evidence.155 
Judge Clinton continued his dissent: 
The district attorney may become a loose cannon unless the 
accused has first secured him.  Without himself presenting any evi-
dence of a conviction and against protestations that there is none – 
it having been ordered expunged – the prosecutor is permitted to 
pretend that there has been because the accused fails to produce 
documentary proof to the contrary.  “Where are your papers?” –            
heretofore alien to this country – is made a proper question in a 
court of law. 
Kafkaesque, the majority now requires a citizen to be prepared 
to demonstrate that he is not a convict by immediately producing 
papers of an event that has been ordered obliterated from the pages 
of the history of his personal life.  Patently, one who has been 
given to understand that he is not a convict should not be expected 
to anticipate a claim that he is and to be ready to prove that he is 
not.156 
Interestingly, in light of Judge Clinton’s dissent in Van Sickle, the Sixth 
Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that it was not “illogical and 
Kafkaesque”157 for the district court to count as a predicate felony, for a 
charge of felon in possession, a sentence from a Michigan state court con-
sisting of probation without a judgment of guilt, an adjudication available 
to first-time drug offenders.158  Among other things, the court of appeals 
relied upon a Michigan Supreme Court case holding, for purposes of the 
state’s fourth-time habitual-offender statute, “[t]he conviction is the finding 
of guilt.”159 
In In re Loss, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that Edward Loss was 
not qualified for admission to the Illinois bar, notwithstanding the opinion 
of the State Board of Law Examiners that Loss had demonstrated sufficient 
rehabilitation from a pre-law-school life that included problems with drugs 
and alcohol and a variety of criminal offenses.160  Justice Simon dissented: 
Edward Anthony Loss will not be permitted to practice law in 
this State, not because he has failed to follow the rules, but because 
  
 155. Id. at 100 (Clinton, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. 
 157. U.S. v. Hawkins, 969 F.2d 169, 173 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Defendant/Appellant’s Br.). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. (quoting People v. Preuss, 461 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Mich. 1990)). 
 160. 518 N.E.2d 981, 985 (Ill. 1987). 
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we have.  The court’s departure from any concept of fairness or 
regularity has been complete, and I would say, almost Kafkaesque.  
Mr. Loss was forced to appear at an inquiry of a type which has 
never been convened before or since to defend himself against un-
known charges.  Unfettered by a previously announced standard of 
review or any rules as to admissibility of evidence, the court has 
now determined, not surprisingly, that its initial concerns as to 
Loss’ fitness were justified.  The court has misused its authority, 
and I dissent.161 
In a dissenting opinion in an attorney disciplinary proceeding, Justice 
Sullivan of the Indiana Supreme Court objected to a thirty-day suspension 
from practice imposed by the court: 
The court suspends Mr. Atanga from the practice of law for 
several ill-advised decisions that he made during the course of a 
kafkaesque series of events.  Approximately one year after being 
admitted to the bar, Mr. Atanga traveled to Lafayette to represent 
without charge an indigent, troubled young woman for whom no 
local representation was apparently available.  After Mr. Atanga 
agreed to represent the woman in another matter (also without 
charge), the judge granted his request to schedule the next hearing 
so that it did not conflict with a previously scheduled court appear-
ance in Indianapolis.  The day before the Indianapolis hearing, the 
judge called Mr. Atanga and, countermanding his earlier entry, or-
dered Mr. Atanga to be in Lafayette the next day.  When Mr. 
Atanga did not appear the next day or at the subsequently sched-
uled contempt hearing, he was arrested in Indianapolis, placed in 
the Marion County jail overnight, transported to Lafayette the next 
day, fingerprinted, photographed, had his belongings confiscated, 
dressed in prison garb and, while so dressed, hauled into court not 
only to defend himself against contempt charges but also to repre-
sent his client, who had also been brought to court.  At this hear-
ing, a full complement from the local press corps was present.162 
  
 161. Id. at 1000 (Simon, J., dissenting). 
 162. In re Atanga, 636 N.E.2d 1253, 1258-59 (Ind. 1994) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).  Sometimes, 
however, a disbarred attorney cannot even rally a dissenter to his side.  In The Florida Bar v. Mogil, 
763 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2000), an attorney who had been removed from judicial office and disbarred in 
New York was disbarred in Florida for the same conduct.  Id. at 306.  In the Florida proceeding, he 
characterized his New York “disbarment under the facts at issue as ‘Kafkaesque,’ ‘exceedingly draco-
nian,’ and ‘an heinous and serious over-punishment.’ ”  Id. at 307.  After noting that Mogil “did not 
directly urge that the New York proceedings themselves were deficient or invalid for want of due 
process, infirmity of proof, or some other grave reason,” id. (emphasis in the original), but only com-
plained “that the presiding judge in his New York judicial removal case was ‘an 85-year-old, long 
 
File: Potter-Macroed Created on: 4/26/2005 12:02:00 PM Last Printed: 5/18/2005 10:50:00 AM 
2005 ORDEAL BY TRIAL 221 
Jara v. Municipal Court is another case about court-appointed inter-
preters, but in a civil rather than a criminal proceeding.163  While the ma-
jority of an en banc panel of the California Supreme Court affirmed the 
denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the municipal court 
to provide an interpreter, at the court’s expense, to an indigent civil defen-
dant in a property damage action resulting from an automobile accident, 
Justice Tobriner dissented, stating:  
The majority argues that the absence of an interpreter for the 
non-English-speaking defendant has not been shown to constitute 
a “substantial burden.”  I cannot agree with the majority’s assess-
ment of the confusion, the despair, and the cynicism suffered by 
those who in intellectual isolation must stand by as their posses-
sions and dignity are stripped from them by a Kafka-esque ritual 
deemed by the majority to constitute, nonetheless, a fair trial.164 
State v. Jones involved double jeopardy.165  Criticizing the majority, 
which held that a criminal defendant, whose first trial ended in a mistrial, 
had no “right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment 
on double jeopardy grounds prior to being put to trial a second time,”166 
Justice Webb of the North Carolina Court of Appeals wrote: “[T]he major-
ity holds that being subjected to a rehearing or retrial does not ‘affect a 
substantial right,’ when the very right ‘affected’ is the right not to be sub-
jected to a rehearing or retrial, a right guaranteed by our constitutions.  
They rely only on civil cases for this Kafkaesque proposition.”167  (Double 
jeopardy was also at issue in Commonwealth v. Keenan, in which Judge 
Cavanaugh explained that “where there is evidence of the Common-
wealth’s intentionally trying a defendant in a court which it knows or 
should know does not have jurisdiction, a subsequent prosecution is im-
permissible on the basis of the constitutional guarantees against being 
placed twice in jeopardy.”168  He went on to call such a litigation strategy 
“vexatious pursuit of a pattern of harassment”169 and a “Kafkaesque sce-
nario.”170). 
  
retired Judge, who had great difficulty in hearing testimony . . . and who was selected and highly paid 
unilaterally by the politically appointed Commission on Judicial Conduct,” id. (emphasis in the origi-
nal), a unanimous panel of the Florida Supreme Court disbarred Mogil. 
 163. 578 P.2d 94, 94-95 (Cal. 1978). 
 164. Id. at 98 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). 
 165. 313 S.E.2d 264 (N.C. App. 1984). 
 166. Id. at 266 (Webb, J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. at 268. 
 168. 530 A.2d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 1987). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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In State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed 
the Ohio Court of Appeals by ruling that “habeas corpus will . . . lie to 
challenge a decision of the [Ohio Adult Parole Authority] in extraordinary 
cases involving parole revocation,”171 but held that the case before it was 
“not one of those extraordinary cases.”172  Justice Pfeifer dissented: 
I dissent from the majority’s holding that this is not an extraordi-
nary case which demands habeas corpus relief.  On September 14, 
1994, we granted Jackson a writ of habeas corpus discharging him 
from prison on the basis that he had been wrongly convicted of 
robbery.  State ex rel. Jackson v. Dallman (1994), 70 Ohio St. 3d 
261, 638 N.E.2d 563.  However, Jackson remains in prison be-
cause the conviction which we determined was wrongful was used 
earlier in a Parole Board hearing to revoke Jackson’s parole. 
Thus, the man who we determined up to the time of our deci-
sion had wrongfully served thirty months of prison time on an im-
proper conviction continues to serve prison time based upon that 
same improper conviction.  I consider this Kafkaesque result ex-
traordinary, and one worthy of correction through habeas corpus 
relief.173 
In State v. Sprattling, the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed a conviction 
for third-degree assault over the defendant’s argument that “the oral charge 
[at trial] failed to allege ‘bodily injury,’ an essential element of the of-
fense.”174  Justice Levinson dissented, observing: 
[T]he jurisdictional defect inherent in an accusation omitting an es-
sential element of an offense is, in and of itself, substantially 
prejudicial as a per se matter.  The accusation is substantially 
prejudicial, not because it fails to notify the defendant of the 
charges against him or her, but because it fails to allege an offense 
within the statutorily conferred subject matter jurisdiction of the 
court and, therefore, nullifies any subsequent proceedings against 
the defendant.  What the majority misapprehends is that the 
Motta/Wells post-conviction liberal construction rule is not simply 
animated by a concern that our criminal justice system must avoid 
convicting an accused pursuant to a Kafkaesque proceeding, in 
which the accused is never adequately informed of the conduct for 
which he or she is being criminally prosecuted, but also by a con-
  
 171. 652 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Ohio 1995). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 749-50 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
 174. 55 P.3d 276, 278 (Haw. 2002). 
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cern that we must avoid convicting an accused pursuant to a 
Manichaean proceeding, in which the jurisdiction of the court is 
never established.  To permit a conviction to stand simply because 
“might makes right” in this particular case would demean the in-
tegrity of our courts and embed a maxim that has no place in the 
criminal law of Hawai’i.175 
In State v. Mowery, Justice Celebrezze of the Ohio Supreme Court ex-
plained, in dissent, that “where a reviewing court upholds some rules of 
evidence but not others, that encourages disregard for all the rules of evi-
dence and foreshadows their future devitalization.”176  Such actions, Justice 
Celebrezze opined, amount to “Kafkaesque judicial alchemy,”177 the inclu-
sion of which rendered the majority’s opinion “demonstrably incorrect, 
plainly disingenuous, intellectually dishonest and institutionally flawed,”178 
not to mention “an exercise of raw judicial power.”179 
In People v. Hobbs, the California Supreme Court ruled that “a major 
portion or all of a search warrant affidavit may validly be sealed in order to 
protect the identity of a confidential informant.”180  Justice Mosk dissented, 
and began his dissent by stating: 
A search warrant containing no information other than the ad-
dress of a home to be searched.  Not a word as to what the gov-
ernment seeks to discover and seize. 
A government informer, his – or, indeed, her – identity kept 
secret from the suspect, the suspect’s counsel, and the public. 
Both the suspect and counsel barred from a closed proceeding 
before a magistrate.  No record of the proceeding given to the sus-
pect or counsel. 
Based entirely on the foregoing, a court order approving an un-
restricted search of the suspect’s home. 
  
 175. Id. at 296 (Levinson, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Motta, 657 P.2d 1019 (Haw. 1983); State v. 
Wells, 894 P.2d 70 (Haw. 1995)). 
 176. 438 N.E.2d 897, 905 (Ohio 1982).  At issue in Mowery was the Ohio rule of evidence rendering 
a person incompetent to testify against his or her spouse when the spouse has been charged with a 
crime.  Id. at 904 (citation omitted). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. 873 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Cal. 1984). 
File: Potter-Macroed Created on:  4/26/2005 12:02:00 PM Last Printed: 5/18/2005 10:50:00 AM 
224 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 3, No. 2 
Did this scenario occur in a communist dictatorship?  Under a 
military junta?  Or perhaps in a Kafka novel?  No, this is grim real-
ity in California in the final decade of the 20th century.181 
In Griffith v. State, Ryan Griffith, a juvenile, was charged with six 
crimes.182  In response to a petition by the State, the juvenile court waived 
jurisdiction, and Griffith was tried and convicted of all six counts in the 
Superior Court.183  Griffith appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals 
ruled that the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear three of the six 
charges, ordered the trial court to vacate the convictions on those three 
charges, and “remanded [the case] to the juvenile court to conduct further 
proceedings not inconsistent with [its] opinion.”184  In his dissent, Judge 
Baker observed: 
Here, Griffith held two victims at gunpoint, took possession of a 
vehicle through threat of force, and murdered David Whitlock.  In-
herent in the trial court’s waiver of jurisdiction was a finding that it 
is in Griffith’s best interest – and that of the community – to be 
removed from the juvenile justice system.  In a Kafkaesque step, 
the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court and keep Griffith’s 
theft, carrying a handgun without a license, and criminal confine-
ment charges in juvenile court actually results in committing Grif-
fith to a system where the trial court found that his best interests 
will not be met.185 
In Kimberlin v. Quinlan, a divided en banc panel of the D.C. Circuit 
denied appellee Kimberlin’s suggestion for a rehearing of a case involving 
application of the direct evidence rule “to reconcile the extension of Bivens 
liability to constitutional torts based on motive . . . with the Supreme 
Court’s determination . . . that qualified immunity should afford officials 
substantial protection not merely from ruinous financial liability, but also 
from the burdens of litigation, including the burdens of discovery.”186 
Dissenting, Judge Edwards found it “incomprehensible that this court 
has refused to rehear a case which is so clearly of great importance, and 
which rests upon a rule that is concededly ‘completely arbitrary and unre-
lated to the strength of the plaintiff’s case.’ ”187  Judge Edwards continued: 
  
 181. Id. at 1263. 
 182. 791 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Ind. App. 2003). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 242-43. 
 186. 17 F.3d 1525, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)). 
 187. Id. at 1527. 
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Even assuming the validity of heightened pleading requirements 
generally, Kimberlin creates a regime under which a civil rights 
plaintiff must prove more to survive a motion to dismiss than he or 
she must prove in order to win at trial.  This rule is nothing short of 
Kafkaesque, and ours is the only circuit that has failed to recognize 
this fact.188 
c. Setting Out General Principles 
Not only do judges invoke Kafka to criticize other tribunals and their 
own colleagues, they also use Kafka to make more general observations 
about how judicial proceedings should, and should not, be conducted. 
For example, Justice Reynoso of the California Supreme Court began 
his opinion in People v. Aguilar by noting: “The right of a criminal defen-
dant to an interpreter is based on the fundamental notion that no person 
should be subjected to a Kafkaesque trial which may result in the loss of 
freedom and liberty.”189  Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit has sug-
gested that at least in some circumstances, “a trial without counsel”190 is a 
“Kafkaesque contest.”191  Judge Young of the District of Massachusetts has 
written about how one particular application of Teague v. Lane192 “runs the 
risk of reducing certain habeas petitions to Kafkaesque proceedings in 
which the petitioner loses but never knows why.”193  Judge Ford of the 
Ohio Court of Appeals once observed that: 
Close examination of the trial court’s judgment in this case reveals 
that beneath the placid surface of the trial court’s judgment entry 
lies a judicial tangle of Kafkaesque proportions . . . [which] be-
hoove[d] this court to undertake a review of proper procedure . . . 
in order to provide a guide through the lower court proceedings.194 
In Levine v. Torvik, an appeal from the district court’s decision to grant 
a writ of habeas corpus, Judge Ryan of the Sixth Circuit quoted, approv-
ingly, Judge Rice’s conclusion that the position advocated by the state 
“would result in dragging [petitioner] ‘Levine into a Kafkaesque cycle of 
  
 188. Id. (citing Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
 189. 677 P.2d 1198, 1199 (Cal. 1984). 
 190. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 191. Id. 
 192. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 193. Nadworny v. Fair, 744 F. Supp. 1194, 1213 (D. Mass. 1990). 
 194. Wickliffe Firefighters Assn. v. City of Wickliffe, 586 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ohio App. 11th Dist. 
1990).  While Judge Ford has only referred to Franz Kafka once, he has penned more than his share of 
memorable opinions.  See Parker B. Potter, Jr., Surveying the Serbonian Bog: A Brief History of a 
Judicial Metaphor, 28 Tul. Mar. L.J. 519, 541-44 (2004). 
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proceedings from which there is no escape . . . .’ ”195  Confronted with a 
complaint alleging wrongful termination filed by an employee who had not 
yet been terminated, Justice Sills of the California Court of Appeals opined 
that “any rule of procedural law that allows one to be sued for conduct in 
which one has not engaged because one is ‘expected’ to do the wrong thing 
in the future is Kafkaesque.”196 
In Thompson v. Superior Court, the question before the California 
Court of Appeals was “whether the People are required to present evidence 
supporting ‘Three Strikes’ prior conviction allegations at preliminary hear-
ings.”197  Writing for a unanimous panel which held that such evidence is 
not required, notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
in Apprendi,198 Justice Aldrich explained that “requiring proof of strike 
priors at preliminary hearings would create procedural impracticalities,”199 
and, after detailing those impracticalities, concluded that “[t]his 
Kafkaesque scenario is not mandated by law.”200 
In United States v. 15 Bosworth Street, the government appealed the 
district court’s decision in favor of the claimants who were the owners of a 
building seized by the government because of its alleged use by drug deal-
ers and who asserted an “innocent owner” defense.201  In an opinion that 
vacated and remanded the district court decision, Judge Selya202 of the First 
Circuit conclude[d] . . . that the lower court took an empty record (a record 
which, as a matter of law, contains inadequate evidence to ground a finding 
  
 195. 986 F.2d 1506, 1519 (6th Cir. 1993).  In Levine, a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the state 
argued that the district court lacked the authority to grant a stay of state court action for the purpose of 
preventing further proceedings that would moot the state court decision about which the petitioner was 
complaining. 
 196. Lee v. Bank of Am., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388, 393 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1994).  Lee, in which an 
employee was suing her employer, is one of those rare opinions in which the term Kafkaesque was 
used to characterize the actions of David rather than Goliath. 
 197. 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 91 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2001). 
 198. Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)). 
 199. Id. at 98. 
 200. Id. at 99. 
 201. 236 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 202. In a previous article, I reported that among American judges, Judge Bruce Selya is the most 
prolific judicial user of the phrases “Serbonian bog” and “paint the lily.”  See Potter, supra n. 194, at 
546-50.  Judge Selya also leads the field with seven references to Franz Kafka.  Giving him a run for 
his money are: Justice David Borden of the Connecticut Court of Appeals (with six Kafka references), 
Justice David Sills of the California Court of Appeals (six), Judge Harold Greene of the District of D.C. 
(five), Judge Milton Shadur of the Northern District of Illinois (five), Bankruptcy Judge Jack Schmet-
terer of the Northern District of Illinois (five), Judge Charles Moylan of the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals (five), Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York (four), Judge Malcolm 
Wilkey of the D.C. Circuit (three), Judge James Oakes of the Second Circuit (three), Judge Richard 
Posner of the Seventh Circuit (three), Judge Stephen Reihnardt of the Ninth Circuit (three), Judge Joyce 
Hens Green of the District of D.C. (three), Justice Daniel O’Hern of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
(three), and Justice Stanley Mosk of the California Supreme Court (three). 
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concerning the innocence of the owners), gave lip service to the accepted 
allocation of the burden of proof, and effectively inverted that burden.203 
Judge Selya continued: 
The claimants attempt to fend off this conclusion in two principal 
ways.  First, noting that the district court called its holding a fac-
tual determination, they proceed to clasp the standard of review as 
if it were a life preserver.  But this argument sinks under its own 
weight.  When nomenclature diverges from substance, substance 
controls.  See Johnson [v. Watts Regulator Co.], 63 F.3d [1129,] 
1138 [(1st Cir. 1995)].  It would bring a Kafkaesque quality to the 
adjudication of cases if trial courts could inoculate themselves 
against meaningful appellate review by the simple expedient of 
creative labeling.  We reject that notion.204 
Judge Selya turned to Kafka yet again when the First Circuit rejected a 
criminal defendant’s argument that, at sentencing, “to undermine a defen-
dant’s safety valve proffer, the government may not rely on an assessment 
simpliciter of the plausibility of the proffer, but, rather, must affirmatively 
produce rebuttal evidence.”205  In Judge Selya’s words: 
By his own admission, the appellant was engaged in large-scale 
narcotics trafficking; he had delivered over 300 grams of heroin 
worth tens of thousands of dollars in a relatively compressed time 
frame.  Based on the activities in which he was engaged and the 
officers’ observations of him, the appellant’s portrayal of himself 
as someone who was paid very little and who knew next to nothing 
about the details of the transactions in which he participated beg-
gars credulity.  Equally as striking, the appellant’s denial that he 
was engaged in counter-surveillance during the March 30 meeting 
was belied by his actions and refuted by the observations of ex-
perienced narcotics agents. 
To say that the sentencing court must close its eyes to such re-
alities would border on the Kafkaesque.  Were we to yield to the 
appellant’s importunings and insist upon extrinsic evidence, dis-
trict courts would be bound to accept even the most arrant non-
sense from a defendant’s mouth so long as the government could 
not directly contradict it by independent proof.  A rule to that ef-
  
 203. 15 Bosworth St., 236 F.3d at 55. 
 204. Id. 
 205. U.S. v. Marquez, 280 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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fect would turn the burden of persuasion inside out.  We therefore 
decline to embrace it.206 
Finally, in a remarkable three-page opinion, seemingly directed as 
much toward the state legislature as toward the parties, Judge Sherman of 
the New York Supreme Court began by stating that “[t]his case illustrates 
one of the many procedural difficulties caused by the fragmented jurisdic-
tion of the Civil Court of the City of New York and the State Supreme 
Court in a multi-tier court system”207 and concluded by noting that “[a] 
Unified Court system would not only prevent these procedural anomalies, 
worthy of a Franz Kafka novel, but also ease the burdens of litigation and 
reduce calendar congestion.”208 
2. Kafkaesque Bureaucracies 
The most common target for judicial use of the Kafka adjective would 
appear to be bureaucracy.209 
In Cantrell v. Celotex Corp., Judge Painter took great pains to protect 
the Ohio Court of Appeals from “be[ing] accused of perpetuating a 
Kafkaesque bureaucracy, in which people are required to submit to hearing 
matters which no one contests.”210  In that case, a worker’s compensation 
claimant appealed an adverse decision of the Industrial Commission to the 
court of common pleas.211  The court of common pleas dismissed the ap-
peal because it was filed beyond the statutory time limit.212  The claimant 
  
 206. Id. at 24-25 (citing U.S. v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 1991) (explaining that a sentencing 
judge is “free to question, and ultimately to discount,” a defendant’s allocution); U.S. v. Royer, 895 
F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1990) (“The guidelines do not require a sentencing judge to play the ostrich, 
burying his head in the sand, struthiously accepting every allocution at face value, and ignoring the 
stark reality of events.”). 
 207. Mantilla v. Aras, 368 N.Y.S.2d 935, 936 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975) (footnote omitted). 
 208. Id. at 937. 
 209. While Hudson v. State, 333 So.2d 587 (Ala. Crim. App. 1975), does not involve bureaucracy per 
se, it contains a Kafka references that is just too good to leave out.  In that case, the defendant was 
charged with assault with intent to murder.  Id. at 588.  After he shot his victim, the victim sought 
assistance at the gate of a nearby Air Force base, but was turned away “and had to drive himself, with 
one lung filling with blood, to Jackson Hospital where he finally got medical attention.”  Id. at 589.  In 
reversing the trial court’s decision to admit evidence concerning the victim’s ordeal, Judge Cates of the 
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals noted: 
 
This testimony, with its Kafkaesque bureaucratic bumbling to frustrate binding wounds of a 
man who had been set upon by thieves, could only have prejudiced the jury against the ap-
pellant as the prime cause of [the victim’s] misery.  But it sheds no light on the issues 
framed by the plea of not guilty and the indictment. 
 
Id. at 591. 
 210. 663 N.E.2d 708, 711 (Ohio App. 1st Dist. 1995). 
 211. Id. at 709. 
 212. Id. at 711. 
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appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, which acknowledged the Industrial 
Commission’s concession that the claimant’s counsel never received for-
mal notice of its adverse decision, but still affirmed on grounds that when 
the claimant discovered that his attorney had not received notice, his rem-
edy was not a direct appeal to the court of common pleas, but, rather, a 
statutory administrative “savings procedure,” which he failed to pursue.213  
In the court’s view, the principle of protecting the integrity of jurisdictional 
prerequisites absolved it from charges of fostering a Kafkaesque bureauc-
racy. 
In an opinion arising out of a suit brought by the State of North Caro-
lina against the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, under 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, Judge Dupree of the District of North 
Carolina observed: 
We are left with an image of Gulliver being held down while the 
Lilliputians fasten thousands of strings around his limbs.  No liti-
gant should have to battle a Kafkaesque bureaucracy in which it is 
beckoned to the administrative hearing or negotiation table while 
being pressured into compliance through the threat of “deferrals” 
which are part and parcel of the original controversy.214 
In American Security Council Education Foundation v. FCC, Judge 
Wilkey of the D.C. Circuit criticized the defendants for charging the plain-
tiff with filing an untimely complaint with the FCC when plaintiff’s “de-
lay” resulted from nothing more than scrupulously following the FCC’s 
own rules for filing a complaint.215  He called the defendants’ argument 
“‘Kafkaesque’ bureaucracy in the ultimate.”216 
In Rodriguez v. City of New York, Judge Birns of the Appellate Divi-
sion of the New York Supreme Court described a patient’s on-going diffi-
culties in receiving hospital treatment–or even a telephone call–from the 
Bronx Memorial Hospital and concluded that he had faced “a Kafka-like 
bureaucracy.”217 
  
 213. Id. at 711-12. 
 214. N.C. v. Dept. of HEW, 480 F. Supp. 929, 939 (E.D.N.C. 1979).  In this case, “deferrals” would 
result in a program-by-program assessment of the University of North Carolina’s compliance with Title 
VI while it was at the same time undergoing a comprehensive evaluation of the same issues.  Id.  (“A 
serious issue also exists as to whether a fund recipient, as here, can be forced into a protracted, wide-
ranging Title VI enforcement proceeding, evaluating its entire body of federal grants and programs, and 
at the same time be compelled to administratively litigate hundreds of new grant and program proposals 
as to their compliance with Title VI.  The inquiries are, in reality, the same: has the University of North 
Carolina violated Title VI?  To litigate this issue in one large proceeding and in many lesser ones is 
illogical and wasteful.”). 
 215. 607 F.2d 438, 473-74 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
 216. Id. (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 557 (1978)). 
 217. 446 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1982) (Birns, J., dissenting). 
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In a case involving a sixty-five day delay between the filing of a peti-
tion for mitigation of forfeiture and the Department of Justice’s disposition 
of that petition,218 Judge Mansfield of the Second Circuit wrote: “The de-
fendants have offered no plausible explanation for their long delay in dis-
posing of the petition.  On the contrary, the record reveals bureaucracy at 
its worst, with government officials relying on a confusing, internally in-
consistent, Kafkaesque set of regulations as the ground for the otherwise 
inexplicable delay.”219 
Substantially longer was the delay faced by Sik On To in Hi-Hat Res-
taurant, Inc. v. INS: 
If To’s petition had been granted in 1975 when it was made, rather 
than taking a stormy and convoluted course through the INS, BIA, 
and the Ninth Circuit, To would have been a legal resident for the 
past eight years, could have received visits from his family (from 
which he has been separated for ten years) and probably would 
have become a United States citizen by now.  Although this court 
is not unacquainted with other cases in which litigants were preju-
diced by administrative and appellate delay, the present case illus-
trates a Kafkaesque extension of the principle.220 
In a case about federal student financial-aid payments, Judge Bruggink 
of the Court of Federal Claims commented on “the Kafka-esque nature of 
the bureaucratic bungling reflected in the record.”221  In a dissenting opin-
ion in Mosby v. Devine, Justice Flanders of the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court characterized the majority’s construction of two gun licensing stat-
utes as creating “an administrative scheme [that] allows government regu-
lation to sink to its most Kafkaesque and insidious depths of arbitrari-
ness.”222  The statutes at issue involved state-level permitting and local 
permitting, and the problem with the majority’s decision, according to Jus-
tice Flanders, is that it gives effective control over local permitting to the 
state–through a nice bit of definitional sleight-of-hand–rather than allowing 
the local permitting statute “to constitute an alternative method of obtain-
ing a gun permit.”223 
  
 218. Johns v. McKinley, 753 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1985).  The object of the forfeiture was the cab of a 
tractor trailer in which the petitioner had attempted to smuggle his girlfriend over the border between 
the United States and Canada and which also served as the petitioner’s primary residence.  Id. at 1197. 
 219. Id. at 1206 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
 220. 569 F. Supp. 776, 777 (D. Or. 1983) (citing U.S. v. Loud Hawk, 564 F. Supp. 691 (D. Or. 
1983)). 
 221. San Juan City College., Inc. v. U.S., 58 Fed. Cl. 26, 30 (Fed. Cl. 2003). 
 222. 851 A.2d 1031, 1078 (R.I. 2004). 
 223. Id. 
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As for what makes a bureaucracy Kafkaesque, it is difficult to find a 
better illustration than the following single sentence from Judge Miner’s 
opinion in Kurnik v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services: 
“Appellant’s Kafkaesque experience with that agency was characterized by 
no information, misinformation, unanswered letters, unreturned phone 
calls, unfulfilled promises, and classic bureaucratic runaround the sum 
total of which amounted almost to studied indifference if not purposeful 
neglect on the part of the agency.”224 
While judges often write critically about bureaucracies they consider to 
be Kafkaesque, they sometimes reach the opposite conclusion.  In a case 
that involved the operation of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Judge 
MacKinnon of the D.C. Circuit observed: “This is not, as the majority im-
plies, a case where some hapless corporation finds itself caught in the coils 
of a Kafkaesque bureaucracy that is systematically attempting to deprive it 
of its rights.”225 
Finally, in the same way that a Kafkaesque proceeding is not necessar-
ily unlawful, it is sometimes the case that a person may lawfully be sub-
jected to a Kafkaesque bureaucracy.  In Ascolese v. Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania Transportation Authority, a Title VII action in which the plaintiff 
alleged, among other things, that she was subjected to a hostile or abusive 
work environment when she encountered difficulties in obtaining light-
duty work during her pregnancy,226 Judge Pollak of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania explained that with one exception, the plaintiff’s “difficulties 
were entirely of a bureaucratic character [and] [w]hile perhaps Kafkaesque, 
these difficulties did not involve the element of immediate personal threat 
that ordinarily contributes the most to the ‘hostility’ or ‘abusiveness’ of a 
work environment.”227  Sears, Roebuck de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Soto-Rios 
was a § 1983 action brought by an employer against the state agency that 
administers the Puerto Rico workers’ compensation system.228  In granting 
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Judge Perez-Gimenez ex-
plained that the plaintiff had failed to state a constitutional claim because 
“[t]he government’s conduct, no matter how Kafkaesque, is not ‘shocking,’ 
nor does it ‘violate universal standards of decency.’ ”229  Finally, in United 
  
 224. 661 So. 2d 914, 917 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 1995). 
 225. Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 877-78 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (MacKinnon, J., 
dissenting). 
 226. 902 F. Supp. 533, 537-38 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
 227. Id. at 544.  Judge Pollak did, however, state: “This is not to say that misfeasances of a bureau-
cratic nature can never establish the existence of work difficulties sufficiently pointed, and gender-
defined, so as to satisfy the Harris standard, but rather that such difficulties must be intense, compre-
hensive and sustained.”  Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993)). 
 228. 920 F. Supp. 266, 269. (D.P.R. 1996). 
 229. Id. at 273 (quoting Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 757 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
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States v. Ripa, an interpleader action brought by the United States to de-
termine rights to $359,000 seized by the United States Customs service 
from Benedetto Romano at the Canadian border (plus approximately 
$130,000 in interest),230 Judge Sack of the Second Circuit found that the 
facts of the case tended to support the defendant’s “characteriz[ation] [of] 
their travails as ‘Kafkaesque,’ ”231 but “conclude[d], nonetheless, that 
Romano has not presented us, as an Article III court, with a legal basis 
upon which to deliver him from these circumstances.”232  In the words of 
Judge Sack: “We are no more able to relieve Romano of the absurdity of 
his situation than we are able to relieve Kafka’s Joseph K of the absurdity 
of his.”233 
  
 230. 323 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2003).  The money was seized in 1983 by the United States Customs 
Service, when Romano attempted to take it across the border into Canada without having completed the 
required currency reporting forms.  Id.  At the time of the seizure, the Internal Revenue Service placed 
a tax lien on the funds.  Id.  The government brought a civil suit for forfeiture (based upon the incident 
at the border), which suit was stayed during the pendency of an unsuccessful prosecution for tax eva-
sion against Romano.  Id.  Finally, fifteen years after the seizure, Romano also prevailed in the civil 
forfeiture suit.  Id.  What remained, then, were the government’s tax lien, a claim to one-third of the 
money asserted by Romano’s attorney, Glen Ripa, and Romano’s claim that he should be granted relief 
from paying interest and penalties on the taxes that were assessed against him in 1983.  Id. 
 231. Id. at 76 (quoting Appellant’s Br. at 27).  Romano’s Kafkaesque situation was composed of the 
following: 
 
The United States Customs Service wrongfully seized a large sum of money from Romano, 
which he alleges made it impossible for him to pay taxes he owed the IRS on those funds.  
Although the government paid interest on the seized money, it did so at a rate so low in 
comparison to the penalties and interest the IRS was charging him on the unpaid taxes that, 
ultimately, the amount Romano owed the government in taxes and interest on the fund far 
exceeded the amount in the fund.  Meanwhile, the civil proceedings over title to the seized 
funds were delayed by related criminal prosecutions, which also eventually proved merit-
less.  When Romano finally prevailed in the civil suit over the seized currency, his money 
had been eaten up by taxes and penalties on it that, he says, he could not have paid because 
the government had wrongfully seized his money. 
 
Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. (citing Franz Kafka, The Trial (Willa & Edwin Muir, trans., Alfred A. Knopf, rev. ed. 
1992)).  Not every tax case, however, results in an unhappy ending.  In Eddy v. U.S., 1994 WL 369913 
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 1994), the plaintiff had his federal tax refund wrongfully intercepted by the State of 
Arizona due to mistaken identity.  Id. at *1.  After Eddy filed suit, he received a check in the amount of 
his federal tax refund from the State of Arizona, but declined to dismiss his claims in order to seek a 
declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the federal statute under which his tax refund was 
intercepted, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6402(c) et seq., as well as “compensatory damages for the costs, pain and 
suffering purportedly incurred by him as a result of the alleged constitutional deprivation.”  Id.  Eddy 
ended up getting his refund, but nothing else.  Judge Bell characterized the case as follows: 
 
Newspaper accounts concerning Eddy’s initial predicament depict a “Kafkaesque” night-
mare in which an unbridled government bureaucracy haunts unwary citizens.  It is some-
what ironic that Eddy’s attorney credits these articles with awakening the Arizona state bu-
reaucrats to the necessity of rebating Eddy’s misappropriated tax payments.  Wherever the 
credit may lie, reckoning has indeed come with dawn, and the midnight specters have made 
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3. Kafkaesque Litigants 
In addition to using the term Kafkaesque to criticize other tribunals or 
to decry bureaucracy, judges have frequently used the term to empathize 
with unfortunate litigants who come before them. 
As Judge Alarcon said in Denton v. United States, “[t]his case chroni-
cles the Kafkaesque plight of a hapless citizen whose claims to widow’s 
benefits regrettably must be denied despite clear evidence that she has been 
the victim of bureaucratic error.”234  Judge Brody of the Appellate Division 
of the New Jersey Superior Court has written of “the Kafkaesque predica-
ment of having to defend against evidence that was totally undisclosed.”235  
In People v. Jones, Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court noted 
that unlike a criminal defendant faced with generic rather than particular-
ized testimony, a defendant tried under a continuous-course-of-conduct 
charge “does not find himself in the Kafkaesque predicament of having to 
answer numerous charges of unspecified criminal misdeeds.”236  In Green 
v. City of Montgomery, a class action brought by officers claiming that the 
defendants discriminated against them in retaliation for exercising their 
first-amendment rights, Judge Thompson of the Middle District of Georgia 
stated that “[a]lthough [he was] sympathetic to [Officer] Henderson’s ap-
parently Kafkaesque fate, [he was] not convinced that such treatment was 
motivated by any first-amendment activity on his part.” 237 
In Werts v. Vaughn, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s de-
nial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.238  Among other things, the 
petitioner claimed that he was denied due process by the prosecutor’s state-
ment, during his closing argument, that “if Tyrone Moore [a prosecution 
witness] had indicated he was going to testify against him [defen-
dant/petitioner] and sent back to the Detention Center with these other in-
  
amends by means of a $1,125.00 check.  This break in events casts a new light on these pro-
ceedings, forcing us to close the chapter on Kafka and the United States alike. 
 
Eddy’s claim for declaratory judgment is moot, and the remainder of his complaint 
must be dismissed for its failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
 
Id. at **4-5. 
 234. 638 F.2d 1218, 1218 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 235. Fisher v. Hundley, 572 A.2d 1174, 1175 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1990) (quoted in Daley v. Dept. 
of Corrections, 751 A.2d 1089, 1093 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2000)).  The petitioner in Fisher was a 
prison inmate appealing from an adverse decision in a disciplinary proceeding in which prison officials 
denied him access to the evidence against him in order to protect the confidentiality of its informants.  
Id. 
 236. 792 P.2d 643, 655 n. 4 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
 237. 792 F. Supp. 1238, 1271 (M.D. Ala. 1992). 
 238. 228 F.3d 179, 206 (3d Cir. 2000). 
File: Potter-Macroed Created on:  4/26/2005 12:02:00 PM Last Printed: 5/18/2005 10:50:00 AM 
234 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 3, No. 2 
dividuals, he would be sent back as a marked man.”239  In the petitioner’s 
view, the prosecutor’s closing argument impermissibly encouraged the jury 
to conclude that the petitioner had threatened the witness with bodily 
harm.240  Writing in dissent, Judge McKee observed: 
In concluding that the prosecutor’s remarks did not deny Werts 
due process in the context of this trial we place defense counsel on 
the horns of a Kafkaesque dilemma.  Had counsel not explored the 
possible bias here, his stewardship would have fallen short of that 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel.  However, 
having made an appropriate (indeed required) inquiry into the cir-
cumstances of Moore’s release, the majority concludes that de-
fense counsel invited the prosecutor’s highly improper and preju-
dicial “reply.”241 
Justice Peck of the Vermont Supreme Court has noted that “it is clearly 
advisable and expected of law enforcement officers that they inform de-
fendants of the offense charged before making an arrest if circumstances 
permit, as a safeguard against Kafka-like bewilderment on the part of ar-
restees,”242 even though such notification is not technically required by the 
Vermont rules of criminal procedure.243  In Little v. York County Earned 
Income Tax Bureau, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court 
order upholding a $20,000 jury verdict awarded to a taxpayer who was 
arrested and held in jail for five days for not paying taxes she had actually 
paid. 244  In the words of Judge Cercone, writing for the majority: 
We cannot say that the jury’s verdict of $20,000 was excessive 
when faced with the parade of horribles which resulted in Little’s 
imprisonment.  She was shown to be – and appellant admits such – 
an upstanding citizen who had complied with all tax laws accord-
ing to appellant’s advice.  The Kafkaesque scenario of her experi-
ence provided the jury with an adequate basis upon which to pro-
vide recovery.245 
  
 239. Id. at 207 (McKee, J., dissenting). 
 240. Id. at 208. 
 241. Id. at 211. 
 242. State v. Peters, 450 A.2d 332, 333 n. 1 (Vt. 1982) (emphasis in the original). 
 243. Id. 
 244. 481 A.2d 1194, 1196-97 (Pa. Super. 1984). 
 245. Id. at 1202. 
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4. Kafkaesque Journeys Through Kafkaesque Labyrinths 
Some of the most memorable Kafka references are those in which 
judges invoke Kafka to create vivid mental images.  Such images include 
Judge Moylan’s “Kafkaesque hall of mirrors,”246 Judge Maher’s 
“Kafkaesque shadows,”247 Judge Mack’s “Kafkaesque chain of secrecy,”248 
and Justice Franchini’s “Kafkaesque quagmire.”249  Writing in dissent from 
an opinion affirming the trial court’s decision to deny a criminal defen-
dant’s motion to quash the indictment against her, Justice Levy of the 
Texas Court of Appeals wrote: “The fog permeating this indictment is 
Kafkaesque in its thick and intimidating vagueness.”250 
Judge Wilkey of the D.C. Circuit once wrote of “the Kafkaesque spec-
ter of supplicants wandering endlessly from one jurisdiction to another in 
search of a proper forum only to find that it lies elsewhere.”251  In a Social 
Security disability benefits case, Judge Kane of the District of Colorado 
“outline[d] the criteria and legal principles by which the [Administrative 
Law Judge] and the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] should be 
guided, with the hope that future claimants will not feel themselves en-
gaged in a Kafkaesque pursuit of justice.”252  Similarly, Justice O’Hern of 
the New Jersey Supreme Court once mentioned “the . . . futile ‘Kafkaesque 
journey’ [of] a citizen who encounters an unreasoning bureaucracy.”253 
Judge Baime of the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior 
Court characterized “the efforts of David and Barbara Rosen to secure ap-
propriate residential services for their [profoundly retarded quadriplegic] 
daughter”254 as “a Kafkaesque journey through an endless bureaucratic 
  
 246. Glenn v. State, 511 A.2d 1110, 1111 (Md. Spec. App. 1986) (discussing “the case law on both 
consummated and inchoate criminal homicide . . . in Maryland and throughout the common law world” 
which was characterized as “a case law still sadly riddled with imprecise generalities, elusive half-
truths, and grandiose jabber”). 
 247. Maurer v. McManus, 409 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Mich. App. 1987). 
 248. Ridge v. Police & Firefighters Ret. & Relief Bd., 511 A.2d 418, 425 n. 11 (D.C. 1986) (citing 
Franz Kafka, The Trial (1956)) (discussing actions of administrative agency that failed to give claimant 
proper notice of proceeding that made ruling adverse to his interests). 
 249. In re Forfeiture of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Dollars and No Cents ($2,730.00) in 
Cash, 809 P.2d 1274, 1277 (N.M. 1991) (explaining that target of forfeiture “was indigent because the 
city confiscated his cash, and he was unable to challenge the confiscation because he was indigent”). 
 250. Moallen v. State, 699 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. App. 1st Dist. 1985) (Levy, J., dissenting). 
 251. Eisel v. Sec. of the Army, 477 F.2d 1251, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing Franz Kafka, The Trial, 
268-78 (Knopf 1937)) (discussing various possible rules for jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceed-
ings brought by armed forces reservists). 
 252. Pettyjohn v. Sullivan, 776 F. Supp. 1482, 1485 (D. Colo. 1991). 
 253. Sperling v. Bd. of Rev., 720 A.2d 607, 610 (N.J. 1998) (O’Hern, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (discussing plaintiff’s quest for workers compensation and/or temporary disability 
benefits for injury suffered somewhere between work and home) (quoting Rosen v. N.J. Div. of Devel-
opmental Disabilities, 607 A.2d 1030, 1031 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1992)). 
 254. Rosen, 607 A.2d at 1031. 
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labyrinth”255 initiated by the New Jersey Division of Developmental Dis-
abilities.  In yet another workers’ compensation case, Justice McGraw of 
the West Virginia Supreme Court decried “bureaucratic indifference [that 
forced petitioners’ attorneys] to lead their clients on a Kafkaesque journey 
through a labyrinth of administrative bungling.”256  In Cannon v. Heckler, 
Judge Stern of the District of New Jersey reminded the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services of the court’s previous instructions “not to create a 
‘Kafkaesque labyrinth’ for [a social security] claimant.”257  Similarly, in 
Petite v. Reno, Judge Oberdorfer of the District of D.C. reminded the de-
fendant of a previous order in the case “describ[ing] in some detail the 
‘Kafkaesque labyrinth of administrative confusion’ that had attended this 
[Title VII] action.”258  And in State v. Johnson, Justice Zimmerman of the 
Utah Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion, linked Kafka and the laby-
rinth in the following way: 
As I noted in my separate opinion in State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 
271-72 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring), much of the ex-
isting federal fourth amendment warrantless search and seizure law 
is rather Kafkaesque, consisting as it does of rules built upon a se-
ries of contradictory and confusing rationalizations and distinc-
tions.  Police officers and judges attempting to make their way 
through this labyrinth often imperil both the rights of individuals 
and the integrity and effectiveness of law enforcement.259 
  
 255. Id. 
 256. Meadows v. Lewis, 307 S.E.2d 625, 644 (W. Va. 1983).  As for what, precisely, constitutes a 
“labyrinth of administrative bungling,” Justice McGraw provided the following description and com-
mentary: 
 
Petitions were processed and hearings scheduled for matters upon which determinations had 
already been made, consequently resulting in proceedings at which only the hearing exam-
iner appeared.  Claims were periodically opened, closed, reopened, reclosed, etc., for no 
cognizable reason other than the commissioner’s repeated justification of “clerical error.”  
In Meadows’ case, one of the two reasons given for termination of TTD benefits at one 
point was his failure to submit to surgery which had already been performed over two 
months prior to entry of the termination order.  In Reichard’s case, the commissioner inex-
plicably took almost five months to acknowledge receipt of a petition to reopen which the 
commissioner subsequently determined established a prima facie case for reopening.  It is 
apparent that the commissioner has acted fully, in utter disregard not only of mandatory du-
ties imposed by law, but also of the plight of injured workers who desperately need the 
prompt resolution of their claims. 
 
Id. (emphasis in the original). 
 257. 627 F. Supp. 1370, 1373 (D.N.J. 1986). 
 258. 822 F. Supp. 815, 816 (D.D.C. 1993). 
 259. 745 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
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In In re Riccardo, Judge Hardin of the Bankruptcy Court for the South-
ern District of New York quoted a New York Times Op-Ed piece “in which 
the writer, a victim of social security number theft, describe[d] as ‘a 
Kafkaesque maze’ the six-month battle of trying to clear [her] name [with] 
phone companies, the credit bureaus and two collection agencies.”260  In an 
order dealing, inter alia, with a discovery dispute, Judge Belot of the Dis-
trict of Kansas noted that “it [was] equally plausible that the FDIC’s failure 
to produce is attributable at least in part to the Kafkaesque maize that is 
endemic to governmental bureaucracy and that retards even inter-
governmental requests for information.”261  While it seems unlikely that 
Judge Belot actually intended to refer to government bureaucracy as 
Kafkaesque corn–unless, of course, legal writing in the Midwest typically 
relies upon crop-based metaphors and other vegetable nuances that are 
unfamiliar to those of us outside America’s breadbasket–there is at least 
one intentional linkage of Kafka and food. 
In In re Commitment of Schulpius, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s request for release from 
commitment as a sexually violent person.262  Writing in dissent, Judge 
Schudson noted that the appellant, Schulpius, had been confined for ap-
proximately four years in direct violation of multiple court orders directing 
that he be given a supervised-release placement.263  Judge Schudson then 
observed: 
¶ 61  Interestingly enough, in the most fundamental way, the par-
ties’ positions are not far apart.  Both Schulpius and the State seek 
compliance with court orders; both want enforcement of the law 
the legislature enacted, not a charade.  But can any remedy give 
Schulpius his due, prevent such Kafkaesque confinement of others, 
and, at the same time, protect the community?  I believe so; but to 
understand how, one must think through each of the several op-
tions. 
¶ 62  Damages?  That’s silly; Schulpius’ new-found wealth 
would be of little benefit behind bars, and the status quo would 
continue.  Financial penalties for government officials or depart-
ments?  That’s spittin’ into the wind; the government could con-
tinue to violate court orders and, ultimately, the penalties would 
  
 260. 248 B.R. 717, 721 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Stacy Sullivan, How I Lost My Good Name, 
N.Y. Times A19 (Apr. 17, 2000)). 
 261. Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1127, 1166 (D. Kan. 1992). 
 262. 678 N.W.2d 369, 370 (Wis. App. 2004). 
 263. Id. at 387.  Those orders were ultimately vacated due to a judicial finding that Schulpius was no 
longer a suitable candidate for supervised release.  Id. at 379. 
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pass on to the taxpayers.  Continued confinement with, again, the 
false promise of possible supervised release?  What could more 
certainly reduce incentives for confined predators to cooperate in 
treatment? 
¶ 63  And where would such remedies lead?  Just play them 
out – any one of them.  Any remedy short of supervised release ac-
tually endangers our community more than release itself.  The 
status quo would continue.  The State, rather than creating a Mil-
waukee County facility to house, treat and supervise predators, 
would keep Schulpius and other predators confined even when 
courts ordered their supervised release.  Wisconsin then would 
need to increase staff and eventually build institutions to make 
room for all the unlawfully confined predators who qualify for the 
supervised release that will never come. 
¶ 64  Then what would happen?  What, in all likelihood, would 
Wisconsin really do?  Now swallow hard; here’s the last bite of 
Kake-Kafkaesque.  Faced with tight budgets and overcrowded in-
stitutions, Wisconsin could solve this fiscal and constitutional rid-
dle in only one way: by no longer seeking commitment of sex 
predators in Milwaukee County (and, eventually, in other counties 
claiming to be unable to provide suitable facilities).  Thus, quite 
certainly, judicial acquiescence in this governmental misconduct 
leaves not only a constitutional stain, but a more endangered 
community.264 
Other than Judge Schudson’s reference to Kake-Kafkaesque–a bittersweet 
torte, one must presume–the cupboard is bare; Judge Schudson seems to be 
the only judge ever to cook up a food-related reference to Franz Kafka.265 
  
 264. Id. at 390-91 (emphasis in the original). 
 265. Howover, Judge Schudson’s cupboard of metaphors is far from bare, as demonstrated by the 
conclusion of his opinion: 
 
¶ 70  To repeat: a sex predator commitment law that, in the most fundamental way, cannot 
function as written cannot stand.  This proposition, I trust, is so clear that, I fear, I belabor 
what should simply be known, without words.  And yet, finding that my voice is crying out 
alone, I persist. 
¶ 71  Thus I struggle to state the obvious: if the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 de-
pends on the substantive rights it declares, the unconscionable removal of those rights de-
stroys its constitutionality.  I search for metaphors – without strings, a Stradivarius is silent . 
. . without wings, an eagle dies. 
¶ 72  Thus, while appreciating the meticulous manner in which the Majority has traced the 
history of this case, and while finding little fault with the Majority’s articulation of certain 
legal principles, I see a very different drama.  The Majority, perhaps distracted by an ugly 
charade, has failed to perceive the classic tragedy Schulpius and the State have performed 
on our constitutional stage. 
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5. Wordplay Inspired by Kafka 
While the mental images some judges have painted using Kafka as pig-
ment are vivid and compelling, so too are many of the Kafka references 
that are primarily verbal. 
It is not difficult to discern Judge Robinson’s opinion of a proposed 
statutory interpretation that would require “imput[ing] to Congress a 
Kafkaesque obscurantism.”266  Equally persuasive is Justice Neely’s refer-
ence, in a case about a West Virginia state mental hospital, to the “tragic 
impact of the hospital’s Kafkaesque lack of coordination.”267  Judges have 
also written of “Kafkaesque nonsense,”268 a “Kafka-like perverse effect,”269 
a “Kafkaesque air of unreality,”270 a “Kafkaesque comedy of errors,”271 the 
  
¶ 73  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
Id. at 393 (emphasis in the original). 
 266. Citizens to Save Spencer County v. U.S. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Robinson, J., 
dissenting) (footnote omitted).  Other judges have used Kafka to comment on the process of statutory 
interpretation.  See e.g. Wright v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 775 P.2d 857, 860 (Or. App. 1989) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“The legislature never intended a Kafkaesque system that cuts off a claim-
ant’s remedy, even though he has no notice that he must act to preserve his rights.”).  And judges have 
also used Kafka to comment on the wisdom of legislative action.  See e.g. Suffolk Sanitary Corp. v. 
Town Bd. of Brookhaven, 375 N.Y.S.2d 740, 749 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1975) (“Nevertheless, 
it is apparent that the Legislature’s ill-conceived rate-setting statute has placed the plaintiff in a 
Kafkaesque position.  It is clearly entitled to a substantial rate increase which it cannot obtain without 
either seeking agreement from those who do not care to agree or obtaining relief from judicial authori-
ties who are powerless to fix rates and can only declare whether a particular rate sought to be charged is 
reasonable.”). 
 267. E.H. v. Matin, 284 S.E.2d 232, 236 (W. Va. 1981). 
 268. Irwin v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 1993 WL 837921 (Pa. Phila. County. Ct. 1993).  In Irwin, which 
discussed the constitutionality of a federal banking statute that allowed one state to establish interest 
rates for other states, Judge Avellini explained: 
 
True, Congress may, and probably should, limit the loan charges imposed by out-of-state 
banks and their credit card affiliates.  Moreover, Congress may, and probably should dele-
gate that responsibility to a federal agency.  Congress may not, however, “go to the ball 
game and authorize the page boys to legislate, [because] the delegation would be unconsti-
tutional.”  Although state lawmakers are hardly congressional pages, they are equally in-
competent to legislate for the nation.  For such Kafkaesque nonsense, We The People will 
require a new Constitution. 
 
Id. at *4 (citations omitted). 
 269. Newland v. Bd. of Govs. of Cal. Community Colleges, 566 P.2d 254, 258 (Cal. 1977) (discussing 
statutory amendment “providing that a person convicted of a Felony sex crime who applies for a cer-
tificate of rehabilitation and who is otherwise fit, can obtain certification to teach in the community 
college system but that an otherwise fit person, convicted of a Misdemeanor sex crime, is forever 
barred”). 
 270. In his concurring and dissenting opinion in State v. Marshall, 690 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1997), Justice 
O’Hern wrote: 
 
The Court’s response to defendant’s request is that the State has agreed to furnish to defen-
dant any documents he can identify as being in the State’s possession.  There is a 
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“Kafkaesque compartmentalization of truth,”272 “the Kafkaesque trappings 
of the ‘third degree,’ ”273 a “Kafkaesque parody,”274 a “Kafkaesque 
twist,”275 and a “Kafkaesque trap of circular reasoning.”276  None of those 
phrases, abstract though they might be, leaves any doubt as the either the 
judge’s meaning or his understanding of Kafka. 
In light of Kafka’s status as a writer of literature, it is somehow fitting 
that some judges have couched their Kafka references as literary meta-
phors.  In Welsh v. City of Philadelphia, Judge Caesar of the Pennsylvania 
Court of Common Pleas characterized the facts of that case as “[t]he 
  
Kafkaesque air of unreality to this analysis.  See Franz Kafka, The Trial (1937).  Like the 
accused in The Trial, who was forced to defend himself without being told the charges 
against him, Marshall is denied access to possibly exculpatory evidence unless he can first 
identify that evidence. 
 
Id. at 103.  Justice Handler, in turn, agreed with Justice O’Hern: “Justice O’Hern is surely correct in 
arguing that to allow defendant access only to those documents he can identify as being in the State’s 
possession has a certain Kafkaesque feel to it.”  Id. at 135 (Handler, J., dissenting). 
 271. Peterson v. Lacy, 1998 WL 883302 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1998) (characterizing the process 
through which state prisoner was denied conditional release in an order declining to accept the magis-
trate judge’s report and recommendation and granting prisoner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus) 
(quoted in Peterson v. Tomaselli, 2004 WL 2211651 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004)). 
 272. Nienhouse v. Super. Ct., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 578 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1996) (rejecting interpre-
tation of constitutional provision pertaining to use of hearsay in preliminary hearings that would allow 
the state to elicit an inculpatory hearsay statement from a law enforcement officer but would preclude 
the defendant from eliciting exculpatory hearsay statements from the same law enforcement officer on 
cross examination). 
 273. Argueta v. State, 764 A.2d 863, 867 (Md. Spec. App. 2001) (explaining the concerns that gave 
rise to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).  In Argueta, Judge 
Thieme quoted the following passage from Judge Moylan’s opinion in Jones v. State, 753 A.2d 587 
(Md. Spec. App. 2000):  
  
Miranda’s concern was with an interrogation environment so oppressive as to give rise to a 
presumption of compulsion in the context of the Fifth Amendment privilege against “com-
pelled” self-incrimination.  The concern was with the Kafkaesque trappings of the “third 
degree.”  The drum-like refrain of the Miranda analysis repeated and re-echoed the theme of 
“incommunicado interrogation” in a “police-dominated atmosphere.” 
 
Id. at 593. 
 274. Marciniak v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 198, 204 (Vet. App. 1997) (Steinberg, J., dissenting) (“Such a 
presumption [that public officers have discharged their official duties properly] accords regularity to 
the actions of officials of the very government that has twice lost the entire claims file.  In a rather 
Kafkaesque parody, that irregularity – losing the file – is what has become ‘regular’ in this case.”). 
 275. Reeves v. Hopkins, 928 F. Supp. 941, 965 (D. Neb. 1996) (explaining that Nebraska Supreme 
Court’s decision that it had authority to sentence criminal defendants, under “independent” standard of 
review, subjected defendant Reeves to “a ‘new ball game,’ one with a Kafkaesque twist.  If Reeves lost, 
he died.”). 
 276. Lipton v. County of Orange, N.Y., 315 F. Supp. 2d 434, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“To deny plaintiff 
[alleging he was subject to a retaliatory transfer from one prison to another] a trial on what plainly is a 
jury question of pretext involving credibility would ensnare him in a Kafkaesque trap of circular rea-
soning” when “the very conduct that offered to justify the transfer was the same constitutionally pro-
tected conduct that would have created the motive for the alleged retaliation.”) (citation omitted). 
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Kafkaesque tale of Ms. Welsh’s effort to save her home and business.”277  
After recounting, in rather colorful language, a series of mindless (or 
worse) bureaucratic machinations inflicted upon an applicant for a building 
permit by “government run amok,” in the form of Prince George’s County, 
Maryland, and the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, Judge 
Wilner of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals concluded his summary 
of the facts: “The Kafkaesque drama was now complete.”278 
Judge Dalzell of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania began his opinion 
in Simmons v. DiDario by stating: “This Kafkaesque case involves a 
United States Air Force colonel who returned from service in Operation 
Desert Storm to find that he was suspended without pay at his civilian job 
because of charges that, to this day, have never been made against him.”279  
He concluded by stating that “[t]he remedies available to Dr. Simmons are, 
in the Court’s opinion, modest in view of the bad faith treatment he suf-
fered in this Kafkaesque drama.”280 
Sometimes, of course, in the absence of an entire Kafkaesque drama, 
there might be a part of one.  In State v. Flemming, Justice Moeller of the 
Arizona Supreme Court spoke of the “Kafkaesque scene” that would be 
created if the state were to prosecute a revocation of probation three years 
after the defendant’s probation had expired.281  Similarly, in People v. 
Coronado, Justice Weiner discussed a “Kafkaesque scene” involving an 
“administrative web in which defendant, after having confided to a proba-
tion officer for purposes of probation, [found] himself entwined as he was 
directed toward the state hospital” for indefinite confinement as a mentally 
disordered sex offender.282 
Finally, and most dramatically, some judges have taken a global view 
in their use of Kafka.  In a case concerning the constitutionality of placing 
a prison inmate in administrative segregation on the basis of allegations 
that he or she is a flight risk, Judge Motz of the District of Maryland ruled 
that “substantive due process requires that in a case where an inmate chal-
lenges an allegation that he is an escape risk, he be given an opportunity 
within a reasonable time after being placed on administrative segregation 
  
 277. 1987 WL 582723 at *5 (Pa. Phila. County Ct. 1987).   After more than twenty years of com-
plaining to the city about the deleterious effect of sewer-line construction near her home and repeated 
assurances that her home was structurally secure, the city ordered Ms. Welsh to vacate her house, 
demolished it, and billed her $4,821.30 for the work.  Id. at *6. 
 278. Prince George’s County v. Blumberg, 407 A.2d 1151, 1155, 1162 (Md. Spec. App. 1979). 
 279. 796 F. Supp. 166, 166 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
 280. Id. at 172. 
 281. 907 P.2d 496, 502 (Ariz. 1995) (quoted in State v. Adler, 931 P.2d 1082, 1088 (Ariz. 1996)). 
 282. 163 Cal. Rptr. 746, 749-50 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1980) (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
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to appear before a hearing officer.”283  In explaining his decision, Judge 
Motz stated: 
While a hearing officer’s decision is entitled to extreme deference, 
it must be based on his or her independent judgment.  Otherwise, 
prisons will become a Kafka-esque world in which, solely on the 
basis of information for which no one is held personally account-
able, an inmate can be placed alone in a cell for almost twenty-four 
hours a day, weeks and months on end.284 
Judge Glasser of the Eastern District of New York has written of “the 
Kafkaesque world of [the federal sentencing] guidelines.”285  In a special 
  
 283. Jackson v. Bostick, 760 F. Supp. 524, 525, 531 (D. Md. 1991). 
 284. Id. at 531. 
 285. U.S. v. Donofrio, 817 F. Supp. 321, 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).  Judge Glasser is hardly the only 
judge to turn to Kafka for help in expressing an opinion on the federal sentencing guidelines or their 
application in particular cases.  For example, in the view of Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of 
New York: 
 
Much of the difficulty with the guideline sentencing and minimum sentences lies not so 
much in the fault of the legislature or even the Sentencing Commission, but in the decisions 
of our courts and their self-imposed barriers to justice. . . .  The Kafkaesque result in the in-
stant case [addition of five years without parole to the five year sentence already imposed on 
a twenty-eight year old female defendant who was the mother and sole caretaker for three 
young children] comes from a combination of a lapse of the usual exercise of sound discre-
tion by the United States Attorney to allow a defendant to plead to a five year minimum in a 
case such as this and from a decision by the Drug Enforcement Agency (the “DEA”) to de-
liver in a suitcase 1,013 grams of heroin instead of the 400 grams swallowed in balloons ex-
pected by the defendant.  The tendency of the DEA to escalate the size of drug deals by 
pressing prospective defendants to buy or accept delivery of ever higher quantities of nar-
cotics in what are ironically referred to by it as “reverse buys” is well known.  It is usually 
offset by realistic pleas and sentences by prosecutors and judges.  In this instance the system 
of balances has been ignored to the severe detriment of the defendant, her children and the 
taxpayers. 
 
U.S. v. Ekwunoh, 888 F. Supp. 364, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see generally U.S. v. Andrews, 301 F. Supp. 
2d 607 (W.D. Tex. 2004). 
  On the other hand, some judges have rejected claims by criminal defendants that the guidelines 
operate, in their cases, in a Kafkaesque manner.  As Judge Bauer of the Seventh Circuit recently said: 
  
Jackson is simply incorrect that the base offense level for Count One should be based on the 
amount of cocaine found in his possession at the time of his arrest, and not on the aggregate 
amount of cocaine which he obtained during the entire period of drug dealing charged in the 
indictment. . . .  Jackson contends that using the aggregate amount is speculative and that 
“basing a prison term on mere speculation is Kafkaesque.”  Jackson is hardly in the position 
of Josef K.  See Franz Kafka, The Trial.  It is clear what offense Jackson was charged with 
and Jackson was given an opportunity to defend himself against the charges.  The district 
court heard evidence and made a conservative estimate of the quantity of drugs attributable 
to Jackson, using, among other things, Jackson’s own statement to come up with a figure.  
The district court did not commit error in any sense. 
 
U.S. v. Jackson, 121 F.3d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); see also U.S. v. Griffiths, 41 F.3d 
844, 845 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting defendant’s argument that two-level enhancement for possession of a 
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concurrence in State v. Huff, Judge Monroe of the Alabama Court of Civil 
Appeals quoted a newspaper column in which “United States House Judi-
ciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde, R-Ill., was quoted as referring to 
the ‘Kafkaesque world of civil asset forfeiture.’ ”286  GreenPoint Credit 
Corp. v. Perez was an “unfair debt collections act involv[ing] an illegal 
threat by a finance company to put an elderly woman in jail for a debt that 
she did not owe, on a mobile home she did not own.”287  Judge Hardber-
ger’s list of six evidentiary bases supporting a $5 million jury verdict in 
Perez’s favor included the following: 
The threat of being put in jail is calculated to put fear and anxiety 
into every citizen’s heart.  It is the very tool used by our justice 
system to control bad behavior in our society.  Even a hardened 
criminal may think twice before doing something that will cause 
him to be locked away from society.  If a criminal may be fright-
ened by jail, how much more mental and physical anguish would 
be suffered by a woman in the position of Mrs. Perez?  Compound 
this with the uncontradicted testimony that she did not even under-
stand what fault she had committed.  Mrs. Perez found herself in a 
truly kafkaesque world, where her reputation and peaceful old age 
were in immediate jeopardy.288 
B. Quoting and Explaining 
While some judges have simply used the word “Kafkaesque,” confi-
dent that readers would be able to determine its meaning and application to 
the case at hand, other judges have gone further, either by including quota-
tions of Kafka or by presenting their own interpretations of one of Kafka’s 
works.  This section discusses opinions by those judges who have gone to 
the greatest lengths to help their readers understand both Kafka’s writings 
and the application of some aspect of Kafka’s fiction to a very real court 
case. 
  
stolen gun, whether or not the defendant had scienter (an element of possession of a stolen firearm in 
interstate commerce) “is Kafkaesque [because] the Sentencing Guidelines . . . empower a trial court to 
punish a defendant post conviction for conduct the defendant could not be convicted of in the first 
place”). 
  Even sentencing at the state level, which, of course, does not involve the federal guidelines, has 
inspired several references to Kafka.  See e.g. People v. Statum, 2003 WL 141468 at *3 (Cal. App. 2d  
Dist. 2003) (“At an initial sentencing hearing, the trial court stated: ‘To me, on this factual basis . . . to 
originally ask for 25 to life is Kafkaesque, to be frank with you in my view.’ ”); Williams v. State, 500 
So. 2d 501, 502-03 (Fla. 1986); State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 16-17 (Minn. 1982). 
 286. 765 So. 2d 7, 8 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (quoting The Birmingham News (May 10, 1999)). 
 287. 75 S.W.3d 40, 43 (Tex. App. San Antonio Dist. 2002). 
 288. Id. at 46. 
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Quesnell v. State was an appeal from “a lower court order denying 
[Joyce Quesnell’s] motion . . . to vacate an earlier order of hospitalization 
committing her to Western State Hospital.”289  Specifically, Quesnell ar-
gued “that the commitment proceeding below was conducted in violation 
of her constitutional guarantees to due process of law and trial by jury.”290  
The Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded.291  Writing for the 
court, Justice Finley quoted, approvingly, from a monograph on law and 
psychiatry: 
[I]t is unfair to demand of a psychiatric patient – especially if he is 
poorly educated and indigent – that he prove his sanity or nondan-
gerousness.  We would not ask that he prove his innocence of a 
criminal charge, and then consider his mere opportunity to do so 
adequate protection against false or unfair accusations by a district 
attorney.  Yet, this is exactly what we ask the mental patient to do.  
To make matters worse, such a person must rebut charges of men-
tal illness, charges as amorphous as anything with which K., 
Kafka’s protagonist in The Trial, had to contend.  It is obvious that 
such a ‘defendant’ is alm[o]st completely helpless and has small 
chance of winning his battle. . . .292 
The appellant in In re J.M. was involuntarily committed to Torrance 
State Hospital for mental health treatment.293  In an opinion reversing the 
trial court’s denial of appellant’s challenge to the order for involuntary 
treatment, Judge Schiller of the Pennsylvania Superior Court restated the 
rule that “[w]here, as here, the [MHPA [Pennsylvania Mental Health Pro-
cedures Act]] has provided for specific procedural protections, and the 
procedures mandated are not followed, involuntary commitment is im-
proper.”294  He continued: 
The importance of this principle cannot be overstated.  The failure 
of the county in this case to follow the required procedures left ap-
pellant detained against her will with no way to get out, or to fully 
  
 289. 517 P.2d 569, 570 (Wash. 1974). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 580. 
 292. Id. at 576, n. 18 (quoting T. Szasz, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry 69 (1963)).  In State v. 
Schuller, 1992 WL 80713 at *2 n. 3 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. April 20, 1992) (Jones, J., dissenting), Judge 
Jones explained a reference to Kafka by noting that “[i]n Franz Kafka’s famous novel The Trial, the 
central character, after being arrested, was required to prove his innocence to avoid conviction.” 
 293. 685 A.2d 185, 186-87 (Pa. Super. 1996). 
 294. Id. at 192-93 (quoting Cmmw. v. C.B., 452 A.2d 1372, 1375 (Pa. Super. 1982)). 
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understand the proceedings against her.  To her the experience of 
the literary figure of Joseph K. became very real.295 
Judge Schiller explained his reference to Joseph K. by quoting from The 
Trial: “‘You can’t go out, you are arrested.’ ‘So it seems,’ said K.  ‘But 
what for?’ he added.  ‘We are not authorized to tell you that.  Go to your 
room and wait there.  Proceedings have been instituted against you and you 
will be informed of everything in due course.’ ”296 
In a concurring and dissenting opinion in a case in which a majority of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed four orders of the Orphans Court 
Division of the Lycoming County (Pennsylvania) Court of Common Pleas 
that terminated the parental rights of two mothers, Justice Nix wrote: 
We who sit as appellate judges must always guard against becom-
ing emotionally isolated from human nature and the human conse-
quences of our decisions lest in our endeavors to render dispas-
sionate justice we lose our compassion.  Kafka, in describing 
judges in a fictional judiciary, wrote:  
“. . . yet confronted with quite simple cases, or par-
ticularly difficult cases, they were often utterly at a 
loss, they did not have any right understanding of 
  
 295. Id. at 193. 
 296. Id. (quoting Franz Kafka, The Trial 3 (1925)).  Orders of commitment and accusations of mental 
illness are, of course, fertile ground for claims of Kafkaesque procedures.  In a case in which an em-
ployer suggested that one of its employees was suffering from paranoia, Judge Stern of the District of 
New Jersey noted that it was “almost Kafkaesque that Kyriazi was deemed in need of psychiatric 
attention for suspecting that her superiors were secretly acting against her, when the supervisors’ own 
secretly recorded memoranda reveal that they were doing just that.”  Kyriazi v. W. Electric Co., 461 F. 
Supp. 894, 941 (D.N.J. 1978).  In a discussion of the various methods of dealing with adjudicated 
juvenile delinquents, Justice Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court observed: 
 
While the conservatives talk about punishment as “retribution” and the cornerstone of “re-
sponsibility,” the liberal, child advocates speak in terms of the “right to punishment.”  Once 
the rehabilitative model is accepted, the next fight is always to show that “treatment” is of-
ten a caricature something worthy of a story of Kafka or a Soviet mental hospital.  There-
fore, while the conservatives throw up their hands because they believe punishment works 
better than treatment, the juvenile advocates return increasingly to punishment on the 
grounds that punishment is much less punishing than “treatment.” 
 
State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401, 415-16 (W. Va. 1980) (footnotes omitted). 
  In Wagenmann v. Pozzi, 1986 WL 715 at *6 (D. Mass. Jan. 7, 1986), Judge Freedman concluded 
that Ronald Wagenmann “was falsely arrested and committed to the Northampton State Hospital under 
what could be described as Kafkaesque procedures.”  Finally, Sanderlin v. U.S., 794 F.2d 727, 729 
(D.C. Cir. 1986), involved a criminal defendant who was committed to a mental hospital after being 
found not guilty by reason of insanity, despite never having raised that defense.  In ruling that the 
government was obligated to initiate civil commitment proceedings, Judge Mikva observed the gov-
ernment’s “reliance on defendant’s passivity to establish the touchstone of the commitment procedure 
is most troublesome.  Its Kafkaesque features are obvious; its conformity to statutory requirements is 
scant.”  Id. at 733. 
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human relations, since they were confined day and 
night to the workings of their judicial system, 
whereas in such cases a knowledge of human na-
ture itself was indispensable.” 
F. Kafka, The Trial 148-49 (M. Brod ed. 1969).  One cannot ig-
nore the human result of the majority’s decision today.297 
B.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services was another child 
custody case which involved, in the words of Judge Gross of the Florida 
District Court of Appeals, “[a] tragic, Kafkaesque scenario.”298  Factually: 
[T]wo little girls have been removed from the custody of their 
mother for over seventeen months.  Even though the children are 
now six and eight years old, there has never been any report or in-
dication that the mother has inflicted any type of injury upon these 
children.  Their removal was based on fatal injuries suffered by an 
infant sibling.  The mother is a suspect because she is one of many 
persons who had access to the infant.  A criminal investigation is 
pending, but there is no end in sight.  Release of autopsy and in-
vestigative reports concerning the infant’s death would not be in 
the best interest of the criminal investigation, since potential sus-
pects could read them and adjust their stories.  The Department [of 
Children and Family Services] cannot try the dependency case 
without going into the circumstances of the infant’s death and 
without obtaining the investigative records of the Sheriff’s Office 
and the autopsy report of the Medical Examiner.299 
After characterizing the foregoing scenario as Kafkaesque, Judge 
Gross quoted extensively from The Trial: 
[I]n no other Court was legal assistance so necessary.  For the pro-
ceedings were not only kept secret from the general public, but 
from the accused as well.  Of course only so far as this was possi-
ble, but it had proved possible to a very great extent.  For even the 
accused had no access to the Court records, and to guess from the 
course of an interrogation what documents the Court had up its 
sleeve was very difficult, particularly for an accused person, who 
  
 297. In re William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1231, 1247, 1250 n. 6 (Pa. 1978) (Nix, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 298. 731 So. 2d 30, 33 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 1999). 
 299. Id. 
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was himself implicated and had all sorts of worries to distract 
him.300 
Given the size and complexity of government child protective agen-
cies, and the importance of the interests at stake in child custody adjudica-
tions, it is not surprising that child custody cases are a major inspiration for 
judicial references to Kafka. 
In Beit v. Probate & Family Court Department, the issue was “whether 
a judge may impose sanctions on an attorney who fails to appear for trial 
without having secured a timely continuance.”301  According to Justice 
Abrams of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: 
The issues raised by this appeal were foreshadowed in Kafka’s, 
The Trial.  “[C]onscious of his own rights, he asked through the 
telephone what would happen if he failed to put in an appearance.  
‘We shall know where to find you,’ was the answer.  ‘And shall I 
be punished for not having come of my own accord?’ asked K., 
and smiled in anticipation of the reply.  ‘No,’ was the answer.  
‘Splendid,’ said K., ‘then what motive could I have for complying 
with this summons?’  ‘It is not usual to bring the powers of the 
Court upon one’s own head,’ said the voice, becoming fainter and 
finally dying away.  ‘It is very rash not to do so,’ thought K. as he 
hung up; ‘for after all one should try to find out what those powers 
are.’ ”302 
The passage quoted above is among the most extensive of all judicial quo-
tations of Kafka. 
In Bruno v. Department of Police, the Louisiana Court of Appeals af-
firmed the New Orleans Civil Service Commission’s decision to uphold 
the termination of police officer Vincent Bruno.303  Bruno was terminated 
for violating the department’s policy concerning the conduct of officers on 
sick leave, but in Bruno’s appeal from an adverse decision from the Civil 
Service Commission, Judge Garrison had “no doubt that the real reason for 
the dismissal of Officer Bruno was his activity as the union leader of the 
police strike and the closing down of Mardi Gras which followed.”304  In a 
dissent from the majority opinion, which affirmed the Civil Service Com-
mission, Judge Garrison stated that “[t]his case appears to me to involve 
the officially sponsored railroading of a veteran police officer . . . [that] 
  
 300. Id. at 33 n. 2 (quoting Franz Kafka, The Trial 146 (The Modern Library 1964) (1937)). 
 301. 434 N.E.2d 642, 643 (Mass. 1982). 
 302. Id. at 643 n. 1 (quoting Franz Kafka, The Trial 290 (Vintage Books 1969)). 
 303. 451 So. 2d 1082, 1088 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983). 
 304. Id. at 1083, 1088 (emphasis in the original). 
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gr[ew] out of a classic union-busting effort of a kind rarely seen in present 
day city administrations.”305  Judge Garrison went on to state that “[a]t 
another level, the case addresses itself to the use of the machinery of jus-
tice to accomplish injustice.”306  According to Justice Garrison, “[t]he 
writer Kafka, makes the point that sometimes those in power are not overly 
concerned about the existence of actual guilt so long as the proper law en-
forcement procedures are followed.”307  Garrison explained himself by 
paraphrasing Kafka: 
In The Trial Joseph K. is arrested but never told the reason for his 
arrest.  At the court he is never told what the charges are.  The 
court chaplain informs him that he will probably be convicted, 
however he does not know what the charges are either.  Ultimately, 
two formally dressed men arrive at his home to pick him up.  He is 
taken to an abandoned quarry where he is executed.308 
Shortly after summarizing The Trial, Judge Garrison quoted from Chapter 
12 of Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland.309 
In an opinion affirming the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence collected as a result of a search of the defendant’s baggage at 
O’Hare Airport, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit noted that the law-
enforcement officer who conducted the search identified himself as a law-
enforcement officer, and told the defendant he was conducting a narcotics 
investigation.310  Judge Posner then contrasted that circumstance with that 
of “Joseph K. (in Kafka’s novel, The Trial) [who] was never told the rea-
son why he was being investigated.”311  In Judge Posner’s view, the law-
enforcement officer in the case before him rendered himself non-
Kafkaesque by stating the reason for his interaction with the defendant. 
Creamer v. Raffety involved a challenge to a Willcox, Arizona police 
policy “that would subject anyone incarcerated on any offence to a strip 
and body cavity search.”312  Explaining the court’s ruling that the policy 
was overbroad, Judge Hathaway of the Arizona Court of Appeals pointed 
out that: 
  
 305. Id. at 1101 (Garrison, J., dissenting). 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 1102. 
 308. Id. at 1102 n. 3. 
 309. Id. at 1102-03 (“It is all very well for the Queen to announce ‘Sentence first – verdict after-
wards,’ but in New Orleans the Superintendent of Police cannot do that and neither can the City Ad-
ministration.”).  Several other judges have also paired up a reference to Franz Kafka with a reference to 
Lewis Carroll.  See infra pt. IV(C)(3). 
 310. U.S. v. Notorianni, 729 F.2d 520, 520-22 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 311. Id. at 523 (quoted in U.S. v. Tavolacci, 895 F.2d 1423, 1426 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
 312. 699 P.2d 908, 913, 920 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1984).  
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The interaction of the blanket strip search policy with an incom-
plete bail list creates a Kafkaesque scheme whereby Mr. Creamer 
or any other misdemeanant could suffer a massive intrusion upon 
the right to privacy in the future at the hands of law enforcement 
personnel stretching the limits of their discretion to release and act-
ing on little or no justification.313 
By way of explaining his reference to Kafka, Judge Hathaway wrote: “In 
The Trial, Franz Kafka described the archetypal encounter of the ordinary 
mortal with the capriciousness and irrationality of modern bureaucra-
cies.”314 
In Seevers v. Arkenberg, a legal malpractice case, Judge Barker of the 
Southern District of Indiana began her order (granting defendant’s motion 
to dismiss and granting in part defendant’s motion for summary judgment) 
as follows: 
In The Trial, Franz Kafka depicts the plight of Joseph K., a 
young man entangled in the arcane and inscrutable webs of the 
law.  Unable to navigate “the system” ’s labrinthine [sic] ways on 
his own, Joseph K. implores the aid of a distinguished yet equally 
cryptic attorney.  Instead of illuminating his client’s situation, 
however, the attorney only compounds the darkness.  Thus the le-
gal system, which should mediate between an individual and soci-
ety, itself became a vehicle of alienation used by the attorney 
against his own client. 
The present case, though not as fantastic as Kafka’s version, 
uncomfortably echoes the estrangement produced when attorneys 
manipulate the law to beguile laymen.  Here the plaintiffs, Gloria 
and Shawn Seevers, believed defendant Arkenberg to be their 
champion and guide in the legal arena, until events revealed a star-
tling metamorphosis: Arkenberg had not protected the plaintiffs 
because, unbeknownst to them, he represented an adverse interest.  
This situation, detailed below, gave rise to the present action.315 
Given Judge Barker’s obvious acquaintance with Kafka’s writings, it is 
difficult to imagine that she did not intend to suggest, by using the word 
“metamorphosis,” that defendant Arkenberg behaved like a cockroach 
when he violated his duty of loyalty to the plaintiffs. 
  
 313. Id. at 920-21. 
 314. Id. at 921 n. 3. 
 315. 726 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (S.D. Ind. 1989). 
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Bexar County Sheriff’s Civil Service Commission v. Davis involved the 
termination of a Sheriff’s Department employee for violating workplace 
rules regarding sexual harassment.316  The issue on appeal to the Texas 
Supreme Court was “whether respondent, a public employee who could 
not be discharged except for cause, should have been provided with the 
names of his employer’s witnesses before either his pretermination or his 
post-termination hearing.”317  The court held that the Constitution imposed 
no such requirement upon the government.318  Writing in dissent, Justice 
Doggett argued that “[d]ue process demands that termination procedures 
be more than some Kafkaesque tale in which the query ‘who is accusing 
me of this?’ is answered only by ‘we’ll tell you when we get there.’ ”319  
Justice Doggett dropped a footnote to explain his use of Kafka: 
Charged on grounds unstated, accused by persons unknown, and 
tried in courts he cannot locate, Joseph K., a character depicted by 
Kafka, asks about this system cloaked in secrecy:  
[T]hough I am accused of something, I cannot recall 
the slightest offense that might be charged against me. 
But that even is of minor importance, the real question 
is, who accuses me?320 
Obviously, the majority did not fully share Justice Doggett’s concern, stat-
ing, in Justice Phillips’s words, that it “d[id] not, of course, endorse the 
Kafkaesque proceedings ‘shrouded in mystery’ against which the dissent-
ing opinion warns . . . hold[ing] only that the plaintiff in this case received 
all the process due him under the United States Constitution.”321 
United States v. Real Property Located at 2323 Charms Road was the 
government’s appeal of the district court’s award of attorney’s fees (under 
the Equal Access to Justice Act) and storage fees to a claimant who suc-
cessfully warded off a civil forfeiture proceeding.322  The government pre-
vailed on appeal to the Sixth Circuit over a dissent by Judge Merritt who 
noted that:  
The key allegations of the complaint are in the passive voice . . . 
[t]he source of the information is not stated [and that] [n]o specific 
person is alleged to have seen, heard, smelled or touched anything 
  
 316. 802 S.W.2d 659, 660 (Tex. 1990). 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 668 (Doggett, J., dissenting). 
 320. Id. at 668 n. 5 (quoting Franz Kafka, The Trial 16 (1937)) (emphasis added by the court). 
 321. Id. at 664 n. 7. 
 322. 946 F.2d 437, 438 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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that would make [the airplane the government tried to seize 
through forfeiture] a drug plane.323 
Judge Merritt went on to argue: 
The government’s use of language here is the same linguistic dou-
ble talk used by the police as they ensnared the hapless Joseph K. 
in Kafka’s The Trial.  How is either Joseph K. or the owner of 
property to reply when the case against him is based on unknown 
sources, unidentified people and an undescribed investigation?324 
Mendiola v. State is another courtroom translation case which resulted 
in a murder conviction for the defendant.325  Throughout the trial, simulta-
neous translation was provided by a bailiff (rather than a certified official 
interpreter), who by his own admission, sometimes failed to provide full 
word-for-word translation.326  However, because the appellant did not ob-
ject to specific instances of faulty translation, at trial, and did not identify 
any on appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant failed 
to preserve any error for appellate review.327  Justice YaZez dissented, ob-
serving that “[a] defendant who is subjected to ineffective translation must 
‘guess’ at what is going on around him [and that] [a]n atmosphere is cre-
ated where the defendant is hindered in effectively assisting his own de-
fense, a milieu worthy of Kafka but unworthy of this court’s imprima-
tur.”328  The justice continued by quoting Kafka: 
Naturally, therefore, the records of the case, . . . were inaccessible 
to the accused and his counsel, . . . consequently one did not know 
with any precision, what charges to meet; . . . accordingly it could 
be only by pure chance that it contained really relevant matter. . . .  
[E]vidence . . . could be guessed at from the interrogations.  In 
such circumstances the Defense was naturally in a very ticklish 
and difficult position.329 
In addition to quoting Kafka, Justice YaZez quoted, but did not translate, a 
work by Pablo Neruda titled “El Hombre Invisible.”330  Touché. 
  
 323. Id. at 438-39, 444-45 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
 324. Id. at 445. 
 325. 924 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi Dist. 1995). 
 326. Id. at 161, 162 n. 3. 
 327. Id. at 163. 
 328. Id. at 167 (Yanez, J., dissenting). 
 329. Id. (quoting Franz Kafka, The Trial 144 (Willa & Edwin Muir, trans., Random House 1956 
(1937)) (emphasis in original)). 
 330. Id.  The text of the poem: “ésta es la palabra, yo no soy superior a mi hermano pero sonrío, 
porque voy por las calles y sólo yo no existo, la vida corre como todos los ríos, yo soy el único invisi-
ble.”  Id. (quoting Pablo Neruda, Odas Elementales 8 (1980)). 
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Kafka was also quoted in Garcia v. State, yet another courtroom trans-
lation case.331  In his opinion for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 
Judge Keasler quoted the “babble of voices” language from Negron,332 and 
concluded his opinion by stating: “‘They deafened my ears with their gab-
ble.’  So said Kafka’s Joseph K of his trial.  Garcia might well make the 
same assertion.”333 
In Rice v. Wood, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit held that it was 
a non-structural harmless error for the death penalty to be imposed upon a 
criminal defendant who was absent from the courtroom when the jury re-
turned the sentence.334  Judge Nelson dissented, and concluded his dissent 
with an invocation of Kafka:  
The majority’s ruling in this case is the ultimate triumph of proce-
dure over substance; the person is now irrelevant to the process.  
This is the nightmare world of The Trial; it is not American Jus-
tice.  Like Josef K, David Lewis Rice was sentenced to death in 
absentia, and, like Josef K, Rice will go to his grave asking, 
‘Where is the judge whom I have never seen?’335 
United States v. Canady was another case about a criminal defendant 
who was sentenced in absentia.336  In explaining the court’s holding that 
the trial judge “violated [Marcus] Canady’s Sixth Amendment right to 
open public trial”337 by mailing him the verdict, rather than announcing it 
in open court,338 Judge Walker of the Second Circuit pointed out that 
“[o]urs is not the system of criminal administration that left Franz Kafka’s 
Joseph K. wondering ‘Where was the Judge whom he had never seen? 
Where was the high Court, to which he had never penetrated? even as his 
death sentence was carried out.”339  While the court of appeals did “not 
equate the district court’s decision to mail Canady’s verdict to the actions 
of the Court in Kafka’s The Trial, [it] hesitate[d] to excuse even such a 
minor violation of the public trial right.”340  In between his two references 
to The Trial, Judge Walker elaborated on his concerns, describing “[t]he 
traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials” by referring to “the 
  
 331. 149 S.W.3d 135, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
 332. Id. at 142 (quoting U.S. ex rel. Negron v. N.Y., 434 F.2d 386, 388 (2d Cir. 1970)). 
 333. Id. at 145-46 (quoting Franz Kafka, The Trial 51 (Penguin 1953)). 
 334. 77 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 335. Id. at 1146, 1150 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Franz Kafka, Der Prozess 194 (1935, 1979)). 
 336. 126 F.3d 352, 355 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 337. Id. at 362. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. (quoting Franz Kafka, The Trial 228-29 (Willa and Edwin Muir, trans., Schocken Books 
1992) (1937)). 
 340. Id. at 363. 
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notorious use of the practice by the Spanish Inquisition . . . the excesses of 
the English Court of Star Chamber, and . . . the French monarchy’s abuse 
of the lettre de cachet.”341 
Mediterranean Construction Co. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 
was an action by a construction company against its insurer, which had 
declined to provide a defense against a suit brought against it by a partner 
in a joint venture.342  State Farm moved for summary judgment, and a hear-
ing was scheduled.343 
On the morning of the hearing, the clerk telephoned counsel to re-
port that the court (Judge Horn) had granted the motion and [that] 
there would be no hearing.  Despite this, counsel for both sides ap-
peared, but were denied permission to argue the merits, object to 
the evidence, or respond to the other side’s papers.344 
The California Court of Appeals reversed, based upon the hearing re-
quirement in the California Code of Civil Procedure.345  In his opinion for a 
unanimous panel, Justice Crosby likened the trial court’s action to “the 
nightmare world of Franz Kafka’s The Trial where Josef K. was left won-
dering, ‘Where was the Judge whom he had never seen.’ ”346 
In Rose v. Superior Court, a state prisoner appealed the trial court’s 
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.347  The trial court held no 
hearing on his petition, and in its “terse minute order,”348 it “made no fac-
tual findings . . . [and gave] not so much as a hint why [it] ruled as it 
did.”349  In an opinion and order remanding the case to the trial court, is-
sued by a unanimous panel of the California Court of Appeals, Justice Gil-
bert first quoted from a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta,350 and then com-
mented that “Rose, like Kafka’s condemned prisoner Josef K., has been 
left to wonder, ‘Where was the Judge whom he had never seen?’ ”351  The 
original opinion in Rose was ultimately vacated after rehearing,352 but both 
  
 341. Id. at 362 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1948)). 
 342. 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 783 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1998). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 785 n. 9 (citing Canady, 126 F.3d at 363). 
 347. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 317 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000). 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. at 321 (“Courts, nonetheless, must not assume that all petitioners in habeas proceedings are 
attempting to ‘throw dust in [their] eyes . . . or [to] hoodwink a judge who is not over-wise’, and to 
perjure themselves ‘as a matter of course.’ ”) (quoting “Lord Chancellor’s Song,” Sir William Gilbert, 
Iolanthe (1882), Act I). 
 351. Id. (quoting Franz Kafka, The Trial 228-29 (Willa and Edwin Muir, trans., Schocken Books 
1992)). 
 352. See Rose v. Super. Ct., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000). 
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Gilbert and Sullivan353 and Kafka354 made it into the opinion as modified 
after rehearing. 
In Bulen v. Navajo Refining Co., Justice Trieweiler of the Montana 
Supreme Court rejected, in quite detailed fashion, a claim of Kafkaesque 
judicial operations made by a defendant that was sanctioned for discovery 
abuses: 
¶ 36  The Appellants further contend, in reliance on In re the 
Adoption of R.D.T., 778 P.2d 416, 418 [(Mont. 1989)], that the 
District Court’s use of deposition testimony solicited subsequent to 
the Appellant’s discovery responses invoked the wisdom of hind-
sight and that doing so results in a Kafkaesque nightmare.  The 
Appellants, however, have misconstrued our holding in Adoption 
of R.D.T. and Franz Kafka. 
¶ 37  In In re the Adoption of R.D.T., we held that the “court 
must strive to avoid the wisdom of hindsight in determining 
whether a pleading was valid when signed . . . .”  778 P.2d at 418.  
We did not establish a shield to protect litigants and their attorneys 
who engage in discovery abuse from evidence of their transgres-
sion just because such evidence was discovered after the document 
in question was signed.  In this case, the discovery abuse occurred 
at the time Gallagher signed the Defendants’ discovery responses 
and reply brief.  The subsequent testimony was simply evidence 
that the Defendants violated Rule 11, M.R.Civ.P., when the docu-
ments were signed, not knowledge gained via the wisdom of hind-
sight. 
¶ 38  In Franz Kafka’s short story The Trial, the main character 
K. was arrested for a crime.  See Franz Kafka, The Trial (Willa & 
Edwin Muir, tran., Schocken Books 1984) (1914).  K. did not 
know of what crime he was accused. K.’s struggle, at least in part, 
was a result of the fact that he could not discover the necessary in-
formation to defend his case.  During K.’s first interrogation, the 
following exchange occurred:  
Emboldened by the mere sound of his own cool words 
in that strange assembly, K. simply snatched the note-
book from the Examining Magistrate and held it up 
with the tips of his fingers, as if it might soil his hands, 
by one of the middle pages so that the closely written, 
  
 353. Id. at 849-50. 
 354. Id. at 852. 
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blotted, yellow-edged leaves hung down on either side.  
“These are the Examining Magistrate’s records,” he 
said, letting it fall on the table again.  “You can con-
tinue reading it at your ease, Herr Examining Magis-
trate, I really don’t fear this ledger of yours though it is 
a closed book to me . . . .” 
Franz Kafka, The Trial 41 (1914) (emphasis added).  K.’s attempt 
to defend himself is, as the Appellants describe it, a “nightmare” 
because K. is prohibited from accessing information about his 
case.  This is precisely the nightmare discovery rules were devel-
oped to alleviate.  The purpose of the Montana Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure is to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action.”  If anyone in this case is guilty of creating a 
“Kafkaesque” nightmare, it was the Defendants, who refused to 
comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure and refused to disclose 
information necessary for the proper preparation of the Plaintiffs’ 
case. 355 
Equal parts legal and literary analysis, Judge Triewiller’s opinion in Bulen 
is a perfect conclusion to this section. 
C. Literary Fellow Travelers 
In previous sections, I have mentioned opinions referring to Kafka that 
also refer to George Orwell,356 Jorge Luis Barges,357 a Gilbert & Sullivan 
operetta,358 Jonathan Swift’s novel Gulliver’s Travels,359 and Lewis Car-
roll’s Alice in Wonderland.360  It is in fact, fairly common for a judge to 
bundle a reference to Kafka with references to other, presumably more 
familiar, literary figures and works.  Those literary fellow travelers are the 
subject of this section.  I begin with George Orwell, continue with Joseph 
Heller’s novel Catch-22, and conclude with several highly evocative but 
less frequently cited fellow travelers. 
  
 355. 9 P.3d 607, 616 (Mont. 2000). 
 356. White v. State, 95 Cal. Rptr. 175, 181 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1971) (Friedman, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
 357. State v. Hurd, 734 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ohio 2000). 
 358. Rose, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 321 n. 2. 
 359. State v. Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 480 F. Supp. 929, 939 (E.D.N.C. 1979). 
 360. Bruno v. New Orleans Dept. of Police, 451 So. 2d 1082, 1102-03 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983). 
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1. George Orwell 
George Orwell is, by a slight margin, the most common literary fellow 
traveler, having been invoked in at least seventeen judicial opinions that 
also refer to Kafka.  As noted above, in White v. State, Justice Friedman of 
the California Court of Appeals spoke of “insidious evolutionary forces 
which propel us toward a collective, Orwellian society”361 in a dissenting 
opinion that found malice on the part of a police department that “was a 
bland cloak for official indifference, shunting [a] citizen in Kafkaesque 
fashion from agency to agency.”362 
In People v. Collier, a trial court opinion in a criminal case, Judge 
McQuillan of the New York Supreme Court managed to mention Kafka, 
George Orwell, and Catch-22363 in his discussion of the undercover activi-
ties of Detective Alvarez of the Bureau of Special Services.364  He invoked 
Orwell in a discussion of privacy: 
The citizens of this nation have an immense passion for pri-
vacy.  We have chosen not to live in a fishbowl environment.  Our 
form of government contemplates that there ought never to be cer-
tain types of surveillance and infiltration of persons and associa-
tions.  Free citizens in a free society must never fear their govern-
ment as an all-seeing intruder.  Such fear can only promote ano-
mie. 
  
 361. White, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 181 (Friedman, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 362. Id. at 184. 
 363. 376 N.Y.S.2d 954 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).  Judge McQuillian’s opinion appears to be 
the second to combine references to Kafka and Orwell, the first to combine references to Kafka and 
Catch-22 and, therefore, the first to combine references to all three. 
 364. Of all the police agencies that have ever merited references to Kafka, Orwell, or Catch-22, the 
Bureau of Special Services, known by the acronym BOSS, would seem be one of the most deserving of 
such treatment.  
 
BOSS was formed in October 1912 under the name Radical Bureau, and in the decades 
which followed, it changed names several times: the Neutrality Squad in 1915, the Radical 
Squad in 1923, the Bureau of Criminal Alien Investigation in 1931, the Public Relations 
Squad in 1945, the Bureau of  Special Services and Investigations in 1946, the Bureau of 
Special Services in 1955 . . . .  But its function remained essentially the same – to investi-
gate and control trouble-making subversives, whoever they happened to be.  During World 
War I, according to . . . Anthony Bouza, a former BOSS official, it was the “bomb throwers, 
German agents, and anarchists”; after the war it was the Communists and the labor agitators; 
during World War II it was the “bundists, fascists and other extremist groups.”  In the 
1950’s focus shifted back to the Communists, but, according to Bouza, the agency settled 
into a “rut of inactivity and disuse.”  The FBI had preempted the “espionage area” and the 
“Communist field,” it seemed, and left BOSS with little to do. 
 
Id. at 960 (quoting Zimroth, Perversions of Justice: The Prosecution and Acquittal of the Panther 47 
(Viking 1974)). 
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Alvarez’s reports that defendant was “in deep thought,” that 
defendant “seemed to have something on his mind,” his specula-
tive interpretation of the meaning of defendant’s “facial expres-
sions,” and his summary conclusion that defendant “seemed to shy 
away from the real answer” evoke remembrances of the Thought 
Police in Orwell’s “1984”: 
“There was of course no way of knowing whether you 
were being watched at any given moment.  How often, 
or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on 
any individual wire was guesswork.  It was even con-
ceivable that they watched everybody all the time. . . .  
You had to live – did live, from habit that became in-
stinct – on the assumption that every sound you made 
was overheard, and, except in darkness, every moment 
scrutinized.”365 
About twenty pages earlier, commenting more directly on Detective Alva-
rez, Judge McQuillan wrote: 
The “catch 22” quality of [the detective’s] answer, pregnant with 
innuendos – and not atypical of much of the evidence supporting 
the charges, particularly the conspiracy counts – becomes apparent 
upon a close second reading of the answer: “some sort of organiza-
tion trying to” do what?  “Attempts being formed” by whom?  
When?  Where?  Does the adverb “supposedly” connote anything 
more than a tentative assumption?  Finally, how can any one, in an 
American court of law, deal with an accusation that he “suppos-
edly was indirectly in control of the whole ballgame”?  The elu-
siveness of the charge is something Kafka’s characters might rec-
ognize – something hauntingly similar to accusing a person of hav-
ing an “over-all plan to harass society’s power structure.”366 
After characterizing Detective Alvarez’s two-year undercover project 
as an “open-ended, free-wheeling, people-watching mission unrelated to a 
proper police function”367 and a “sweeping, free-wheeling, penetrating and 
extremely protracted infiltration of the entire Lower East Side community . 
. . [,as contrasted with the situation] in which an undercover police officer 
courageously infiltrates a conspiracy of international drug dealers or an 
armed band of hi-jackers,”368 Judge McQuillan dismissed the indictments 
  
 365. Id. at 987. 
 366. Id. at 966. 
 367. Id. at 982. 
 368. Id. at 989. 
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(for conspiracy, possession of a weapon, and possession of stolen property) 
against the defendant.369 
People v. Privitera was the appeal of a physician and others who were 
convicted under California state law for conspiring to sell, and actually 
selling, laetrile, an unapproved drug for the treatment of cancer.370  A split 
panel of the California Court of Appeals reversed the convictions.371  Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Staniforth discussed nineteen cancer patients 
who had testified at trial, in support of the defendant physician: 
To these nineteen cancer victims the enforcement of Health 
and Safety Code section 1707.1 [under which laetrile was an un-
approved drug], the denial to them of medical treatment albeit un-
orthodox, albeit unapproved by a state agency, must surely take on 
a Kafkaesque, a nightmare, quality.  No demonstrated public dan-
ger, no compelling interest of the state, warrants an Orwellian in-
trusion into the most private of zones of privacy. 
The state has in the name of protecting the cancer victim 
criminalized the doctor who is willing to innovate, willing to try an 
unapproved drug with the consent of his patient.  From the termi-
nal patient’s viewpoint a new depth of inhumanity is reached by a 
broad sweep of this law so interpreted.  No compelling interest of 
the state requires Dr. Privitera’s nineteen cancer patients to endure 
the unendurable, to die, even forbidden hope.372 
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed the 
Court of Appeals, in a split decision.373  As her dissent, Justice Bird re-
printed Judge Stanisforth’s majority opinion, quoted above.374 
In United States v. Finazzo, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s suppression of evidence “obtained from electronic eavesdropping 
devices which FBI agents secretly installed by breaking into [the defen-
dant’s] offices.”375  In an opinion joined by Judge Cecil, Judge Merritt 
noted that “[t]he novels of Kafka and George Orwell evoke some of the 
same fears and concerns we feel when we contemplate the possibility that 
wholesale eavesdropping and wiretapping by federal and local police could 
spread and become customary.”376  Judge Merritt went on to observe that: 
  
 369. Id. at 992. 
 370. 141 Cal. Rptr. 764, 766 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1977). 
 371. Id. at 785-86. 
 372. Id. at 784. 
 373. People v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 920 (Cal. 1979). 
 374. Id. at 927. 
 375. 583 F.2d 837-38 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 376. Id. at 841. 
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Orwell’s image of 1984 is no longer fiction if we should hold that hun-
dreds of police officers across the country in every town and village have 
the power to break into homes and offices to plant electronic monitoring 
devices if they can obtain permission from a local magistrate in a secret 
hearing.377 
In Vargas v. Brown, Judge Pettine of the District of Rhode Island 
granted a petition for habeas corpus relief to a prisoner who argued that 
“he was denied due process by the state trial court’s refusal to enquire into 
the voluntariness of a prior statement made by . . . a witness at trial before 
permitting the prosecution to use that statement in impeaching [that wit-
ness’s] testimony.”378  After setting out the facts underlying the petition, 
which include a three-to-four-hour interrogation of a Spanish-speaking 
witness by non-Spanish-speaking detectives that concluded with the wit-
ness signing a statement typed by the detectives in English,379 Judge Pet-
tine summarized the facts of the case: 
Surely, this is a scene worthy of Kafka or Orwell: a man is interro-
gated for several hours in a language he poorly apprehends; he 
signs a statement in this language, which purports to be ‘his’; then, 
he is given an interpreter who translates ‘his’ statement into a 
comprehensible tongue in order that the man can understand what 
it was that he has said.380 
Russell v. National Mediation Board addressed “the question of 
whether jurisdiction exists under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 
151-188, to review refusal by the National Mediation Board to process an 
employee’s application to hold an election among a class of employees 
after the Board determined that those employees apparently desired to ter-
minate collective representation.”381 
After criticizing the Board for “playing games with the plaintiffs and 
with this court,”382 Judge Jolly of the Fifth Circuit stated, in a footnote: 
“Equally disturbing is the Board’s response, when asked why Russell had 
not been informed of the ‘preferred’ method of petitioning [the Board], that 
they had never been asked.  Mr. Orwell, meet Mr. Kafka.”383  However, 
despite the court’s determination “that certain of the Board’s positions 
  
 377. Id. at 842. 
 378. 512 F. Supp. 271-72 (D.R.I. 1981). 
 379. Id. at 276. 
 380. Id. 
 381. 714 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 382. Id. at 1342. 
 383. Id. at 1342 n. 12. 
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were Orwellian and Kafkaesque,”384 a subsequent Fifth Circuit panel af-
firmed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access 
to Justice Act.385 
In Bangert v. Hodel, employees of the United States Department of the 
Interior sought to enjoin, on constitutional grounds, the Department’s pro-
gram of random urinalysis and reasonable-suspicion drug testing.386  To-
ward the end of an order granting a preliminary injunction against random 
urinalysis and denying a preliminary injunction against reasonable- suspi-
cion drug testing, Judge Greene of the District of D.C. painted the follow-
ing word-picture: 
By contrast, if relief is not granted to the plaintiffs, the injury 
to them and the other Interior Department employees will be ir-
reparable, for the humiliation and indignity to which the employ-
ees would be subjected under the testing program could never be 
undone. 
Indeed, if the injunction does not issue, the following scene 
may become both familiar and commonplace: as the tourists view 
the majestic Interior Department buildings from the outside, there 
being lectured by their tour guides on the freedoms under our sys-
tem of government, on the inside of these buildings platoons of bu-
reaucrats will march in unending streams toward the Department’s 
toilets for their next urination procedure under the steady gaze of 
the government’s urination inspectors.  As the toilets are reached, 
these inspectors will make certain that the candidates’ outer gar-
ments are removed and nothing untoward has been hidden, that the 
water in the bowl is sufficiently blue, the urine is at the correct 
temperature of between 90.5 and 99.8 degrees Fahrenheit, and the 
cup is sufficiently full.  If the cup is not filled as required by the 
regulations, the employee will at this point be required to drink 
more liquids and then urinate again; and if the urine temperature is 
not satisfactory, the employee will likewise have to urinate again, 
this time under the direct visual observation of the inspector.  It 
may be expected that all this time many other presumably trusted 
and valued civil servants of the United States will stand in line, 
awaiting their turn at this procedure.  Only a Kafka, an Orwell, or a 
Gogol could do true justice to such a scene, or perhaps, in keeping 
  
 384. Russell v. Natl. Mediation Bd., 764 F.2d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Russell, 714 F.2d at 
1342 nn. 11-12). 
 385. Id. at 342. 
 386. 705 F. Supp. 643-45 (D.D.C. 1989). 
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with the farcical aspects of this tragedy, those modern masters of 
the absurd, Samuel Beckett or Eugene Ionesco.387 
Who needs novelists or playwrights when judges write like that? 
In State v. Schuller, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the defen-
dant’s conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol.388  As a 
factual matter, the defendant had been found by police officers asleep be-
hind the wheel of his car, which was parked in his driveway.389  He had a 
can of beer between his legs and a blood alcohol concentration of .177.390  
Judge Jones did not concur in the majority’s opinion, writing, to the con-
trary: “I vigorously dissent because the Kafkaesque result under the major-
ity opinion is outrageous.”391  In Judge Jones’s view, the defendant was 
“convicted of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol . . . without a scin-
tilla of evidence that he drove a vehicle even one foot, or that he intended 
to do so.”392  After musing that the majority’s reasoning would make it  
wholly illegal for a football fan, listening to the Ohio State-
Michigan game on the radio, to leave the confusion caused by the 
kids in his house on Saturday afternoon and retreat to his automo-
bile parked in the driveway, and partake of a six pack of beer, the 
virtues of which have been extolled by the media for hours,393 
Judge Jones concluded by stating: “The law has been applied, public policy 
has been served, and in true Orwellian fashion, another ‘drunk driver’ has 
been removed from the ‘streets.’ ”394  
In State v. Roman, Justice Berdon of the Connecticut Supreme Court, 
writing in dissent, quoted the reference to Kafka and Orwell in Vargas v. 
Brown395 to support the proposition that:  
Before a statement resulting from custodial police interrogation 
can be introduced, a defendant whose primary language is other 
than English must be advised in his or her primary language of the 
following rights: (1) to continuous word-for-word interpretation in 
  
 387. Id. at 655-56 (citations omitted). 
 388. 1992 WL 80713 at *2 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. Apr. 20, 1992). 
 389. Id. at *1. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. at *2.  Judge Jones went on to explain that “[i]n Franz Kafka’s famous novel The Trial, the 
central character, after being arrested, was required to prove his innocence to avoid conviction.”  Id. at 
*2 n. 3. 
 392. Id. at *2. 
 393. Id. at *4. 
 394. Id. 
 395. 512 F. Supp. 271 (D.R.I. 1981). 
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that language; and (2) to respond in that language, or alternatively 
to be interrogated only in the defendant’s primary language.396 
In the majority opinion from which Justice Berdon dissented, the court 
affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the police did not unconstitutionally 
coerce or violate the due process rights of the defendant by giving him 
Miranda warnings and a Miranda waiver form in Spanish and then con-
ducting a subsequent interrogation in English.397  In affirming the trial 
court, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s contention “that, be-
cause of his linguistic impairment [presumably, speaking English as a sec-
ond language], the federal constitution required continuous interpretation 
during his custodial interrogation.”398 
United States v. Heinz was a case about the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.399  In Heinz, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision 
to suppress several tape recordings of telephone conversations between a 
cooperating defendant and a suspect who had invoked his right to counsel 
during a search of his office, but who had not yet been indicted.400  Accord-
ing to the court, Heinz’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet 
attached at the time the government recorded his telephone conversa-
tions.401  While concurring with the majority’s Sixth Amendment analysis, 
Judge Parker dissented in part, based upon his concern “about the prosecu-
tion team’s utilization of a prosecutorial alter ego to secure statements 
from a target defendant who was, at the time of the clandestine interroga-
tion, represented by counsel on the matters about which the prosecutorial 
alter ego inquired.”402  In Judge Parker’s view: 
No alleged ‘chinese wall’ should be allowed to provide team 
prosecutors access to the ill-gotten gains from such prosecutorial 
alter ego interrogations.  In today’s world of advanced technology, 
such a rule runs an undue and unacceptable risk of sanctioning 
Orwellian investigative techniques and creating Kafkaesque judi-
cial administration.403 
National Treasury Employees Union v. United States Department of 
the Treasury involved a request for a preliminary injunction against the 
  
 396. 616 A.2d 266, 275-76 (Conn. 1992). 
 397. Id. at 268-69. 
 398. Id. at 270. 
 399. 983 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 400. Id. at 612. 
 401. Id. at 612-13. 
 402. Id. at 614. 
 403. Id. at 619 (citing George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949); Franz Kafka, The Trial (1925)). 
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Treasury Department’s use of an employee questionnaire.  In the words of 
Judge Greene: 
By requiring employees to answer incriminating questions, 
coupled with a warning that the answers could be used against the 
employee, the government is effectively coercing a waiver of im-
munity.  An employee who is discharged for refusing to answer 
under these circumstances is, in fact, being discharged for a refusal 
to waive his constitutional privilege.  Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 
431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977). 
The Court concludes that Customs is engaged in the 
Kafkaesque maneuver of attempting to reassure concerned em-
ployees falsely that the answers they provide will not be used 
against them – unless they are used against them.  Similarly, gov-
ernment counsel at the hearing on the motion strenuously insisted 
that the answers would not go to the Department of Justice, only to 
concede subsequently that there was no impediment to that at all.  
Employees should not be so misled; nor should courts.  A tribunal 
would plainly be justified in assuming the very real possibility of 
abuse by government officials when confronted with forms which 
ask highly personal questions and the answers are demanded 
through “1984”-like means.  The Court finds that the answers to 
Question 19, the other answers on the SF-85P, as well as the an-
swers to the other two forms, are compelled.404 
Perhaps needless to say, Judge Greene granted the injunction.405 
In McElroy v. United States, brought under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (“FTCA”), several plaintiffs sued for damages resulting from negli-
gence or intentional torts allegedly committed by government agents work-
ing as members of the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task 
Force.406  Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed, and proved at trial, that due 
to a clerical error in a search warrant, members of the task force bashed in 
the front door of their unit in a duplex (the actual suspect lived on the other 
side), took them to the floor roughly, and handcuffed them.407  Ruling in 
the defendants’ favor on the negligence claim, Judge Sparks of the Western 
  
 404. 838 F. Supp. 631, 639 (D.D.C. 1993) (footnote omitted). 
 405. Imagine the conversations that must have taken place around the keg when the Treasuries played 
the Interiors in the federal softball league.  (And imagine the lines in the locker room after the beer 
party if the game happened to be played at the home field of the Interiors . . .).  As for who should 
umpire the debate over which agency’s employees had it worse, who better than Judge Greene, who 
decided both Bangert and National Treasury Employees Union? 
 406. 861 F. Supp. 585, 587 (W.D. Tex. 1994). 
 407. Id. at 588, n. 1. 
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District of Texas noted that “[t]he FTCA does not waive the United States’ 
sovereign immunity in all cases where the acts or omissions of a federal 
employee are challenged,”408 and cited, in particular, the discretionary 
function exception.409  After stating that the discretionary function excep-
tion applied to bar the plaintiffs’ claims, Judge Sparks explained his deci-
sion in the following way: 
The Court should also mention the obvious underlying policy rea-
sons for exempting the United States from actions in negligence 
arising out of the discretionary decisions of its law enforcement 
agents and officers.  Were negligence actionable under these cir-
cumstances, law enforcement tactics would become hesitant, ap-
prehensive, and less effective.  In light of the rampant drug prob-
lem in this country, public policy assigns a high priority to the ag-
gressive enforcement of the drug laws.  Furthermore, by exempt-
ing negligence under these circumstances the Court does not sanc-
tion intentional police intrusions into the lives of innocent citizens.  
The Court is well aware of democratic peoples’ aversion to that 
type of Orwellian or Kafkaesque police activity.410 
In addition to granting judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’ negli-
gence claims, Judge Sparks also ruled in favor of the defendants on the 
plaintiffs’ intentional tort claims.411 
Blanca P. v. Superior Court was a case about accusations of child mo-
lestation, parental responses to therapy, and the so-called “confessional 
dilemma.”412  Regarding cases in which “the parent has complied with the 
service plan, but for some reason has not convinced a psychologist or so-
cial worker that it would be safe to return the child to the parent,”413 Justice 
Sills of the California Court of Appeals wrote: 
Let us be plain.  The idea that, despite enduring countless hours of 
therapy and counseling (much of it predicated on the possibly er-
roneous assumption that her husband is a child molester), a parent 
who has faithfully attended required counseling and therapy ses-
sions must still relinquish her child because she has not quite “in-
  
 408. Id. at 591. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. at 592 n. 13. 
 411. Id. at 595-96. 
 412. 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 689-90 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1996). 
 413. Id. at 694 (emphasis in the original). 
File: Potter-Macroed Created on: 4/26/2005 12:02:00 PM Last Printed: 5/18/2005 10:50:00 AM 
2005 ORDEAL BY TRIAL 265 
ternalized” what she has been exposed to has an offensive, Orwel-
lian odor.414 
The confessional dilemma, 
[O]ne of the most troublesome problems in juvenile dependency 
jurisprudence [is] the dilemma faced by a parent who is falsely ac-
cused of sexually molesting his or her child.  If the parent denies 
what any decent person must regard as a horrible act, that denial it-
self – as the agency’s argument here illustrates – may end up pre-
venting reunification.415 
According to Justice Sills: 
In considering this problem of the “confession dilemma,” a few 
basic (and for the most part commonplace) truths must be kept in 
mind.  Few crimes carry as much (or as much deserved) social op-
probrium as child molestation.  Most people would rather be ac-
cused of bank robbery.  The crime is usually done in secret. Proof 
is often difficult.  Perpetrators are not likely to admit their guilt.  
The victims of molestation may be too young, too frightened, too 
embarrassed or too dependent to provide credible evidence against 
the molester.  And innocent children need protection. 
But by the same token, it cannot be denied that it is an outra-
geous injustice to use the fact parents deny they have committed a 
horrible act as proof that they did it.  That really is Kafkaesque.  
And by the same token it is also unjust to use the fact that a parent 
denies molesting his or her child as the reason to terminate reunifi-
cation services – at least when (assuming we can be certain of such 
matters) the parent has been falsely accused.  Further, it is undeni-
able that false accusations of child molestation do happen.  In such 
a case, “denial” – in both its legal and psychological senses – 
should not become, perversely, the very fact which demonstrates 
the futility of reunification services.416 
In a footnote following the reference to Kafka, Justice Sills added:  
  
 414. Id. at 695-96 (citing In re Jamson O., 878 P.2d 1297, 1320 (Cal. 1994) (Baxter, J., dissenting) 
(“Under this radical new standard, any parent who is not sufficiently sensitive in a way that pleases 
Department-paid therapists will risk being found unfit.  This is the Orwellian new rule: If a therapist 
thinks a parent should be more loving and demonstratively affectionate, the parent loses the child – 
period and forever.”)). 
 415. Id. at 696 (emphasis in the original). 
 416. Id. at 696-97 (footnotes omitted). 
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Judging from Dr. LaCalle’s report, Blanca is not likely to be ac-
quainted with the tradition of dystopian literature exemplified by 
authors such as Orwell, Huxley and LeGuin.  But consider the elo-
quence of this testimony, ironically elicited by the deputy county 
counsel at the 18-month review hearing in response to a question 
as to whether Blanca would believe her daughter “if she said she 
was molested”: 
They keep telling me, just say – admit, say, say say it’s 
true that. [¶] And to me, they – they wash my head 
here, say, say, say.  But I don’t believe it.  The truth is, 
I don’t believe it, because I know my husband.  I have 
been with him for 12 years.417 
And in another footnote, Justice Sills demonstrated how the Kafkaesque 
can also be a Catch-22: 
If the [dependency] court believes a molest [sic] occurred and the 
family member could have been responsible a “true finding” is 
made and wardship declared.  If a father denies molest [sic] and a 
true finding is made, he suffers the ultimate Catch 22 – he can ei-
ther admit and take a chance that the department will allow him to 
begin reunification with his family or he can deny and no reunifi-
cation will occur. [¶] But the irony does not end there.  If the 
spouse supports her husband’s denial, she cannot be trusted to pro-
tect the child and she too will not be allowed to reunify with the 
child., a [sic] current assertion is that the mother must have known 
all along and failed to protect.  That then becomes a protective is-
sue and reason to remove the child from the mother. [¶]  Still 
worse, if the child denies the molest [sic], this can be seen as part 
of a “child abuse accommodation syndrome” and an additional 
reasons [sic] why the child should have no contact with the parents 
. . . .  Thus, all members of the family can deny a false molest [sic] 
allegation and, in each instance, the system uses the denial as evi-
dence of guilt.418 
 
In the end, the court granted the mother’s petition for a writ of mandate 
commanding the juvenile court to vacate its order terminating parental 
  
 417. Id. at 696 n. 8. 
 418. Id. at 697 n. 10 (quoting Alexander, Big Mother: The State’s Use of Mental Health Experts in 
Dependency Cases, 24 Pac. L.J. 1465, 1482 n. 81 (1993) (quoting San Diego Grand Jury, Child Sexual 
Abuse, Assault, and Molest Issues, Rep. Nos. 8, 2, 3 (June 29, 1992)). 
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rights, and to hold another hearing on the molestation allegations against 
the father.419 
United States v. Su was a case in which Kafka was initially invoked by 
a party.420  In Su, a criminal prosecution for conspiring to make false state-
ments to obtain immigrant visas by fraud and for obtaining visas unlaw-
fully, one defendant moved to suppress certain statements he had made to 
an agent of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”).421  It was 
undisputed that defendant Chan was separated from the other two defen-
dants and placed in a cubicle to await his turn to be interviewed by an INS 
agent.422  He was given Miranda warnings at the beginning of his inter-
view, which was conducted by an agent in a separate cubicle.423  According 
to Chan, he was in government custody from the time he was placed in the 
first cubicle to await his interview,424 and, Chan further argued, any con-
clusion to the contrary “would be ‘virtually Kafkaesque.’ ”425  Judge Mu-
kasey of the Southern District of New York disagreed on both legal and 
literary grounds: 
My disagreement with Chan’s legal conclusion is set forth in the 
text.  I chafe also at his literary allusion.  Chan may be arguing that 
his experience at INS recalls the surreal and threatening experi-
ences of Joseph K. in Franz Kafka’s The Trial, presumably the 
work to which Chan refers.  That argument is hyperbole for rea-
sons set forth in the text.  It is also peculiarly inapposite because 
when government agents told K. of his arrest at his home, they told 
him also that he was free to go about his business; he was not 
taken into custody – which was part of what made this encounter 
the first of K.’s many Kafkaesque experiences.  Franz Kafka, The 
Trial 21 (Compact Books ed.) (1925)).  But in no sense can the 
conclusion that Chan was not in custody before he entered Heer-
lein’s cubicle be characterized, even hyperbolically, as 
Kafkaesque; Orwellian maybe, but certainly not Kafkaesque.426 
One can only hope that Judge Mukasey’s discussion of Kafka and Orwell 
brought a smile to the face of the literature teacher who introduced him to 
those two authors. 
  
 419. Id. at 701. 
 420. 1997 WL 695655 *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1997). 
 421. Id. at *1. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. at **1-2. 
 424. Id. at *5. 
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. at *5 n. 1. 
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Arguably, the most famous judicial opinion with a reference to Kafka 
is Justice Scalia’s dissent in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin.427  In Martin, a 
seven-member majority of the United States Supreme Court ruled that the 
Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) requires the PGA Tour to allow 
disabled golfer Casey Martin to use a golf cart while playing in its tourna-
ments.428  Justice Scalia dissented, referring to: 
[T]his Court’s Kafkaesque determination that professional sports 
organizations, and the fields they rent for their exhibitions, are 
“places of public accommodation” to the competing athletes, and 
the athletes themselves “customers” of the organization that pays 
them; its Alice in Wonderland determination that there are such 
things as judicially determinable “essential” and “nonessential” 
rules of a made-up game; and its Animal Farm determination that 
fairness and the ADA mean that everyone gets to play by individu-
alized rules which will assure that no one’s lack of ability (or at 
least no one’s lack of ability so pronounced that it amounts to a 
disability) will be a handicap.429 
Franz Kafka, Lewis Carroll, and George Orwell in one sentence is 
quite the literary trifecta, even for a judicial stylist of Justice Scalia’s mag-
nitude.430  And, in keeping with Justice Scalia’s contrarian tendencies, it 
seems somehow fitting that while most other judges who invoke Orwell 
are inspired by Nineteen Eighty-Four, Justice Scalia turned, instead, to 
another Orwell classic, Animal Farm.  However, given the uproar that en-
sued when city leaders in Prague proposed naming a public square in 
Kafka’s honor–the proposal was withdrawn “after scholars insisted that 
Kafka would be aghast at the idea”431–it seems somewhat anomalous, if not 
ironic, for Justice Scalia to mention Kafka in an opinion about golf.  But, 
on the other hand, “[s]ome critics have seen [Kafka’s] work as a flatly 
bourgeois depiction of middle-class despair”432 and, as any dedicated 
golfer will attest, the golf course can be the source of its own special form 
of bourgeois middle-class despair. 
  
 427. 532 U.S. 661, 691 (2001).  See Michael Frost, Justice Scalia’s Rhetoric of Dissent: A Greco-
Roman Analysis of Scalia’s Advocacy in the VMI Case, 91 Ky. L.J. 167, 171 (2003) (quoting several 
literary references in Scalia’s dissent as examples of “language that attracts public attention”). 
 428. Id. at 691. 
 429. Id. at 705. 
 430. And in the very next sentence, Justice Scalia wrote, to conclude his opinion: “The year was 
2001, and ‘everybody was finally equal.’ ”  Id. (quoting Kurt Vonnegut, Harrison Bergeron, in Animal 
Farm and Related Readings 129 (1997)). 
 431. Litowitz, supra n. 1, at 104 (citing Kate Connolly, Kafka Would Hate to be a Square, say Pra-
gue Officials, 14 London Guardian Foreign Papers (Feb. 16, 2000)). 
 432. Litowitz, supra n. 1, at 133 (citing Georg Lukacs, Against a Misplaced Realism, in The World of 
Franz Kafka (J.P. Stern ed., 1980)). 
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In In re Leon G., the Arizona Supreme Court determined that the 
state’s Sexually Violent Persons (“SVP”) statute did not violate the federal 
substantive due process rights of those committed pursuant to it.433  While 
Justice Feldman concurred with the analysis and disposition of the issues 
covered in the majority opinion, he wrote “separately only to note that in 
this court [one of the plaintiffs] raised an as-applied challenge to the SVP 
statutes, describing the conditions under which the SVP inmates or patients 
are held in an almost Kafkaesque manner.”434  After drawing the distinc-
tion between civil commitment and punitive incarceration, Judge Feldman 
noted that: 
If the state is, in fact, incarcerating rather than treating the mentally 
ill, we will have improperly approved a system that has been de-
scribed as follows: “By committing individuals based solely on 
perceived dangerousness, the Statute in effect sets up an Orwellian 
‘dangerousness court,’ a technique of social control fundamentally 
incompatible with our system of ordered liberty guaranteed by the 
constitution.”435 
In United States v. Andrews, Judge Biery of the Western District of 
Texas was called upon to sentence a “strapping, six foot two inch tall 220 
pound twenty eight year old”436 criminal defendant who had stolen the 
identity, and seemingly the life savings of his neighbor, “an elderly lady, 
slight in stature, who appeared to the Court to weigh perhaps a hundred 
pounds dripping wet.”437  The sentence Judge Biery imposed, 120 months, 
included an upward departure of 105 months from the sentence the defen-
dant would have received under the federal sentencing guidelines.438  Judge 
Biery began his opinion with a speech written by Charles Dickens for his 
  
 433. 26 P.3d 481, 490 (Ariz. 2001) (Feldman, J., concurring). 
 434. Id. 
 435. Id. (quoting Adam J. Falk, Sex Offenders, Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility: The 
Constitutional Boundaries of Civil Commitment after Kansas v. Hendricks, 25 Am J.L. & Med 117, 
117 (1999)). 
 436. 301 F. Supp. 2d 607, 609 (W.D. Tex. 2004).  Judge Biery noted that a co-defendant had “died 
and will therefore have to face whatever karmic or spiritual punishment awaits her,” id., and suggested 
that “[p]erhaps Dante’s Eighth Circle [of Hell] would be apropos.”  Id. (citing Dante Alighieri, The 
Divine Comedy (The Inferno) Canto XXX (1321)).  One can only imagine the shape Dante’s master-
piece would have taken had the sentencing guidelines been in place during his time. 
 437. Id. at 608. 
 438. Id. at 607-08. 
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character Mr. Bumble,439 referred to comedian Flip Wilson’s character 
“Geraldine,”440 and concluded with a literary crescendo: 
Within the parameters of the rules of law cited, and our revered 
concepts of checks and balances and separation of powers, ulti-
mately one human being must don a black robe and sit in judgment 
of another.  It is an art – not a science to be imposed by computer-
ized formulae and statistics.  It is the constitutional duty of the ju-
dicial branch to practice that art conscientiously, courageously and 
independently of our legislative and executive friends and col-
leagues.  Indeed, the Court has had an occasional case where those 
who supported longer prison terms and circumscribed judicial dis-
cretion had a change of the human heart when their friend or loved 
one was perceived to be living a Kafkaesque/Orwellian Guideline 
Nightmare.  United States v. Kimmel, SA-01-CR-376-FB 
(W.D.Tex. Aug. 13, 2002); United States v. Barnes, No. DR-00-
CR-599(1)-FB (W.D.Tex. May 23, 2001).  Behold, the Ox re-
turns.441  Those who prey upon the elderly, and the financially un-
sophisticated who hope to become elderly with secure pensions, do 
greater economic damage and scar the social contract far more 
deeply than petty criminals serving longer sentences.  They are of-
ten those to whom much opportunity and education have been 
given and of whom much better is expected.  They corrupt their 
opportunities and education not to satisfy a physiological craving, 
but greedily to accumulate and consume, and to worship at the al-
tar of ill-gotten wealth.  Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy (The 
Inferno) Canto VII (1321) (Fourth Circle of Dante’s Inferno is oc-
  
 439. “If the law supposes that . . . the law is . . . a idiot . . . and the worst I wish the law is, that his eye 
may be opened by experience – by experience.”  Id. at 607 (quoting Charles Dickens, The Adventures 
of Oliver Twist 327 (Country Life Press 1900) (1897)).  According to Judge Biery, “Mr. Bumble might 
feel the same about the sentencing law in this case.”  Id. 
 440. Id. at 609, n. 3 (attributing to Geraldine the catch phrase “The Devil made me do it”). 
 441. The Ox plays a part in parable about lawyers that was once published by Noah Webster: 
 
A Farmer came to a neighboring Lawyer, expressing great concern for an accident which he 
said had just happened.  One of your Oxen, continued he, has been gored by an unlucky 
Bull of mine, and I should be glad to know how I am to make you reparation.  Thou art a 
very honest fellow, replied the Lawyer, and wilt not think it unreasonable that I expect one 
of thy Oxen in return.  It is no more than justice quoth the Farmer, to be sure; but what did I 
say? – I mistake – It is your Bull that has killed one of my Oxen.  Indeed says the Lawyer, 
that alters the case: I must inquire into the affair; and if – And If! said the Farmer – the 
business I find would have been concluded without an if, had you been as ready to do justice 
to others as to exact it from them. 
 
Id. at 611 n. 4 (quoting Noah Webster, The American Spelling Book (Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin 
1788)) (emphasis in the original). 
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cupied by the Avaricious, whose sin is excessive greed).  They 
need to receive a message: The punishment will fit the crime. 
The Court finds 120 months fits defendant Andrews. 
It is so ORDERED.442 
On appeal, Judge Biery’s sentence was vacated and the case was re-
manded for sentencing by a different district judge, on grounds that his 
“decision was fatally infected with antagonism toward the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines.443 
2. Catch-22 
Running a close second to Orwell as a literary fellow traveler with 
Kafka is Joseph Heller’s novel Catch-22.444  Interestingly, while judges 
have often invoked the name of George Orwell without naming one of his 
books, judicial references to Catch-22 generally omit the name of its au-
thor.  Like Collier and Blanca P., discussed above, the opinions discussed 
below also combine references to Kafka and Catch-22. 
Prince George’s County v. Blumberg, cited above for its “Kafkaesque 
drama,” also involved what Judge Wilner called “a ‘Catch-22’ master-
piece”445 created by the government’s argument that a permit applicant’s 
suit was bared because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 
by appealing to an administrative tribunal that lacked the authority to grant 
him the relief he sought.446 
In SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment Corp., 
  
 442. Id. at 611-12. 
 443. U.S. v. Andrews, 390 F.3d 840, 843 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 444. According to Judge Greene of the District of Columbia Circuit, “The Catch-22 label from Jo-
seph Heller’s book of the same name has been applied so often to so many situations that it has by now 
acquired the status of a cliché.”  Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 876 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Greene, J., concurring).  After so noting, Judge Greene continued: 
 
But it is difficult to imagine a situation where that label is more apt: a corporation is summa-
rily designated by a governmental agency as a “Cuban national,” but it is not allowed effec-
tively to defend itself against that designation on the theory that, because it is a “Cuban na-
tional,” the designating agency need not permit it to be represented by counsel to challenge 
the designation.  If there are precedents in American law to such circular processes, they 
have not been pointed out to us. 
 
Id.  Judge Ginsburg also mentioned Catch-22 in her opinion for the court, id. at 869 n. 5, and Judge 
McKinnon mentioned “the coils of a Kafkaesque bureaucracy,” id. at 878, in his dissent, but none of 
the three judges referred to both Kafka and Catch-22. 
 445. 407 A.2d 1151, 1162, 1164 (Md. Spec. App. 1979). 
 446. Id. at 1164. 
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[t]he less easily resolved question posed by [the] case [was] 
whether the SEC should be awarded summary judgment [in a civil 
action against Sam Ford] on its securities claims on the basis of 
Ford’s wire fraud conviction, when the same jury [that found Ford 
guilty of wire fraud also] acquitted him on those [criminal securi-
ties] charges.447 
In response to that question, “[t]he defendant, with a literary flair, 
ask[ed] ‘(i)s it consistent with traditional principles of equity to hoist a 
convicted defendant on the petard of his acquittals?  Collateral estoppel, 
Catch 22 or Kafka?’ ”448  Judge Tenney did “not share the defendant’s 
melodramatic sentiments,”449 and granted summary judgment to the SEC, 
reasoning that Ford’s “wire fraud conviction necessarily rest[ed] on factual 
findings that constitute the securities violations alleged here.”450 
Dodson v. United States Department of the Army, like Dimensional 
Entertainment, contains a Kafka/Catch-22 double-dip drawn directly from 
a party’s brief: “Overall Dodson argues that, through an incorrect record 
placed into his OMPF–an EER 110–followed by a ‘Kafka[e]sque night-
mare of Catch 22s, Army bungling, and the Army repeatedly violating its 
own regulations,’ the Army has erroneously barred him from reenlist-
ing.”451 
In United States ex rel. Green v. Peters, Judge Shadur began his opin-
ion by stating that “[a]ll too often the representatives of the Illinois Attor-
ney General’s office appear in the federal court system wearing false–or at 
least misleading–colors.”452  At issue in Peters was the Attorney General’s 
role in impeding access to habeas corpus relief for convicted criminal de-
fendants who were, for various reasons attributable to the State, effectively 
denied the appeal they are guaranteed under state law.453  After criticizing 
the Attorney General for making “the Catch-22 argument that habeas cor-
pus does not lie because petitioners have not exhausted their state reme-
dies,”454 Judge Shadur reconsidered his choice of literary references: “Per-
haps ‘Kafkaesque’ might be a more elegant and appropriate characteriza-
tion than ‘Catch-22,’ given Kafka’s The Trial and the judicial-system con-
  
 447. 493 F. Supp. 1270, 1277 (S.D.N.Y 1980). 
 448. Id. (quoting Ford Mem. at 10). 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. 
 451. 988 F.2d 1199, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 452. 1994 WL 8258 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1984). 
 453. Id. 
 454. Id. at *3.  That argument was a Catch-22 because chronic understaffing in the appellate defend-
ers’ office resulted in direct appeals that were often filed after a defendant had served most or all of his 
or her sentence.  Id. 
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text in which the Attorney General has asserted his outrageous posi-
tions.”455 
In another case from Illinois, Eaglin v. Welborn, the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s granting a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus.456  At trial, the defendant attempted to deny that he had committed the 
crime of soliciting murder for hire and to assert an entrapment defense.457  
The trial court “refused to instruct the jury on the entrapment defense be-
cause Eaglin was also denying that he had any intent to kill, one of the 
essential elements of the crime charged, and, therefore, was denying that 
he had committed the crime.”458  In the view of Judge Will, 
[t]his case is a classic example of life being stranger than fiction.  
It has both Catch-22 and Kafkaesque qualities.  The refusal to al-
low Eaglin to assert both that he had not sought to have anyone 
killed and therefore was not guilty of the crime charged, and that 
any of his arguably incriminating acts of statements were induced 
by entrapment, was a form of Catch-22.459 
After stating the facts of the case, including the lack of a real hit 
man,460 the fact that the defendant “never paid a penny to have anyone 
killed,”461 and actually stated on a number of occasions that he did not 
want anybody to be killed,462 Judge Will observed that “Franz Kafka could 
have made much of this scenario.”463 
In Streett v. United States, Dr. Streett and his wife were the subjects of 
an Internal Revenue Service investigation who sought to quash a third-
party summons served upon their accountant on Fifth Amendment 
grounds.464  Prior to the hearing on the Streetts’ motion to quash, the 
United States moved to quash subpoenas the Streetts had served on several 
IRS employees.  The Magistrate Judge granted the government’s motion to 
quash, and the Streetts objected.465  Before Judge Michael of the Western 
District of Virginia, the government argued that the information the 
Streetts sought through their subpoenas was privileged, within the meaning 
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A) by virtue of 26 C.F.R. § 3001.9000-1, which 
  
 455. Id. at *3 n. 8. 
 456. 41 F.3d 268, 275 (7th Cir. 1994).  The petitioner’s victory was short-lived; the case was reheard 
en banc, and the full court reversed the trial court.  See Eaglin v. Welborn, 57 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 457. Id. at 269. 
 458. Id. 
 459. Id. at 272. 
 460. Id. 
 461. Id. at 273. 
 462. Id. 
 463. Id. 
 464. 1996 WL 765882 at *1 (W.D. Va. Dec. 18, 1996). 
 465. Id. at *1. 
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requires IRS approval before IRS employees may testify in court.466  In 
rejecting the government’s argument, Judge Michael noted: 
The Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 
U.S. 462 (1951), upheld a similar regulation under challenge and 
concluded that a federal employee refusing to obey a subpoena 
based on such a regulation could not be held in contempt of court 
as a consequence of his noncompliance.  The Supreme Court and 
Justice Frankfurter (in a concurring opinion) carefully delineated 
the limits of Touhy.  The decision pointedly avoided the traps of a 
potential Kafkaesque Catch-22: you can reach the employees by 
the legal process, but you cannot subject them to judicial review; 
you can subject the agency head to judicial review, but you cannot 
reach him by the legal process.  See Joseph Heller, Catch-22 
(1955).  Justice Frankfurter summarized the distastefulness of such 
an outcome: “To hold now that the [agency head] is empowered to 
forbid his subordinates, though within a court’s jurisdiction, to 
produce documents and to hold later that the [agency head] himself 
cannot in any event be procedurally reached would be to apply a 
fox-hunting theory of justice that ought to make Bentham’s skele-
ton rattle.” 340 U.S. at 473 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 469 
(“The validity of the superior’s action is in issue only insofar as we 
must determine whether the [agency head] can validly withdraw 
from his subordinates the power to release department papers.”) 
(opinion of the Court).467 
Judge Michael, of course, deserves extra credit for adding Jeremy Ben-
tham’s skeleton to the mix, and Bentham, in turn, deserves mention for the 
measures he took to keep his skeleton from rattling.468 
In the first line of his opinion in Peterson v. Lacy, Judge Patterson of 
the Southern District of New York declared: “In this habeas corpus peti-
tion, to misquote Yogi Berra, ‘It’s Catch-22 all over again.’ ”469  The 
  
 466. Id. at *3. 
 467. Id. 
 468. In addition to his contributions as a legal scholar and political philosopher, Bentham was a 
scientist.  
  
After Bentham’s death, in accordance with his directions, his body was dissected in the 
presence of his friends.  The skeleton was then reconstructed, supplied with a wax head to 
replace the original (which had been mummified), dressed in Bentham’s own clothes and set 
upright in a glass-fronted case.  Both this effigy and the head are preserved in University 
College, London.  
  
2 Encyclopaedia Britanica 110 (15th ed. 2003). 
 469. 1998 WL 883302 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1998). 
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“Kafkaesque comedy of errors”470 that inspired Judge Patterson’s evocative 
ménage à trois471 involved the petitioner’s ill-fated attempt to serve a state-
court sentence that was to run concurrently with a federal sentence for a 
parole violation.472  The petitioner’s difficulties stemmed, in large measure, 
from the repeated failure of state prison officials to release him to federal 
custody for the purpose of being sentenced on his parole violation.473  Ul-
timately, Judge Patterson rejected a report and recommendation from a 
Magistrate Judge and granted the petitioner a writ of habeas corpus.474 
People v. Henley addressed the question “[w]hen the prior conviction 
of . . . a [serious] felony [in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury 
on any person other than an accomplice] is alleged for purposes of the 
three strikes law, must the prosecution prove that the injured party was not 
an accomplice?”475  Answering that question in the affirmative for a unani-
mous panel of the California Court of Appeals, Justice Thaxter explained 
that “[p]lacing the burden of proof on [the defendant]/appellant while re-
stricting his proof to the record of a proceeding in which he had no oppor-
tunity to litigate the issue can aptly be described as a ‘Catch 22.’ ”476  In a 
footnote, Judge Thaxter noted that “[a]ppellant uses another literary refer-
ence, ‘Kafkaesque,’ to describe the predicament he faced because of the 
lower court’s ruling.”477 
In Bowers v. Radiological Society of North America, Inc., the issue 
was the interplay between the statute of limitations and the continuing vio-
lation doctrine in the context of a Title VII sexual harassment claim.478  
Ruling in favor of the plaintiff on the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment, which was based upon an argument that the plaintiff knew long 
before filing suit that she had been harassed, Judge Bucklo of the Northern 
District of Illinois explained: 
The law here is a bit tricky, but the key point is that it is the actual, 
and not the imagined, accrual of the cause of action that triggers 
the continuing violation doctrine.  It would be neither fair nor in 
  
 470. Id. 
 471. Picture, if you will, Yogi Berra, Joseph Heller, and Franz Kafka setting down together to throw 
back a couple of brewskis – pilsner, I would presume, if Kafka is buying.  For a discussion of judicial 
uses of the alleged Yogi Berraism “déjà vu all over again,” see Parker B. Potter, Jr., A Good Piece of 
Paper Spoiled: An Eighteen-Hole Round-up of American Hole-in-One Jurisprudence, 2 DePaul J. 
Sports L. & Contemp. Problems 152, n. 107 (2004). 
 472. Peterson, 1998 WL 883302 at *1. 
 473. Id. 
 474. Id. at 10. 
 475. 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 124 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1999). 
 476. Id. at 129 (citing Joseph Heller, Catch 22 (1961)). 
 477. Id. at 129 n. 6. 
 478. 98 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
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accord with the law to say that if Bowers failed to file charges pre-
paratory to bringing a lawsuit that she would have lost on a motion 
to dismiss or summary judgment because her cause of action had 
not accrued that she must later lose the claims on which she could 
not then have sued if the harassment subsequently did indeed ripen 
into actionable behavior.  That would be a genuine Catch-22: 
heads, defendant wins, tails, plaintiff loses.  The law is not so 
Kafkaesque.479 
Nicholson v. Williams was a class action against various agencies of 
the City of New York filed by mothers whose children had been taken 
away because those mothers had been abused by their husbands or boy-
friends.480  As Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York de-
scribed the situation in the fact section of his order: 
For the mother and her children the situation is devastating.  Even 
a Kafka would be hard put to address her Catch-22 situation: “You 
have a right to your child, abused mother, but the child will be 
taken.”  “You have a right to due process before your child is 
taken, but we will take your child first.”  “You have a right to 
counsel to defend your rights in court, but we will assign counsel 
in a way that prevents her from protecting you.”  “The judge will 
protect you, but she cannot do so until effective counsel is avail-
able to you and such counsel is not available.”481 
The foregoing quotation leaves little doubt as to the resolution of the case; 
Judge Weinstein granted the plaintiffs the preliminary injunction they were 
seeking.482 
Pontarelli v. United States Department of the Treasury was a case 
about the procedure by which felons may seek restoration of the right to 
possess firearms.483  18 U.S.C. § 925(c) “allows convicted felons to apply 
to ATF [the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] for restoration of 
their firearms privileges, and gives district courts jurisdiction to review a 
‘denial’ by ATF of a felon’s application.”484  However, “[s]ince 1992, 
Congress has provided in each ATF appropriations bill that ‘none of the 
funds appropriated herein shall be available to investigate or act upon ap-
plications for relief from Federal firearms disabilities.’ ”485  That ban, in 
  
 479. Id. at 955 (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted). 
 480. 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 481. Id. at 227. 
 482. Id. at 260. 
 483. 285 F.3d 216, 217 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 484. Id. 
 485. Id. 
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turn, “prevents ATF from acting upon – and thus from denying – felons’ § 
925(c) applications.”486  The question presented in Pontarelli was whether 
“the district courts have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) to review 
convicted felons’ applications for restoration of their firearms privileges 
when ATF, pursuant to Congress’s mandate, is unable to do so.”487  The 
majority of an en banc panel of the Third Circuit concluded: “Section 
925(c) gives district courts jurisdiction to review applications only after a 
‘denial’ by ATF.  The appropriations ban renders ATF unable to deny in-
dividual felons’ applications, and thus effectively suspends § 925(c)’s ju-
risdictional grant.”488  Concurring in the judgment, Judge McKee “agree[d] 
that the tension between the legislative history of the appropriations ban on 
the Secretary’s investigation mandated under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) requires 
the result the majority reaches,”489 but was “not persuaded that Congress 
actually intended to repeal [the courts’] subject matter jurisdiction under § 
925(c).”490  In Judge McKee’s view, Congress did not intend to repeal the 
courts’ jurisdiction, but only to “[create] a situation that leaves the jurisdic-
tional grant in place while making its exercise absolutely impossible,”491 
thus “plac[ing] the applicant as well as the courts in a Catch-22 reminis-
cent of a Kafka novel.”492  Judge McKee concluded by observing that he 
felt like a circus worker who had “been handed the shovel, and invited to 
clean up after the elephant.”493 
In addition to the opinions in which Kafka and Catch-22 are paired up 
in the same sentence or phrase, as in “Kafkaesque Catch-22”494 or “Catch-
22 reminiscent of a Kafka novel,”495 there are several others that employ 
both literary references, but deploy them more distantly from one another, 
to describe different things. 
Wickham v. Hall was the case of a woman who was discharged from 
the United States Army only to have her discharge revoked on grounds that 
  
 486. Id. 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id. at 231. 
 489. Id. 
 490. Id. (emphasis in the original). 
 491. Id. 
 492. Id. at 236.  Why a “Catch-22” would not be reminiscent of Heller novel is a question for a big-
ger brain than mine. 
 493. Id. at 238.  Not long after Pontarelli was decided, the big shovel came out.  In U.S. v. Bean, 537 
U.S. 71, 78 (2002), the Supreme Court unanimously held that “the absence of an actual denial of [an 
applicant’s] petition by ATF precludes judicial review under § 925(c),” thus reversing the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s determination that “the District Court had jurisdiction to review ATF’s (in)action.”  Id. at 73 
(citing U.S. v. Bean, 253 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 2001)).  Justice Thomas, it should be noted, announced the 
decision of the Court without reference to either Kafka or Catch-22. 
 494. Streett, 1996 WL 765882 at *3.  
 495. Pontarelli, 285 F.3d at 236.  
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it was obtained fraudulently.496  After the Army revoked Wickham’s dis-
charge, it attempted to institute court-martial proceedings against her for 
fraudulently obtaining her discharge.497  Wickham challenged the court-
martial, seeking to have the Army’s charges against her tried in a civilian 
court.498  The question presented to the Fifth Circuit was “whether Article 
3(b) [of the Uniform Code of Military Justice] may constitutionally confer 
court-martial jurisdiction over a person who has received a discharge that 
is later challenged by the issuing service on the ground [that] it was fraudu-
lently procured.”499  Writing for the majority, which ruled in favor of the 
Army, Judge Clark noted that while Wickham’s argument for trial in a 
civilian court “presupposes that an unfair resolution of the issue awaits her 
before the military tribunal . . . military courts are not Kafkaesque Star 
Chambers.”500 
Writing in dissent, Judge Thornberry argued that Wickham was not 
questioning the fairness of the result that awaits her in a military court, but 
arguing that “since she is not a soldier, she may not be tried as a sol-
dier.”501  While Kafka entered both the majority and the dissenting opin-
ions in the context of commenting on the quality of military justice, Judge 
Thornberry turned to Catch-22 to describe the reasoning of the majority 
which, in his view, “implicitly indulged in the impermissible assumption 
that Wickham is guilty of the fraudulent act with which she is charged.”502  
That is, “[i]n order to exercise jurisdiction over Wickham a court-martial 
must necessarily presume that she is a servicewoman.  However, she 
would only be a servicewoman if she is guilty of the very offense for 
which it wishes to try her; fraudulent separation from the service.”503  Ac-
cording to Judge Thornberry: 
There is no way out of this catch-22; the Army wishes to try her to 
prove her guilt, but it cannot try her unless her guilt has already 
been proved.  The fallacy inherent in an argument is often most 
clearly revealed by the illogical consequences of its application.  If 
Wickham is tried by court-martial and then acquitted, it will mean 
that she was validly discharged.  If she was validly discharged, 
then she was a civilian all along, and was not subject to military ju-
risdiction.  Of course, if the military lacked jurisdiction to try her, 
  
 496. 706 F.2d 713, 714 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 497. Id. at 715. 
 498. Id. 
 499. Id. 
 500. Id. at 717. 
 501. Id. at 724. 
 502. Id. at 719. 
 503. Id. at 720. 
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of what value is the determination by a court-martial that she is in-
nocent, and therefore a civilian?  The argument circles endlessly 
back to its source, confounded as it is by its own impermissible 
premise.504 
In State v. Huff, Judge Borden of the Connecticut Court of Appeals de-
clined to address “a potential defect in the jury charge which [defendant’s 
counsel] did not raise at trial,”505 explaining that “do[ing] so would turn 
this appeal into a ‘Kafkaesque academic test [in] which [the trial judge] 
may be determined on appeal to have failed because of questions never 
asked of him or issues never clearly presented to him.’ ”506  In a later sec-
tion of the opinion, Judge Borden addressed the trial court’s rulings that 
sustained two objections to the defendant’s closing argument.507  At issue 
was the defendant’s attempt to argue that his failure to flee from a subse-
quent encounter with the person he was alleged to have earlier robbed and 
assaulted was an indication of a consciousness of innocence.508  However, 
the defendant did not testify, thus providing the jury with no evidence that 
he had not recognized the alleged victim, which “was a necessary predicate 
for an inference that the defendant’s failure to flee was a sign of his inno-
cence.”509  Without the defendant’s testimony, Judge Borden observed that 
“the jury would have been placed in the realm of speculation, not reason-
able inference, by the defendant’s final argument.”510  Judge Borden then 
went on to explain that: 
[D]efense counsel’s argument placed the state in a Catch-22 situa-
tion.  Before the state’s final closing argument, it requested that the 
jury be excused so that it could obtain some guidance from the 
court as to how far it could properly go in responding to that part 
of the defendant’s final argument which had been permitted, with-
out running afoul of the prohibition against commenting on a de-
fendant’s failure to testify.  State v. Allen, 517 A.2d 1043, [1048] 
[Conn. App. 1986)].  The state’s only rebuttal to defense counsel’s 
argument, namely, to point out the absence of evidence on the is-
sue of recognition, might have implicated the defendant’s right not 
to testify, since the defendant would be the natural person to sup-
ply the missing evidence.  Id. at 1049.  The defendant cannot have 
  
 504. Id. at 721. 
 505. 523 A.2d 906, 910 (Conn. App. 1987). 
 506. Id. (quoting State v. Cosby, 504 A.2d 1071, 1075 (Conn. App. 1986)).  The phrase “Kafkaesque 
academic test” has a long and distinguished history.  See infra pt. V(C). 
 507. Id. at 911. 
 508. Id. 
 509. Id. at 912. 
 510. Id. 
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his constitutional cake and eat it too.  He cannot exercise his con-
stitutional right not to testify and, at the same time, ask the jury to 
draw an inference of innocence supportable solely by testimony 
which only he could have given.  See United States ex rel. Leak v. 
Follette, 418 F.2d 1266, 1268 (2d Cir. 1969) . . . (accused who in-
vokes constitutional privilege not to testify may not “impose on the 
prosecution shackles that would be unavailable to a man who testi-
fies in his own defense”).511 
People v. Tilbury was another case involving the rights of a person 
found not guilty of a criminal offense by reason of insanity: “The question 
before [the California Supreme Court was] whether appellant, who has 
been found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a state hospi-
tal, is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of his eligibility for placement in a 
community mental health program as a supervised outpatient.”512  In Cali-
fornia, one year as an outpatient in a community mental health program is 
a necessary prerequisite for the unconditional release of a person who has 
been found not guilty by reason of insanity.513  The court held that “the 
relevant factors do not, singly or in combination, support the conclusion 
that it violates due process for a judge [rather than a jury] to consider an 
insanity acquittee’s application for placement in a community mental 
health program.”514  In dissent, Justice Mosk first noted the court of ap-
peals’ observation that  
Tilbury could be caught in a classic Catch-22: although under [In 
re] Franklin[, 496 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1972),] Tilbury would have the 
right to a jury review of his fitness for unrestricted release, it is 
possible that during his almost 24-year term of confinement no 
jury would have the chance to undertake this review, because a 
judge might deny access to the prerequisite supervised outpatient 
program.515 
After discussing an opinion from the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice 
Mosk noted: “Our statutory scheme does not offend due process in quite 
the same manner.  But if the offensive elements in our scheme are differ-
ent, they are no less Kafkaesque.”516 
Finally, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno ad-
dressed a petition for “a permanent injunction enjoining the INS from us-
  
 511. Id. at 912-13. 
 512. 813 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Cal. 1991). 
 513. Id. at 1320. 
 514. Id. at 1326-27. 
 515. Id. at 1328. 
 516. Id. at 1333. 
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ing confidential information in adjudicating [petitioner’s] IRCA [Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act] applications.”517  In American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, the petitioners’ applications were denied based 
upon classified information linking them to the Popular Front for the Lib-
eration of Palestine (“PFLP”).518  In granting the petitioners’ request for an 
injunction on due process grounds, Judge Wilson of the Central District of 
California explained that “[t]he INS’s reliance on undisclosed, classified 
information in this case imposes on plaintiffs the nearly impossible burden 
of proving two negatives – that they are not members of the PFLP, and that 
the PFLP does not advocate any of the statutorily-disapproved doc-
trines.”519  Judge Wilson went on to note that “the D.C. Circuit [had] lik-
ened such a position to the dilemma faced by Joseph K. in Franz Kafka’s 
The Trial, and [had] concluded that ‘[i]t is difficult to imagine how even 
someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a burden.’ ”520  
While Judge Wilson granted petitioners the injunctive relief they sought, 
he rejected their argument that he was not entitled to conduct an in camera 
ex parte review of the classified information on which INS based its deci-
sion.521  Judge Wilson justified his decision in the following way: 
Accepting plaintiffs’ position regarding the in camera submission 
would place the Court in a “Catch-22” position of needing to make 
a determination as to the procedural fairness of allowing the INS 
adjudicator to consider the information while simultaneously the 
Court would be unable to examine the information. “Blindfolded” 
judging is not required.522 
3. Other Fellow Travelers 
George Orwell and Catch-22 are the dynamic duo of fellow travelers, 
and Judge Greene is a superhero in his own write523 for referring to Kafka, 
Orwell, Gogol, Samuel Becket and Eugene Ionesco within a single sen-
tence.524  But even after Judge Greene’s impressive literary roll-call, there 
remain several more pairings with Kafka worthy of note. 
  
 517. 883 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 518. Id. 
 519. Id. at 1376. 
 520. Id. (quoting Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
 521. Id. at 1376 n. 11. 
 522. Id. 
 523. John Lennon, In His Own Write (Simon & Schuster 1964). 
 524. See Bangert v. Hodel, 705 F. Supp. 643, 655-56 (D.D.C. 1989). 
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Franz Kafka has been paired up with Lewis Carroll in at least four 
opinions, two of which have already been mentioned.525  United States v. 
Schultz was a criminal case in which the defendant moved for a new trial 
on grounds that “one of the jurors ingested controlled substances so as to 
‘materially and substantially impair [his] ability to intelligently understand 
and comprehend the evidence and legal instructions in this case and pre-
vented an intelligent deliberation thereon, and did render him unfit to per-
form his duties as a juror.’ ”526  As Judge Woods described the right at is-
sue:  
To a society which values the jury system and rule by law, it is al-
most inevitable, in order to avoid the kind of nightmares described 
so graphically in Alice in Wonderland or by Kafka, that defendants 
would be found to have a due process right to a ‘sane and compe-
tent jury’ – as indeed they have been.527 
Ultimately, however, Judge Woods denied the defendant’s motion for a 
new trial or an evidentiary hearing.528 
In re Chicago Lutheran Hospital Assn. involved an application for 
compensation and reimbursement filed by a Chapter 11 debtor’s attor-
ney.529  In declining to grant the attorney the full amount requested, Judge 
Ginsberg noted that the attorney “has not proved that all of the attorney 
services in question were necessary to preserve or maximize the value of 
the secured creditors collateral,”530 and went on to observe that: 
Franz Kafka or Lewis Carroll would be proud of an argument that 
it was necessary, for the good of the secured creditor, that the 
debtor, over the objection of the secured creditor, use up large 
amounts of the secured creditor’s cash collateral in a futile reor-
ganization effort; or that it was necessary for the secured creditor’s 
interest that the debtor, again over the opposition of the secured 
creditor, unsuccessfully seek to effect sales of the hospital property 
at prices which were inadequate to satisfy the secured creditor’s 
claim; and finally, that it was necessary for the good of the secured 
creditor that the debtor’s attorneys spend large amounts of time 
  
 525. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 705 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bruno v. Dept. 
of Police, 451 So. 2d 1082, 1102-03 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983). 
 526. 656 F. Supp. 1218, 1219 (E.D. Mich. 1987). 
 527. Id. at 1220 (citing Sullivan v. Fog, 613 F.2d 465, 465 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 528. Id. at 1225. 
 529. 89 B.R. 719, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). 
 530. Id. at 729. 
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preparing briefs advocating their rights to be paid out of the se-
cured creditor’s collateral.531 
Charles Dickens is another common Kafka companion.  Judge Biery’s 
recent opinion referring to Oliver Twist’s Mr. Bumble,532 discussed supra, 
is one of at least five opinions that link the twentieth-century Czech and 
the Victorian-era Englishman. 
In State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert, Justice Neely of the West Virginia 
Supreme Court “endeavor[ed], with some apprehension, to clarify the 
proper procedures at the dispositional stage of a juvenile proceeding”533 
and went on to note that the facts of the case before the court “constitute[d] 
a veritable primer on how a juvenile should not be handled by the courts 
under either [the court’s] prior rulings or the applicable sections of Chapter 
49 of the W. Va. Code.”534  Early in his opinion, Justice Neely observed 
that “the control of juveniles and the treatment of juveniles (if that expres-
sion can be used without conjuring Kafkaesque images) are frequently 
irreconcilable goals.”535  Later in his opinion, Justice Neely explained: 
Some things we have enough knowledge to treat and other things 
we do not have enough knowledge to treat.  Broken homes, uncar-
ing parents, learning disabilities, Dickensian poverty, parental 
abuse, and an unhealthy environment are all things which the 
State, “solicitous of the welfare of its children but also mindful of 
other demands upon the State budget for humanitarian purposes,” 
can begin to cure.536 
Finally, toward the end of his opinion, Justice Neely wrote about the 
fight “to show that ‘treatment’ [for juvenile offenders] is often a caricature 
– something worthy of a story of Kafka or a Soviet mental hospital.”537  
Still in West Virginia, still within the realm of mental health, and just over 
a year later, Justice Neely began his opinion in E.H. v. Matin by stating: 
“Once again this Court’s attention must be focused on the ‘Dickensian 
Squalor of unconscionable magnitudes’ of West Virginia’s mental institu-
tions.”538  After presenting a dispassionate accounting of various shortcom-
ings at the Huntington State Hospital, Justice Neely summed up his discus-
  
 531. Id. at 729 n. 12. 
 532. U.S. v. Andrews, 301 F. Supp. 2d 607 (W.D. Tex. 2004). 
 533. 269 S.E.2d 401, 405 (W. Va. 1980). 
 534. Id. at 406. 
 535. Id. at 408-09. 
 536. Id. at 411 (quoting State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318, 331 (W. Va. 1977)). 
 537. Id. at 416. 
 538. 284 S.E.2d 232, 232-33 (W. Va. 1981) (quoting State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 
120 (W. Va. 1974)). 
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sion as having “focused on the tragic impact of the hospital’s Kafkaesque 
lack of coordination.”539 
McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. was an appeal to the 
Second Circuit by an attorney against whom sanctions had been imposed 
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.540  In a discussion 
of Rule 11 sanctions, Judge Cardamone explained: 
Over the last several decades burgeoning and voluminous discov-
ery requests of dubious merit with attendant escalation of needless 
costs made the prospect of a Jarndyce v. Jarndyce mentality in 
modern American litigation a distinct possibility, with lawyers en-
gaged in “stages of an endless cause, tripping one another up on 
slippery precedents, groping knee deep in technicalities, running 
their . . . heads against walls of words, and making a pretense of 
equity with serious faces, as players might.”  C. Dickens, Bleak 
House, 12-13.541 
In a subsequent discussion of appellate court sanctions, Judge Cardamone 
noted “the ‘Kafkaesque dream’ of courts being besieged by motions to 
sanction attorneys for making frivolous motions for sanctions.”542 
Kafka and Dickens are most closely linked in Jenkins v. State.543  In 
that case, Joseph Jenkins sued in state court “for damages resulting from 
his alleged fraudulent conviction of murder in 1957 and wrongful incar-
  
 539. Id. at 236. 
 540. 896 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 541. Id. at 21.  Jarndyce v. Jarndyce was a case discussed in Bleak House.  Fossa v. Fossa, 869 A.2d 
58, 60 n. 8 (R.I. 2005).  In that per curiam opinion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court explained: 
 
Quite frankly, the travel of this case reminds us of the mythical case of Jarndyce v. 
Jarndyce, which Dickens so devastatingly satirized over 150 years ago in Bleak House.  He 
describes that pertinent case as follows: 
 
“[Jarndyce v. Jarndyce] drones on.  This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, be-
come so complicated, that no man alive knows what it means.  The parties to it under-
stand it least; but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it 
for five minutes without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises.”  
Charles Dickens, Bleak House 7-8 (George Ford & Sylvère Monod eds., W.W. Norton 
& Co. 1985) (1853). 
 
We wish to emphasize, however, that the Rhode Island court system is not the Court of 
Chancery of the Victorian era, and we are determined to see to it that our cherished system 
never descends to anything approaching that ignominious level. 
 
Id. 
 542. Id. at 24 (quoting Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th 
Cir. 1986)). 
 543. 615 So. 2d 405 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993). 
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ceration for thirty years.”544  The suit was removed to federal court.545  
Jenkins filed a second suit in state court, and then moved to remand the 
first case back to state court.546  His motion to remand was denied, and 
ultimately the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute.547  Based upon 
the decision in the federal case, the State moved to dismiss the second state 
action on grounds of res judicata.548  The trial court, relying upon La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 13:4232,549 denied the State’s motion to dismiss, and the Lou-
isiana Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining: 
In the present case, plaintiff alleges that he has been the victim of a 
horrendous injustice.  His interest in proceeding with the law suit 
outweighs any interest in the strict application of res judicata, es-
pecially considering that his predicament is the result of his attor-
ney’s conduct and not his own.550 
Judge Byrnes concurred with reasons: 
[La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §] 13:4232(1) should be reserved for truly ex-
ceptional circumstances and applied sparingly.  However, there is 
something disturbing about using an unusual combination of ar-
cane procedural technicalities to allow the justice system to pre-
vent the respondent from redressing what may have been an outra-
geous injury inflicted upon him by that very system of justice.  The 
rigid application of res judicata to these facts seems more like 
some legalistic nightmare from Charles Dickens’ Bleak House or 
Franz Kafka’s “Vor Dem Gesetz” than the American justice sys-
tem.  This is one of those exceedingly rare instances that cries out 
for the application of [La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §] 13:4232(1).  I fear 
that to do otherwise would be to cast our justice system in a poor 
light and supply munitions to the literary armory of some contem-
porary Dickens or Kafka.551 
While many of Kafka’s fellow travelers are venerable literary figures, 
Kafka has also been linked to at least one piece of American popular cul-
ture: Rod Serling’s Twilight Zone.  In State v. Leach, the Ohio Court of 
  
 544. Id. at 406. 
 545. Id. 
 546. Id. 
 547. Id. 
 548. Id. 
 549. That statute provides, in pertinent part: “A judgment does not bar another action by the plaintiff: 
(1) When exceptional circumstances justify relief from the res judicata effect of the judgment.”  La. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:4232(1). 
 550. Jenkins, 615 So. 2d at 406-07. 
 551. Id. at 407. 
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Appeals rejected a criminal defendant’s argument that the trial court erred 
in imposing consecutive sentences without specifically “indicat[ing] what 
facts of the case applied to the [required statutory] findings” that supported 
the imposition of consecutive sentences.552  After noting that the trial court 
articulated reasons for its ruling and that “nothing in the statutory scheme . 
. . requires the court to note specific factors for each individual finding,”553 
Judge Gallagher, writing for the majority, stated that “[r]equiring anything 
more than is expressly stated in the statute would turn the imposition of a 
legally sufficient consecutive by a trial court into an episode of The Twi-
light Zone.”554  Judge Karpinski concurred and dissented: 
The majority here predicts that requiring a reason to be aligned 
with its related finding would turn the trial court into an episode of 
The Twilight Zone.  On the contrary, to require anything less turns 
the appellate court into a Kafkaesque episode in which the burden 
falls on appellate judges to divine the nexus between a finding and 
all the facts in a record.  In other words, if the trial court is not re-
quired to provide the nexus, this burden would fall on the review-
ing court.  The reviewing court, therefore, would not be reviewing 
a specific reasoning process; it would be walking around with a 
divining rod.555 
While no other twilight zone reference is quite as explicit as Judge Karpin-
ski’s, the other two leave little doubt that their authors also intended to 
invoke Serling’s topsy-turvy fictional world by referring to the twilight 
zone.556 
  
 552. 2004 WL 637769 at *3 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. Apr. 1, 2004). 
 553. Id. 
 554. Id. at *4. 
 555. Id. at *6.  One is left to wonder whether, in Judge Karpinski’s view, the creator of The Twilight 
Zone qualified as a divining Rod. 
 556. Three other cases combine a reference to Kafka with the phrase “twilight zone,” but in two of 
those cases, the source of the twilight zone reference would appear to be Justice Van Orsdel of the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals rather than Rod Serling, see Haney v. Pagnanelli, 830 A.2d 978, 
981 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923) (“Just when a 
scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is 
difficult to define.  Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recog-
nized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony [deduced] from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”)); 
Trach v. Fellin, 817 A.2d 1102, 1120 (Pa. Super. 2003) (Klein, J., dissenting) (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 
1014), while in the third, the source would appear to be Justice Jacobs of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, see Sperling v. Bd. of Rev., 720 A.2d 607, 607 (N.J. 1998) (quoting Janovsky v. Am. Motorists 
Ins. Co., 93 A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. 1952)). 
  In addition to quoting the “twilight zone” language from Frye, in Judge Klein’s dissent, Trach 
has become celebrated in its own right for stating that: “Clearly, however, our supreme court did not 
intend that trial courts be required to apply the Frye standard every time scientific experts are called to 
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In Wagenmann v. Adams, Judge Selya of the First Circuit began with a 
quotation from seventeenth-century poet George Herbert,557 and then pro-
ceeded to lay out the remarkable story of a man illegally arrested for alleg-
edly attempting to disrupt his daughter’s wedding.  According to the father 
of the bride, the successful plaintiff in a § 1983 action against the police 
officers who arrested him, he had traveled from his home in New York to 
Massachusetts to reconcile with his daughter and give her a gift on the eve 
of her nuptials.558  In the words of the inimitable Judge Selya: “What 
awaited Wagenmann in Massachusetts was not reconciliation but instead, a 
doorway into the twilight zone.  His passage through this phantasmagoric 
portal culminated in his arrest, imprisonment, and commitment to a mental 
institution.”559  In a discussion of the defendants’ unsuccessful argument 
that the trial court had awarded excessive compensatory damages, Judge 
Selya quoted the trial judge’s comment that “[p]laintiff undoubtedly ex-
perienced a horrific thirty-six hours . . . under what could be described as 
Kafkaesque procedures.”560  In another case originating in Ohio, Judge 
Ryan of the Sixth Circuit, quoting the district court, characterized the State, 
in a habeas corpus action, as advocating a position that “would result in 
dragging ‘[the petitioner] into a Kafkaesque cycle of proceedings from 
which there is no escape . . . .”561  Judge Ryan further noted that the district 
court had also described the petitioner’s plight as a “‘twilight zone’ sce-
nario.”562 
Literature and popular culture are not the only sources of fellow travel-
ers for judicial references to Kafka; history, too, has provided its share of 
judicial glosses on Kafka.  The paragon of this genre is Judge Walker of 
the Second Circuit, who mentioned Kafka, the Spanish Inquisition, the 
English Court of Star Chamber and the French lettre de cachet in his dis-
cussion of the repugnance of secret trials.563  As noted above, judges have 
also written of “Kafkaesque victim[s] of Star Chamber secret proceed-
  
render an opinion at trial, a result that is nothing short of Kafkaesque to contemplate.”  817 A.2d at 
1110.  That phrase has been quoted in at least four subsequent opinions, all from Pennsylvania courts.  
See Commw. v. Dengler, 843 A.2d 1241, 1243 (Pa. Super. 2004); Ford ex rel. Pringle v. Phila. Hous-
ing Auth., 848 A.2d 1038, 1054 (Pa. Commw. 2004); Campbell-Perfilio v. Penn DOT, 2004 WL 
2212894 at *18 (Pa. Com. Pl. Ct. June 10, 2004); Haney, 830 A.2d at 982 (quoting Trach, 817 A.2d at 
1110).  Judging by the early returns, this short line of cases seems likely to become a full-fledged 
parade, at least in Pennsylvania. 
 557. 829 F.2d 196, 199 (1st Cir. 1987) (“Marry your son when you will; your daughter when you 
can.”). 
 558. Id. at 201. 
 559. Id. 
 560. Id. at 216. 
 561. Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1519 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 562. Id. 
 563. Canady, 126 F.3d at 362. 
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ings”564 and “Kafkaesque Star Chambers.”565  Finally, in an opinion in 
which he referred to both Kafka and Orwell while affirming the district 
court’s decision to suppress certain evidence obtained from electronic 
eavesdropping devices,566 Judge Merritt of the Sixth Circuit reported that 
the eighteenth-century British jurist Lord Camden had “criticize[d] the Star 
Chamber Judges who issued search warrants without parliamentary author-
ity and thereby ‘usurped a general superintendence . . . and exercised a 
legislative power over all matters relating to the subject.’ ”567 
Kafka has even been given a biblical running buddy.  Shaw v. United 
States was the case of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense who chal-
lenged his termination from a noncareer executive assignment.568  As a 
noncareer employee, Shaw was subject to removal upon the change of 
presidential administrations and, in fact, as a Nixon appointee, he was ter-
minated early in the Carter administration.569  Despite being subject to ter-
mination by an incoming administration, Shaw wanted more information 
about why, precisely, he “no longer had the confidence of his superiors and 
was no longer suitable to them.”570  While he ultimately ruled against 
Shaw, Judge Nichols of the U.S. Court of Claims expressed sympathy for 
his position: 
It is understandable to the court that [Shaw’s] inability to generate 
a conversation on such matters [i.e., why the new administration 
had lost confidence in him] might induce a feeling in the victim 
like one of Kafka’s heroes, or of the prophet Job, who said ‘would 
that mine enemy had written a book,’ meaning, let me know what I 
am accused of.571 
D. Drawing Kafka into the Case 
Some of the more entertaining judicial references to Kafka are those 
that bring the long-dead author back to life and employ him as a character, 
or at least a presence, in the analysis of the case at hand.  So hoary is this 
rhetorical device that it has been utilized in the titles of at least three law 
  
 564. U.S. v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting). 
 565. Wickham v. Hall, 706 F.2d 713, 717, 724 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 566. U.S. v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 567. Id. at 843 (quoting 19 Howard’s State Trials at 1069). 
 568. 640 F.2d 1254, 1255 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
 569. Id. at 1256. 
 570. Id. 
 571. Id. at 1258. 
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review articles, in which Kafka meets, respectively, Torquemada,572 Sche-
herezade,573 and Charles Dickens.574  And, as noted above, Franz Kafka 
was introduced to George Orwell by Judge Jolly of the Fifth Circuit in 
footnote 12 of Russell v. National Mediation Board.575  In addition to de-
picting Kafka performing the aforementioned meet-and-greets, judges have 
personified Kafka as a writer, as an imaginer of things to write about, and 
as an ironic observer. 
1. Kafka as Writer 
Several invocations of Kafka as writer have already been quoted: 
“[o]nly a Kafka, an Orwell, or a Gogol could do true justice to such a 
scene,”576 and “Franz Kafka could have made much of this scenario.”577  
There are others. 
In the most curious of those references, Judge Nettesheim of the U.S. 
Claims Court invoked the image of Kafka not as an author, but as a stenog-
rapher: “The backdrop for this case before the court after argument on 
cross-motions for summary judgment is an administrative process that 
would have invited Franz Kafka to take notes.”578  In Siano v. Blum, the 
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court vacated a decision by 
the State Commissioner of Social Services to terminate Leonard Siano’s 
home assistance, explaining, in an unsigned memorandum decision, that in 
the administrative process to which Siano was subjected, “[t]he final blow 
was struck at the fair hearing he had requested to protest his case’s termi-
nation, the minutes of which read as though written by Kafka.”579 
Winkler v. State School Building Authority580 was a taxpayer suit 
brought to challenge the issuance of certain revenue bonds the School 
Building Authority proposed to issue.  In a concurring opinion replete with 
erudite historical references and discussions of economic theory, which 
focused, inter alia, on the differences between government and business, 
  
 572. John C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine 
to Administrative Proceedings, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1289 (1997).  Dubin’s article has been cited in at 
least nine judicial opinions. 
 573. Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 
14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 51 (1999). 
 574. Anna Lou Dehavenon, Charles Dickens Meets Franz Kafka: The Maladministration of New 
York City’s Public Assistance Programs, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 231 (1989-90). 
 575. 714 F.2d at 1342 n. 12. 
 576. Bangert, 705 F. Supp. at 656.  Judge Greene is too modest; it is difficult to see how Kafka, 
Orwell, or Gogol could improve upon his colorful description of drug testing in the national parks. 
 577. Eaglin, 41 F.3d at 273. 
 578. O’Connell v. U.S., 14 Cl. Ct. 309, 310 (Cl. Ct. 1988). 
 579. 433 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1980). 
 580. 434 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1993). 
File: Potter-Macroed Created on:  4/26/2005 12:02:00 PM Last Printed: 5/18/2005 10:50:00 AM 
290 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 3, No. 2 
Justice Neely observed that “Reaganomics was really Keynes as restated 
by Kafka.”581 
Finally, in State v. Whiting, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court’s decision to dismiss a murder indictment against Terry Lee 
Whiting on grounds that too much time–fourteen years–had elapsed be-
tween the murder for which Whiting was indicted and the date of the in-
dictment.582  Judge Young dissented, observing that “[f]rom the eyes of the 
defendant, this case is a horror story which could have been written by 
Franz Kafka”583 and that “[t]his court is appending another chapter to the 
sorry tale by sending the case back for another hearing on an issue that the 
state cannot possibly win.”584 
2. Kafka as Imaginer 
Before a writer can set pen to paper, he or she must think up something 
to write about.  Several judges have invoked the image of Kafka exercising 
his imagination. 
Fish v. Simpson tells an extraordinary tale of a canny interloper who 
manipulated the legal system to the point where he was able to have the 
lawful tenant of an apartment he coveted served with a court order granting 
him immediate possession.585  After recounting the facts of the case, Judge 
Silbermann of the New York City Civil Court noted that the “infamous 
Order to Show Cause . . . without a hearing resulted in the police forcibly 
reinstating [the interloper’s] occupancy to the subject premises and the 
commencement of the instant proceedings in a manner only Franz Kafka 
would have thought possible.”586 
  
 581. Id. at 440 (Neely, J., concurring). 
 582. 1997 WL 568018 at *2 (Ohio App. 2d Dist. Sept. 5, 1997). 
 583. Id. at *4.  Judge Young identified Kafka as the “Austrian novelist of The Trial and other works 
wherein he recorded modern man’s fate of having been caught in an incomprehensible nightmare 
world.”  Id. at *4 n. 1.  Judge Young concluded his dissent by stating: “I would affirm and end this 
Kafkian nightmare.”  Id. at *5.  While approximately 310 opinions use the adjective “Kafkaesque,” 
only one other opinion, Ragland v. Karmy, 1995 WL 1056008 at *6 (Vir. Cir. Oct. 24, 1995), uses the 
adjective “Kafkian.” 
 584. 1997 WL 568018 at *4. 
 585. 477 N.Y.S.2d 946, 949-51 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1984). 
 586. Id. at 951.  As it turns out, Kafka references in landlord-tenant disputes are not uncommon in 
New York.  Corbin v. Harris, 400 N.Y.S.2d 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 1977), involved a pair of 
landlords caught between an administrative mandate to restore their building to lawful occupancy by 
reducing the number of dwelling units from three to two, and a tenant who was immune from judicial 
enforcement of her obligation to pay rent due to the illegality of her unit, an illegality that could not be 
corrected while the tenant still resided in the illegal third unit.  In the words of Judge Hirsch of the New 
York Supreme Court: 
 
In way of clarification, at this point, we have a situation in which the landlords, who are in 
violation of the law because of the “illegality” of their basement apartment, cannot evict 
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In State of Maine v. Thomas, a declaratory judgment action brought by 
several states and environmental groups to compel the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency to fulfill its promise to promulgate air pollution regula-
tions, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on jurisdic-
tional grounds, with Judge Selya observing that “[e]ven Kafka would have 
found it difficult to devise a more twisted antilogy” than the argument ad-
vanced by the plaintiffs to the effect that the six-year-old promise they 
sued to enforce was not a final agency action. 587 
Atwater v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer & Regula-
tory Affairs was another administrative law case.588  At issue was the juris-
diction of an administrative law judge, as opposed to the Superintendent of 
Insurance, to resolve the plaintiff’s claims under the consumer protection 
provisions of the District of Columbia’s compulsory no-fault motor vehicle 
insurance statute.589  In response to the District’s claim that the case should 
be remanded to the Superintendent of Insurance, Judge Schwelb stated, for 
a unanimous panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals: 
Given this history, remanding the action now would have the ef-
fect of telling Mr. Atwater, four years after he filed the complaint 
in the office which the District now says is the right one, that be-
cause the case was assigned by the agency to be heard by one of its 
offices rather than by another, he must begin the process all over 
again.  As Mr. Atwater justifiably remarks, “Franz Kafka could not 
imagine a more horrific bureaucratic scenario.”590 
  
their tenant to remove the violation.  They cannot obtain rent even at the reduced rental, as 
the tenant simply refuses to pay, and to add to the Kafkaesque situation, they are obligated 
to supply their unwanted “guest” with free gas, electricity and hot water.  For six and one-
half years this injustice has been perpetuated.  The tenant has been tenacious both in her re-
fusal to remove herself and in her refusal to pay rental for the apartment she occupies.  The 
landlords are frustrated in their inability to register the premises as a multiple dwelling and 
thwarted by the inflexibility of statutory technicalities. 
 
The law, as pertains to this instance, is punctilious, uncompromising and embarrassing 
in its result, most certainly, inconsistent with our preferred concepts of law as sagacious and 
venerable.  Fortunately, the rigid confines of statutory law can, on appropriate occasion, be 
tempered with the more pliable remedies of Equity. 
 
Id. at 311.  Remarkably, a similar situation arose in yet another case from New York, Aponte v. Santi-
ago, 630 N.Y.S.2d 869 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1995).  In Aponte, the court relied in part on the 
decision in Corbin in granting the landlords a judgment of possession.  630 N.Y.S.2d at 871. 
 587. 874 F.2d 883, 886, 889 (1st Cir. 1980) (quoted in Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Adminstr, 
U.S. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
 588. 566 A.2d 462 (D.C. 1989). 
 589. Id. at 463. 
 590. Id. at 469. 
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Pettibone Corp. v. Payne (In re Pettibone Corp.) involved an attempt 
by Pettibone, a corporation subject to bankruptcy protection, to discharge a 
tort claim against it which arose “22 months after the first claims bar date, 
3 ½ months before confirmation.”591  In a suit for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, “Pettibone argue[d] that publication notice to unknown creditors 
almost two years before [tort claimant] Payne was injured comprised ade-
quate notice to Payne, and that Payne’s suit should be barred since she 
failed to file a timely claim.”592  Judge Schmetterer of the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois understood Pettibone’s argument 
to be based on one of two implications: (1) “that, once Payne was hurt, she 
should have immediately ascertained whether any parties that might be 
liable were in bankruptcy and, if so, race to the court file to see if a claim 
should be filed before any Plan was confirmed;”593 or (2) 
that uninjured persons who wish to protect themselves in the event 
of future injuries have the burden of monitoring national financial 
papers (such as those in which Pettibone published) to read notices 
about business they have no claims against because they are on no-
tice of claim bar dates affecting any future injuries caused by such 
companies.594 
As to the second implication, Judge Schmetterer opined that “Franz 
Kafka would have been able to accept such a legal principle in one of his 
stories; the Bankruptcy Code and the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution cannot.”595 
Finally, in Walthall v. United States, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s decision that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was not 
obligated to provide Robert and Dorothy Walthall with direct notice of an 
audit of a tax-shelter partnership in which they had invested.596  Judge 
Noonan concurred and dissented, beginning his opinion in the following 
way: 
Cornwallis surrendered to Washington to the tune of The World 
Turned Upside Down.  The surrender ended taxation without rep-
resentation.  The American republic has taken another turn when 
the government can successfully take the position that although it 
knows the identities of the taxpayers adversely affected by its ac-
tion it has no obligation to tell them of the actions because the tax-
  
 591. 151 B.R. 166, 169 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
 592. Id. at 172. 
 593. Id. 
 594. Id. (emphasis in the original). 
 595. Id. 
 596. 131 F.3d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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payers failed to follow government regulations that were not in ex-
istence. 
That the government knew the names and interests of the tax-
payers is not disputed.  That in 1985 (and indeed for five years) the 
regulations were not in existence is not disputed.  So the govern-
ment rests its case by pointing to 26 U.S.C. § 6223(c)(2) which 
says, “The Secretary shall use additional information furnished to 
him by the tax matters partner or any other person in accordance 
with regulations prescribed by the Secretary.”  No regulations, no 
need to use the additional information.  Q.E.D. 
Kafka could have designed such a world.  I do not believe that 
Congress did.597 
A bureaucracy so absurd that Kafka could not have designed it must be a 
dreadful bureaucracy indeed. 
3. Kafka as Observer 
Not only have judges conjured up images of Kafka hunched over his 
writing desk or engaged in the process of imagining what to write about 
next (whatever that may have looked like), judges have also inserted Kafka 
into their opinions as a detached ironic observer of the factual scenarios 
they are confronted with.  Such is the Kafka, who, along with Lewis Car-
roll, would have been proud of the bankruptcy lawyer’s argument in In re 
Chicago Lutheran Hospital Assn.,598 quoted at length in part IV(C)(3), 
supra, or the Kafka who, in Nicholson v. Williams,599 “would [have been] 
hard put to address [the] Catch-22 situation”600 of abused mothers and their 
children, discussed in part IV(C)(2), supra. 
In Carmona v. Insurance Arbitration Forums, Inc., an unsigned memo-
randum decision of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme 
Court recounted an amazing story of bureaucratic misadventure involving 
the New York Arbitration Commission and the New York State Insurance 
Department and concluded by noting that “[o]nly Kafka could have appre-
ciated the sequence of events and the conclusion.”601 
Terry Oilfield Supply Co. v. American Security Bank, N.A. returns us to 
the Kafkaesque world of bankruptcy.602  In that case, Terry Oilfield Supply 
  
 597. Id. at 1297. 
 598. 89 B.R. at 719. 
 599. 203 F. Supp. 2d at 153. 
 600. Id. at 227. 
 601. 469 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1983). 
 602. 195 B.R. 66 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996). 
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received certain real property interests by means of two court-authorized 
post-petition transfers from the reorganized debtor.603  When the debtor 
sought to have Terry defend its title to that property as a claim in its bank-
ruptcy, Judge Hughes ruled that “[t]he court-approved contract alienate[d] 
the debtor’s property from the bankruptcy estate [such that] the estate can-
not get it back,”604 further explaining:  
It is one thing to assert that the mere existence of a bankruptcy 
puts people who had pre-petition dealings with the debtor on no-
tice that their property may be challenged in the reorganization, but 
even Kafka would fail to appreciate the idea that those who have 
dealt with the debtor in possession are required to participate in 
every proceeding to assure themselves that the debtor will not mis-
takenly act as if it still owns the property it has sold.605 
In Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., the California Su-
preme Court ruled that under California’s unfair competition law (“UCL”), 
“a private, for-profit corporation may maintain on behalf of the general 
public an unfair competition action against a retailer who, in violation of 
the Penal Code, sells cigarettes to minors.”606  Justice Brown dissented, 
calling the case a “poster child for [the] sort of abusive litigation”607 that 
uses the California UCL as “a means of leveraging settlements at the ex-
pense of the public interest.”608  By Justice Brown’s calculation, the suit 
before the court was one of eight nearly identical actions filed by the same 
attorney, against almost 2000 defendants, seeking injunctive relief, more 
than $50 billion in restitution, and attorney’s fees.609  She also observed 
that the corporate plaintiff, Stop Youth Addiction (“SYI”), had no employ-
ees, did no business other than filing lawsuits, and had virtually no source 
of funding other than the attorney’s fees it won in successful lawsuits.610  
Moreover, it seems that SYI did not even have to file a lawsuit in order to 
get paid.  Justice Brown noted that the record from another SYI suit in-
cluded “evidence of attempts by . . . [Stop Youth Addiction’s attorney] to 
obtain . . . payments from franchise defenders prior to filing the lawsuit (in 
which they would be accused of committing a crime), in exchange for 
dropping their names from the action.”611  “[I]t also appear[ed] from the 
  
 603. Id. at 72. 
 604. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(2)(B)). 
 605. Id. 
 606. 950 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Cal. 1998). 
 607. Id. at 1107. 
 608. Id. (citation omitted). 
 609. Id. 
 610. Id.  
 611. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in the original). 
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record in [another case brought by SYI] and from concessions during oral 
argument that Stop Youth Addiction employed children as decoys in pri-
vately run ‘sting’ operations to obtain evidence of illegal cigarette sales by 
some or all of the defendants.”612  Near the end of her extensive dissenting 
opinion, Justice Brown argued that “[t]he result the majority reaches is not 
compelled by law or logic.”613  She continued: 
This case is proof of the comment, made by the author of the Law 
Revision Commission’s report, that UCL litigation is like a Bos-
nian war zone: “Anyone may attack for any reason and it appears 
that nobody can negotiate – not only are there factions, but it is un-
clear who has authority to bind anyone to peace or a final resolu-
tion.” 
It is equally evident that no means exists in these cases – short 
of an actual trial – to assure the public that any of the small retail-
ers that may already have settled rather than pay the cost of law-
yers are factually guilty of having committed the underlying crime 
on which these suits rest.  Allegations in the record that plaintiff’s 
counsel offered to forego even filing suit against individual defen-
dants in exchange for fees, testimony that counsel is compensated 
exclusively from such fees, and evidence that he systematically of-
fers to settle on terms that include attorney fees but no legally 
binding relief are equally disturbing.  They suggest the use of the 
UCL as a means of generating attorney fees without any corre-
sponding public benefit. 
Any empathy for the result the majority reaches vanishes when 
the logistics of this suit are considered: In order to obtain evidence 
of alleged unlawful activity, Stop Youth Addiction’s agents must 
induce minors to commit crimes – repeated violations of section 
308 – by purchasing cigarettes.  It thus appears from the record 
that Stop Youth Addiction and its attorney have filed this and re-
lated UCL actions against thousands of retailers alleging violations 
of the same penal law that Stop Youth Addiction has violated in 
obtaining evidence to support these suits.  And while retailers may 
have done so inadvertently, Stop Youth Addiction has acted delib-
erately.  The result is so exquisitely ridiculous, it would confound 
  
 612. Id. 
 613. Id. at 1114. 
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Kafka.  In a case that abounds with moral ironies, the worse is this: 
The avenger may be guilty of the greater crime.614 
It is one thing to suggest that a bureaucracy is so absurd that Kafka could 
not have designed it; it is another thing entirely–and a stronger indictment–
to suggest that a legal scenario is so ridiculous that Kafka could not even 
understand it. 
Fierro v. INS was the case of a man who defended against INS depor-
tation proceedings “on the ground that he [was] an American citizen be-
cause his father was naturalized before [he, the deportee] reached the age 
of eighteen . . . well within what the Government calls ‘the “window of 
opportunity” to gain derivative citizenship.’ ”615  Incorrectly, INS found 
that the plaintiff was over eighteen at the time his father received his citi-
zenship.616  In response, Judge Young of the District of Massachusetts 
wrote: 
The consequences of this error deserve far greater consideration 
than the Government seems willing to admit: Imagine for a mo-
ment the agony of living one’s life in exile, knowing that the deci-
sion to deport hinged, at least partially, on an error of basic arith-
metic.  Kafka himself would recoil at such a blunder.617 
Judge Young was so concerned with the INS’s actions that Kafka alone 
was not enough; he began his order with a quotation from Robert Bolt’s A 
Man for All Seasons.618 
E. Imagining the Case into Kafka’s Fictional World 
As discussed in the previous section, some judges invoke Kafka as a 
character in their opinions, setting him to work writing, imagining, or ob-
serving the facts of their cases.  Other judges have made Kafka references 
in exactly the opposite way, by projecting the facts of their cases into the 
fictional world created by Kafka. 
  
 614. Id. (emphasis in the original). 
 615. 81 F. Supp. 2d 167, 168 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 616. Id. 
 617. Id. 
 618. Id. at 167 (Judge Young’s order began: “Consider this famous exchange from Robert Bolt’s A 
Man for All Seasons: Roper: So now you’d give the Devil benefit of law!  More: Yes. What would you 
do?  Cut a great road through the law to get to the Devil?  Roper: I’d cut down every law in England to 
do that!  More: Oh?  And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you – where 
would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?  This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to 
coast – man’s laws, not God’s – and if cut them down – and you’re just the man to do it – d’you really 
think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?  Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of 
law, for my own safety’s sake.”) (quoting Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons 66 (1962)). 
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In Fuerst v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, Judge Bauman 
of the Southern District of New York was called upon to decide whether 
the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare correctly determined that 
Leah Fuerst was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act 
because she continued to work after her diagnosis of (and treatment for) 
breast cancer, a medically determinable impairment.619  While Judge 
Bauman ruled against the claimant, based upon his understanding of the 
relevant statutes and case law, he also took a swipe at the rules under 
which he was constrained to decide the case: “The Court cannot help but 
feel that something is wrong here – that the HEW rules would have been 
incorporated in a Kafka novel had they existed at the time.”620 
City of Los Angeles v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board in-
volved a police officer’s application for workers’ compensation and the 
officer’s claim that his psychiatric problems stemmed, in part, from his 
treatment by the police department as it investigated a charge that he had 
plotted to have his wife killed.621  In an opinion remanding the case to the 
Compensation Appeals Board, Justice Stevens of the California Court of 
Appeals quoted extensively from the report of an independent medical 
examiner in psychiatry who stated: 
Further, like a scene in a Franz Kafka story, allegations that are 
unclearly stated, unstated, not familiar, and do not fit with what 
one observes of the reality about him also have a befuddling disor-
ganizing effect upon the mind and make it very difficult to func-
tion mentally.  One’s mind feels disintegrated, scattered and dam-
aged in such circumstances.  That is different qualitatively and 
more devastating quantitatively than the unpleasant empty, weak 
psychotic feeling that characterizes depression.  To be sure, a loss 
of self-esteem secondarily accompanies a loss of self-integrity.  
With an apt metaphor, like a cracked (‘crazed’, ‘crazy’) vessel, a 
disintegrated ego cannot hold self-esteem.622 
In Johnson v. Verrilli, the defendant physicians in a medical malprac-
tice action moved for summary judgment, arguing that a prospective par-
ent’s mental and emotional distress resulting from the still birth of a child 
are not compensable under New York law.623  Justice Beisner of the New 
  
 619. 354 F. Supp. 185, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
 620. Id. at 187-88.  Judge Bauman continued, a bit wistfully, one must imagine, by explaining that 
“the remedy [to HEW’s Kafkaesque rules] must be provided by an agency with a heart or the Congress 
– not by the Courts.”  Id. 
 621. 174 Cal. Rptr. 25, 25-28 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist. 1981). 
 622. Id. at 28 n. 3. 
 623. 511 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1987). 
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York Supreme Court denied the motion.624  In so doing, he noted that un-
der the existing precedent, a mother has no cause of action to recover for 
emotional distress arising from a still birth unless she suffers independent 
physical injury, while the stillborn fetus has no cause of action at all.625  In 
Justice Beisner’s view, those two rules lead to situations, such as the one 
before him, in which “[t]here is an injury without a remedy.”626  Moreover, 
Judge Beisner found the situation to be more than merely inequitable in 
light of the source of the rule allowing parental recovery accompanied by 
physical injury: a case in which “the defendants performed an emergency 
caesarean section on the plaintiff and the fetus died in the course of deliv-
ery.”627 
Ironically, one of plaintiffs [sic] allegations of omissions in the 
present case is the defendants’ failure to perform a caesarean sec-
tion.  Plaintiffs’ plight would fit comfortably in a Franz Kafka 
story.  Had defendants performed the caesarean, section, they give 
their patient a cause of action.  The inference is chilling.628 
Pilon v. United States Departmen of Justice was a case about “one of 
the more disturbing phenomena of the Washington scene – the leaking of 
false information to damage the reputation or livelihood of an official.”629  
As Judge Greene characterized the case: “in actions reminiscent of Franz 
Kafka’s novel The Trial, Department of Justice officials leaked confiden-
tial information concerning plaintiff with considerable abandon . . . while 
at the same time plaintiff was told that he could not be allowed access to 
the facts underlying the investigation the government had conducted of 
him.”630 
In a concurring opinion that must be read to be appreciated, Justice 
Steigmann of the Illinois Court of Appeals lambasted the Illinois Environ-
mental Protection Agency for maintaining a highly publicized “State Re-
medial Action Priorities List” of allegedly polluted properties which lacked 
a mechanism by which an owner of an allegedly polluted property could 
challenge a listing he or she believed to be erroneous.631  Because “[t]he 
record shows that the IEPA has in effect found States Land guilty of violat-
  
 624. Id. at 1011. 
 625. Id. at 1009-10. 
 626. Id. at 1010. 
 627. Id. (citing Zinn v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 476 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 
1984)). 
 628. Id. at 1010-11 (citation omitted). 
 629. 796 F. Supp. 7, 8 (D.D.C. 1992) (footnote omitted). 
 630. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 631. Sts. Land Improvement Corp. v. EPA, 596 N.E.2d 1164, 1168 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1992) (Stieg-
mann, J., concurring). 
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ing the [Environmental Protection] Act and might very well choose to let 
the matter lie forever in its current state of limbo, thus denying States Land 
any semblance of due process,”632 Justice Steigmann concluded that “[t]he 
regulation at issue and the IEPA’s utilization of it in this case are truly 
right out of the novels of Franz Kafka.”633 
Justice Arabian of the California Supreme Court began his concurring 
opinion in Rappleyea v. Campbell by stating: 
Defendants, an out-of-state couple who unwisely chose to repre-
sent themselves, timely presented their answer for filing.  But in a 
story line worthy of a Kafka novel, an innocent $70 error [in the 
filing fee, which was attributable to misinformation provided by 
court personnel] at the outset led, after a series of misadventures, 
to a $200,000 default judgment.634 
In In re Washington, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of ap-
peals and held that “sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court’s 
finding that the [eight-year-old] appellee committed rape.”635  Judge 
Wright dissented: 
This case was originally filed because the “appellee showed no 
remorse for the rapes.”  To have remorse, a person must under-
stand the nature and consequences of the wrong.  I cannot seri-
ously believe that an eight-year-old child intended to commit a 
rape and then callously ignored the consequences. 
It appears from the facts that the parents attempted to resolve 
this problem.  Somehow, in a manner that defies explanation, the 
problem turned into a court case and is now before this state’s 
highest court.  Perhaps I am missing something, but this strikes me 
as a scenario out of a Franz Kafka novel.636 
In Valona v. United States Parole Commissionn,637 a federal parolee 
argued that he should be released from supervision because the Parole 
Commission had failed to conduct a review of his status, as required by 
statute, five years after his release.638  The district court dismissed on 
grounds that the petitioner had not exhausted his administrative reme-
  
 632. Id. at 1170. 
 633. Id. 
 634. 884 P.2d 126, 132 (Cal. 1994). 
 635. 662 N.E.2d 346, 349 (Ohio 1996). 
 636. Id. at 350. 
 637. 165 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 638. Id. at 509. 
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dies.639  Commenting on he dismissal, which the court of appeals reversed, 
Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit said: “Only in the world of Kafka 
would a court dismiss a claim that an agency has taken too long to reach a 
decision on the ground that the agency has yet to reach a decision – and 
that the aggrieved party can’t complain until it does (by which time, of 
course, the claim will be moot).”640 
In an accounting proceeding to recover from Herbert Bricker’s estate 
the value of medicaid payments made on his behalf, but for which he was 
not eligible, Judge Holzman of the New York Surrogate’s Court observed 
that “requiring a person to pay for hospital services imposed upon him 
while he was being detained in the hospital because the hospital was erro-
neously of the opinion that he was not competent to make his own deci-
sions is worthy of a nightmare recounted in a novel by Kafka.”641 
F. References Too Good to Leave Out 
This section presents Kafka references that do not fit neatly into any of 
the categories I have already discussed but are just too well phrased to 
leave out of an article devoted to memorable judicial writing.  The first part 
of the section discusses Kafka references in a judge’s own words while the 
second part is devoted to Kafka reference made by parties that judges have 
found compelling enough to quote verbatim. 
1. Bon Môts from the Bench 
Law Research Service, Inc. v. Crook is too good to leave out because 
in that opinion, Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit dropped the K-bomb 
on a particularly unlikely target: “Collier [on Bankruptcy] tells us in some-
what Kafkaesque terms . . .”642  In Falkowski v. EEOC, Judge McGowan 
began the background section of his opinion by observing: “The history of 
Ms. Falkowski’s struggles with the EEOC stretches back to 1973 and en-
compasses an intervening volume of courtroom litigation and agency pro-
ceedings that for sheer sinuosity falls nothing short of Kafkaesque.”643 
In Self v. Board of Review, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that 
“employees who are unable to get to work because of [a] lack of transpor-
  
 639. Id. at 510. 
 640. Id. 
 641. In re Est. of Bricker, 702 N.Y.S.2d 535, 536-39 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1999).  However, 
based upon a variety of other factors, Judge Holzman ultimately ruled that the New York Department 
of Social Services was entitled to $26,000 of the $34,913.44 it sought from Bricker’s estate. 
 642. 524 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Collier, Bankruptcy P 9.29(2), at 369 (14th ed. 
1972)). 
 643. 719 F.2d 470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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tation” had “left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such 
work” and, thus, were not eligible for unemployment benefits.644  Justice 
O’Hern dissented: 
There is a difference between quitting and being fired from a job.  
Only in the regulatory world do the concepts get confused. 
The fact is that these two claimants didn’t quit their jobs.  They 
were fired after they couldn’t get to work for two days because 
they had lost their ride.  No reading of this record will disclose 
evidence to support a contrary finding. . . . 
.     .     . 
The supervisor knew he had fired the claimants.  In fact, they 
testified that he was the one who told them to apply for unem-
ployment insurance.  These claimants were hardworking building 
maintenance employees.  They wanted work, not a handout.  Had 
they been given a few days to arrange transportation, they might 
have been able to return to work.  Under these circumstances, only 
a legal fiction of Kafkaesque subtlety can convert their discharge 
into a voluntary quit.645 
In Dobbert v. Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court denied 
Ernest Dobbert’s application for a stay of his death sentence.646  In a dis-
sent joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall wrote of his concern over 
“[t]he ‘right’ of the State to a speedy execution,”647 further observing that 
“[t]he frenzied rush to execution that characterizes this case has become a 
common, if Kafkaesque, feature of the Court’s capital cases.”648 
Grillo v. Coughlin was a § 1983 action by a state prison inmate who 
claimed that altered documents were used against him in a prison discipli-
nary proceeding.649  During that proceeding, “it emerged that the copies of 
two documents served on [the inmate] differed from the copies submitted 
to the hearing officer as evidence against him.”650  In a unanimous opinion 
reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
prison officials on the inmate’s evidence tampering claim, Judge Laval of 
the Second Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion that the inmate 
  
 644. 453 A.2d 170, 171, 174 (N.J. 1982). 
 645. Id. at 174 (O’Hern, J., dissenting) (citation and footnote omitted). 
 646. 468 U.S. 1231 (1984). 
 647. Id. at 1241 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 648. Id. at 1242 n. * (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 649. 31 F.3d 53, 54 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 650. Id. 
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received a fair hearing that cured any constitutional violation that may 
have resulted from a false accusation against him: 
A hearing in which the false accusation or evidence is shown to the 
factfinder but concealed from the accused would not comport with 
. . . due process standards . . .  It is but a slight turn of Kafka for 
the accused to be required to mount his defense referring to prison 
documents that, unbeknownst to him, differ from those before the 
hearing officer.  Unquestionably, the right of an accused to know 
the evidence against him and to marshal a defense is compromised 
when the evidence he is shown differs from the evidence shown to 
the factfinder.651 
In Ellis v. Ellis, Hubert Ellis argued that he was entitled to alimony 
from his ex-wife, based upon substantial disparities in their annual in-
comes.652  The majority of a panel of the Florida District Court of Appeal, 
relying on Canakaris v. Canakaris,653 held “that the trial court reasonably 
denied the former husband’s request for alimony because he has failed to 
show either that he needs it or that his former wife has the ability to pay 
it.”654  Judge Harris dissented: 
In any event, this unemployable and unemployed husband whose 
income is substantially less than his employable and employed 
wife receives no alimony but instead is required to stand ready to 
pay alimony if the wife proves unable to continue to earn sufficient 
salary from the family business awarded to her. . . . 
No one recognizes more than I that there is no such doctrine as 
the doctrine of comparable fairness.  The doctrine was first 
“floated” by the plurality opinion in Kennedy v. Kennedy, 622 
So.2d 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).  It was immediately sunk in 
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 641 So.2d 408 (Fla.1994), in a most sum-
mary and unique fashion – summary because no reason was given 
and unique because even though the supreme court lacked jurisdic-
tion, it nevertheless declared the doctrine DOA.  In any event, 
there must be somewhere in the Constitution, perhaps in the “pe-
numbra” of the specific rights granted therein, perhaps even in the 
specific right granted in Article I, Section 2 of the Florida Consti-
tution (“[a]ll natural persons are equal before the law . . .”) some 
right of fairness.  Even though Canakaris has become Kafka’s 
  
 651. Id. at 56. 
 652. 699 So. 2d 280, 282 (Fla. 5th Dist. App. 1997). 
 653. 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980). 
 654. Ellis, 699 So. 2d at 283. 
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doorkeeper in so far as a review of fairness is concerned, still we 
can consider whether the trial court relied on the correct principles 
of law.  Rewarding a wife who “stuck by her man” is not such a 
principle.655 
In In re Devon B., the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial 
court abused its discretion when it denied a motion by Tammy M., the 
homeless and mentally handicapped mother of Devon B., to join the state 
department of mental retardation as a necessary party in Devon’s child 
dependency proceeding.656  Judge Katz, writing for the majority of an en 
banc panel of the court, and Judge Sullivan, who dissented, also disagreed 
about which result would be more Kafkaesque.  The issue was precisely 
how to insure Tammy M.’s compliance with various steps intended to help 
address her retardation and homelessness.657  The department of children 
and families argued that there was no need to join the department of mental 
retardation as a necessary party because the two departments were “already 
working together to fashion appropriate services for the respondent 
[Tammy M.]”658 who, in turn, could be ordered to continue working with 
the department.659  In the majority’s view, “[o]rdering the respondent to 
continue to work with the department of mental retardation does not insure 
that the department will provide her with the necessary services to help her 
regain custody of her child.”660  Judge Katz elaborated: 
Indeed, although Terreri’s testimony [for the department of chil-
dren and families] indicated that he had contacted the department 
of mental retardation about parenting classes for the respondent, 
there was nothing in the record to indicate that it in fact had ar-
ranged any classes.  Furthermore, any suggestion by the petitioner 
that it is up to the respondent to take certain initiatives is 
Kafkaesque.661 
Writing in dissent, Judge Sullivan noted that “under the majority’s 
reasoning, any number of persons and entities–such as the department of 
correction, the probation department, police departments, schools, teachers, 
counselors, physicians, grandparents, in short, anyone whose participation 
  
 655. Id. at 284 (citing Franz Kafka, “Before the Law,” from The Trial (definitive ed., Willa Muir & 
Edwin Muir, trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1984)). 
 656. 825 A.2d 127, 129 (Conn. 2003). 
 657. Id. at 135. 
 658. Id. at 135-36. 
 659. Id. at 136. 
 660. Id. (emphasis in the original). 
 661. Id. at 136 n. 18 (emphasis in the original) (citing Franz Kafka, The Trial (W. Muir & E. Muir, 
trans., Alfred A. Knopf rev. ed. 1982)). 
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could facilitate reunification of parent and child–must be treated as neces-
sary parties in a neglect proceeding.”662  In his view, “it is the prospect of a 
proceeding requiring the presence of all these parties that is 
Kafkaesque.”663 
Finally, in Triplett v. Azordegan, the issue was the timeliness of a § 
1983 action, filed in 1974, in which the plaintiff alleged that he “was de-
prived of his constitutional rights under color of state law by virtue of his 
being drugged before confessing to a 1954 murder.”664  The plaintiff was 
convicted, and served seventeen years in state prison before he was re-
leased, and all charges were dismissed, in 1972, by order of the Plymouth 
County District Court, “on grounds of the involuntary confession.”665  The 
defendants in plaintiff’s action argued that they were entitled to summary 
judgment because “the plaintiff knew all the operative facts in 1955 and 
should have sued then.”666  After noting that it was “clear that the issues 
surrounding the confession were raised at trial and in post trial motions, 
but failed to affect the conviction,”667 Judge McManus of the Northern 
District of Iowa pointed out that “[i]t is almost too evident to warrant 
comment that plaintiff, having been convicted of murder by virtue of a 
confession which in 1955 was deemed legal and admissible, could not 
have, at that time, pursued a § 1983 claim.”668  He then rejected the state’s 
statute of limitations defense: “To hold that plaintiff had to ignore the 
criminal proceedings and immediately sue under § 1983 would mean that 
plaintiff would have had to pursue a technically possible, but at the time 
frivolous suit.  To so argue is to read Kafka into law.”669 
2. From the Mouths of Litigants 
The focus of this article is on judicial invocations of Kafka, and in-
deed, the most compelling Kafka references are those penned (or key-
stroked) by a judge in his or her own voice.670  But no small number of 
Kafka references have entered judicial opinions as direct quotations from 
  
 662. Id. at 139. 
 663. Id. at 140. 
 664. 478 F. Supp. 872, 874-75 (N.D. Iowa 1977). 
 665. Id.  
 666. Id. at 875. 
 667. Id. 
 668. Id. (citations omitted). 
 669. Id. (quoted in Woods v. Candela, 825 F. Supp. 43, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). 
 670. Perhaps the ultimate example of the term being expressed in a judge’s own voice is the follow-
ing sentence, penned by Judge Friedman: “While he [a criminal defendant] would not use this adjec-
tive, his experience has been somewhat Kafkaesque.”  Commw. v. Reefer, 2001 WL 34058295 at *3 
(Pa. Com. Pleas Allegheny County Ct. May 1, 2001), rev’d, Commw. v. Reefer, 831 A.2d 599 (Pa. 
2003) (prison term shortened due to lack of resources to care for medical condition). 
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hearing transcripts or parties’ briefs.  This section begins with opinions in 
which a writing judge has quoted a Kafka reference from the winning side 
and concludes with the opinions representing the more common situation, 
in which a judge quotes a Kafka reference from the party he or she is rul-
ing against. 
a. Kafka References from the Winning Side 
When a litigant claims that something or another is Kafkaesque, and 
the judge agrees–a situation that is more than a little rare–the result is 
nearly as powerful as a statement in a judge’s own words.  In addition to 
the opinions discussed above in which several courts concurred with liti-
gants that they had been subjected to Kafkaesque procedures or bureaucra-
cies, only to rule against the Kafkaesque victims, there is one opinion in 
which a court agreed, in part, with a litigant’s invocation of Kafka, and 
another opinion in which a part of a court agreed with such a claim. 
Turning first to the court that agreed in part, Virgil Reed appealed the 
trial court’s decision to uphold the suspension of his general manager’s 
license by the Kansas Racing Commission (“KRC”).671  The charges 
against him included perjury.672  On appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, 
Reed argued that the trial court erred in upholding the KRC’s decision be-
cause “the KRC found him guilty of conduct not specified in the amended 
hearing notice in connection with the perjury charge,”673 thus depriving 
him of due process. 
Reed emphasize[d] that the trial court erred when it found that the 
perjured matters were stated “to the extent known.”  According to 
Reed, the trial court’s reasoning create[d] a “Kafka-like” dilemma: 
Despite the notice requirements of the prehearing conference order 
limiting the charges, he “should have been prepared to defend him-
self on all possible charges of perjury arising from the emergency 
hearing . . . as long as those unknown charges were ‘similar’ to 
those actually alleged.”  Reed insists that he did not even know 
during the hearing what he was charged with.674 
The court sided with Reed to the extent of reversing the KRC’s perjury 
findings on matters not specified in the prehearing conference order.675 
  
 671. Reed v. Kan. Racing Commn., 860 P.2d 684, 696 (Kan. 1993). 
 672. Id. at 688. 
 673. Id. at 690. 
 674. Id. at 691. 
 675. Id. at 696. 
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And then there is the dissenting opinion of Judge Smith in Florida De-
partment of Environmental Regulation v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dis-
rict.676  In that case, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling 
that the appellant Department of Environmental Regulation (“DER”) “was 
without jurisdiction to regulate dredge and fill activities on the land in 
question”677 and that the appellees were not required to exhaust their ad-
ministrative remedies before filing suit.678  Writing in dissent–that is, in 
favor of the DER’s position–Judge Smith quoted the appellee’s claim that 
their situation–which, in their view, involved “an eight month [administra-
tive] run-around”679–was “identical to the situation in which Joseph K. was 
faced in his search for justice in Kafka’s unfinished novel, The Trial.”680  
Judge Smith disagreed with the appellee’s characterization of their plight, 
and pointed out that “the Department’s rules offered a clearly effective 
remedy from March 1979 onward, requiring nothing but a request from 
[appellees],”681 which request appellees did not make, seemingly for stra-
tegic reasons.682 
b. Kafka References from the Losing Side 
While a judge will occasionally put the weight of his or her robe be-
hind a litigant’s assertion of Kafkaesque victimhood, it is far more com-
mon for a judge to quote a litigant’s Kafka-clad claim only to reject it.  
Some of the opinions rejecting a party’s invocation of Kafka are relatively 
quotidian,683 while in others, the litigant’s claim, the judge’s response, or 
  
 676. 424 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 1982). 
 677. Id. at 793. 
 678. Id. at 796-97. 
 679. Id. at 811-12 (citation omitted). 
 680. Id. (quoting Appellee’s Br. at 22). 
 681. Id. 
 682. Id. 
 683. See e.g. U.S. v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145, 155 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Footman argues . . . that it is 
Kafkaesque to say his consent [to the interception of telephone calls he made from prison] was volun-
tary” when he was forced “to choose between making no phone calls and agreeing to have his phone 
calls recorded”); U.S. v. Atropine Sulfate 1.0 mg. (Article of Drug) Dey-Dose, 843 F.2d 860, 864 n. 7 
(5th Cir. 1988) (“This statement explicitly supports a result characterized as ‘kafkaesque’ by counsel 
for Dey at oral argument.”); U.S. v. Giacalone, 853 F.2d 470, 482 (6th Cir. 1988) (“In their brief on 
appeal, defendants characterize the district court’s ruling as ‘Kafkaesque’ because all the evidence 
relating to the government’s compliance with the minimization [of intercepted communications] issue 
remained in the government’s possession. . . .  We find defendants’ argument without merit.”); Inland-
boatman’s Union of the Pacific v. Durta Group, 279 F.3d 1075, 1083 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The union 
termed the process [of arbitration and settlement] ‘Kafka-esque’ in its argument to the district court.  
The fallacy in the union’s position may be seen . . . .”); People v. Pack, 248 Cal. Rptr. 240, 242 (Cal. 
App. 2d Dist. 1988) (“The People argue that Pack has not shown a reasonable possibility that the evi-
dence sought [mental health records of the victim and complaining witness in a rape case] might have 
resulted in a different verdict.  Pack argues his situation is ‘Kafkaesque’ in that, because of the confi-
dential nature of the records, he is unable to view them to ascertain if they are relevant.”); Global Land, 
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both, are enough to bring a smile to the face of the connoisseur of colorful 
writing. 
For example, in Polanco v. Pan American University, the trial court 
granted Pan American University a default judgment against Polanco.684  
Polanco appealed.  His brief, however, failed to include a listing of points 
of error, in violation of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.685  While 
otherwise deficient, the brief ended on a high note: 
Even within the Texas judiciary’s well earned reputation for met-
ing out “Frontier Justice”, the lower court’s conduct cannot be 
condoned, for it would confirm the Kafkaesque nature of this 
“trial”.  Moreover, this Court must admonish by opinion and order, 
the lower court, to maintain the standards of fairness and compe-
tence in an orderly and civilized society – not one controlled by the 
exigencies of electoral politics.686 
In an opinion for a unanimous panel of the Texas Court of Appeals, Judge 
Hinojosa wrote, presumably with tongue in cheek: 
These statements and subtitles [in Polanco’s brief], which do not at 
any point refer to any part of the record before us hardly qualify as 
“points of error” under Tex.R.App.P. 74(d).  This Court would 
humbly point out to appellant that, although we have a bit more to 
travel before we reach the advanced stage of the enlightened judi-
ciary found in the East Coast, in Texas we do have certain appel-
late rules, albeit archaic, which require appellants to designate spe-
cific points of error.  These rules make it easier for frontier Courts 
of Appeals to “figger out” what specific actions of the trial judge 
the appellant complains are erroneous.  This is especially impor-
tant when appellant files a brief with this Court replete with asser-
tions and allegations regarding various matters, (for example, a 
federal action, ex parte communications, conflicts of interest, and 
other issues), the substance of which is not in the record before this 
Court.687 
  
Inc. v. City of Peekskill (In re Karta Corp.), 296 B.R. 305, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Plaintiffs argued the 
situation is ‘kafka-esque’.  This cannot be.”). 
 684. 818 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi Dist. 1991). 
 685. Id. 
 686. Id. at 99. 
 687. Id. 
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Among the things the court of appeals was able to “figger out” was that 
Pan American University was entitled to hold the default judgment it had 
been granted by the trial court.688 
In Andresen v. State, a criminal defendant attacked the pre-sentence 
report prepared on him and did so in a way that involved, in the words of 
Judge Moylan of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, considerable 
“sound and fury.”689  Somewhere between the sound and the fury was the 
defendant’s suggestion that the pre-sentence report resembled “the secret 
inquisition described by Franz Kafka.”690  Judge Moylan, on the other 
hand, found that “[t]he report was actually rather routine.”691 
Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, Local No. 30 was an em-
ployment discrimination action brought by a group of black male waiters 
and applicants for positions as waiters, against various unions and hotels.692  
In an attempt to make their prima facie case, plaintiffs presented statistical 
evidence which they attempted to bolster by presenting five types of cir-
cumstantial evidence of discrimination including “‘a series of obstacles’ 
confronting applicants at the hotels, which they characterize[d] as ‘some-
thing out of a Kafka novel.’ ”693  Writing for a unanimous panel of the 
Ninth Circuit, Judge Wallace found the plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence 
unpersuasive for a variety of reasons,694 and the court of appeals affirmed 
the district court’s decision that the plaintiffs had failed to make their 
prima facie case. 
In Schmitt v. State, a criminal defendant argued that “Kafka himself 
would have been proud of the result” of his trial and appeal, and that “[t]he 
absolute absurdity of [the] circular reasoning [to which he had been sub-
jected by the trial and appellate courts] would be laughable, were it not for 
the fact that we are dealing here with not a work of fiction, but rather with 
a real-life case.”695  In the defendant/appellant’s view, Kafkaesque reason-
ing denied him the opportunity to be heard on the merits of an admissibil-
ity issue that went against him at trial.696  However, Judge Moylan pointed 
out that the appellate court had, in fact, ruled on the merits of appellant’s 
argument,697 thus completely undercutting the appellant’s attempt to dress 
himself in the clothes of a Kafkaesque victim. 
  
 688. Id. at 100. 
 689. 331 A.2d 78, 127 (Md. Spec. App. 1975). 
 690. Id. 
 691. Id. at 128. 
 692. 694 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 693. Id. at 553. 
 694. Id. 
 695. 779 A.2d 1004, 1010 (Md. Spec. App. 2001) (quoting Appellant’s Br.). 
 696. Id. 
 697. Id. at 1011. 
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In re Kramer was an attorney discipline action.  In the Decision and 
Recommendation of the Disciplinary Review Board (“DRB”), included as 
an appendix in the New Jersey Supreme Court’s order of disbarment, the 
DRB quoted the special master who, in turn, quoted soon-to-be-former 
attorney Steven Kramer: 
As to respondent’s non-compliance with R. 1:20-20, the special 
master found that, as of the date of his report, respondent still had 
not complied with the rule and had not properly applied for rein-
statement: 
Despite the fact that respondent’s non-reinstatement is clearly 
his own fault, in his answer to Count Four he has the temerity to 
proclaim “. . . the suspension was supposed to be for six months.  
It has lasted two and one half years without any more explanation 
(i.e. none) than that given to the Joseph created by Kafka.”698 
In Kalmin v. Department of Navy, a former civilian employee of the 
Naval Sea Systems Command (“NAVSEA”), sought various documents 
relating to his employment under the federal Freedom of Information 
Act.699  After ruling that “[a]ll of the documents [plaintiff sought] . . . ap-
pear to be entitled to the immunity from production on the several grounds 
the Navy claims for them,”700 Judge Jackson went on to observe: 
Kalmin is acutely aware that the Navy, for reasons neither he nor 
the Navy has chosen to articulate, suspects that he is emotionally 
unstable.  He vehemently denies it, and he has submitted a lengthy 
affidavit of his own, and the declaration of the psychologist and 
report of the psychiatrist who have, respectively, treated and exam-
ined him.  In his own affidavit he relates the course of a 
Kafkaesque persecution to which he has been subjected by his 
NAVSEA superiors; the psychologist and psychiatrist attest to the 
absence of any mental pathology on his part which might suggest 
that his perception of it is hallucinatory.701 
The defendant in United States v. Nickens was convicted of importing 
and possessing cocaine despite arguing at trial that he “was a respectable 
citizen traveling for recreational and medical reasons who was caught up in 
a Kafkaesque plot”702 involving, among other things, a luggage switch that 
  
 698. 800 A.2d 111, 126 (N.J. 2001). 
 699. 605 F. Supp. 1492 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 700. Id. at 1496. 
 701. Id. 
 702. 955 F.2d 112, 125 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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he was unable to recognize due to his color blindness.703  In Baldwin v. 
Labor & Industry Review Commission, four workers who had filed 
worker’s compensation claims asked to withdraw their claims, due to the 
alleged bias of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”), were denied that re-
lief, failed to appear at their hearings, and had their applications dismissed 
with prejudice, and lost on appeal to the state circuit court.704  In a subse-
quent appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs’ ar-
gument, on the issue of administrative exhaustion and futility, that “requir-
ing an applicant to proceed with a hearing before a biased ALJ . . . is a 
‘useless Kafkaesque’ and ‘unworkable burden,’ because it is much more 
difficult, if not impossible . . . to correct bias on review.”705  Justice Cane’s 
response, for a unanimous panel: “We disagree.”706 
Ojavan Investors, Inc. v. California Coastal Commission involved a 
challenge to permit conditions imposed upon plaintiff’s predecessors in 
title by the California Coastal Commission.  In affirming the trial court’s 
dismissal on statute of limitation grounds, Justice Boren of the California 
Court of Appeals wrote: 
Contrary to appellants’ assertion, there is nothing fundamentally 
unfair or “Kafkaesque” about their inability because of a lack of 
standing to have challenged coastal development permits issued 
years ago to other parties and their present inability to challenge, 
because of the statute of limitations, the same permits which now 
affect them.  To the contrary, it would be illogical and unfair to 
grant third parties, such as appellants, the right to challenge per-
mits when such a challenge would be time barred if brought by the 
party who was initially granted the permit.  A permit holder also 
must have legal confidence after a definite point in time in invest-
ing financial resources to implement an approved development. 
Once the 60-day statute of limitations has run, the permit issued 
must be deemed good as against the world.707 
In Oliveto v. Circuit Court, a public defender turned to her client, after 
the sentence was announced in a criminal case, and said: “Ridiculous.”708  
In an opinion for a divided panel of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Judge 
Eich wrote: 
  
 703. Id. at 115. 
 704. 599 N.W.2d 8, 11-12 (Wis. App. 1999). 
 705. Id. at 20. 
 706. Id. 
 707. 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 103, 108 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1994). 
 708. 519 N.W.2d 769, 770-71 (Wis. App. 1994). 
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The suggestion in Oliveto’s brief that the only way Judge Curry 
could have heard her remark was either through inadvertence or 
“eavesdropping on protected attorney-client communications” 
(emphasis added) adds nothing to her argument.  The same may be 
said, we think, for her characterization of Judge Curry’s action as 
“Kafka[esque],” her assertion that the judge was simply using the 
contempt proceedings as “a club . . . on [her] client,” her admoni-
tion that we “should swiftly put an end to [Judge Curry’s] invita-
tion to join in a trip to Wonderland,” or her statement that the 
court’s instruction to consider her act as contempt was “the 
Judge[’s] . . . little secret.”709 
The defendant in United States v. Jones was charged with “making a 
false, fictitious or fraudulent claim to the United States Department of Ag-
riculture [USDA] . . . by inflating the number of meals provided through 
the USDA Summer Food Service Program he sponsored.”710  He pled 
guilty, but then attempted to withdraw his plea, on grounds that “when he 
entered his plea, he took vicarious responsibility for the actions of others, 
conduct which does not satisfy the government’s burden of proving that he 
acted intentionally to submit false claims.”711  The defendant also argued 
the facts of the case, contending: 
[A]t all times, he knew he did not claim more meals than he served 
but only bought less milk.  He urges “the fallacy” of the govern-
ment’s case is “that many children do not like and, therefore, do 
not drink milk.”  Because Mr. Jones “deemed it wasteful” to throw 
out unopened milk cartons, he simply put them on ice and served 
them with another meal.  Hence needing less milk, he ordered less 
milk, causing the auditors, mechanically matching up meals to 
milk, to conclude Mr. Jones was claiming more meals when, in 
fact, he “re-served unused, unopened containers of milk.”  Mr. 
Jones believes this misunderstanding thus placed him in the 
“Kafkaesque predicament” of the police investigating a “crime” 
which did not occur.  He urges here, therefore, that although he ini-
tially accepted responsibility for the “proper administration of the 
program” and entered a plea, the district court abused its discretion 
  
 709. Id. at 776 n. 7.  It is not apparent from the context whether Attorney Oliveto was referring to 
Alice’s wonderland, or some other otherworldly locale.  
 710. 172 F.3d 63 (table), 1999 WL 61390 at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 10, 1999). 
 711. Id. at *2. 
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in preventing him from withdrawing the plea when he discovered 
he had not understood its factual basis.712 
The court of appeals was not persuaded, explaining that, with respect to the 
defendant’s assertions of error by the trial court, “the record dwarfs this 
showing, devoid as it is of any representation by Mr. Jones that he is inno-
cent of the conduct charged.”713 
This section concludes with an invocation of Kafka which, along with 
other instances of inflammatory language by counsel for both parties, in-
spired Judge Morgenstern-Clarren to remind the attorneys of the principles 
of civility.714  Judge Morgenstern-Clarren’s opinion speaks for itself: 
This case involves important property and liberty rights. . . .  Nei-
ther side, however, seems willing to consider that there may be 
some merit to the other’s viewpoint and hence some reason to ac-
commodate competing concerns and compromise these discovery 
issues.  This is complicated by the fact that counsel appear to have 
forgotten that the dispute is between their clients and not between 
them personally.  The full record must be reviewed to appreciate 
the tenor of the arguments, but a few quotations from the attor-
neys’ communications will illustrate the point: 
It has been my experience that when bank’s [sic] cause 
unfair prosecutions, they never realize the impropriety 
of this conduct until it is far too late.  Sort of the arro-
gance of power in it’s [sic] finest glory.  (Letter from 
Mr. Mann’s criminal counsel to KeyBank’s counsel). 
In the face of overwhelming evidence of fraud, [Mr. 
Mann] offers a series of flimsy, disingenuous argu-
ments that collapse under the slightest scrutiny . . . 
contains astounding representations . . . [and includes] 
a shameless effort to bolster th[e] flimsy premise. . . .  
(Response of KeyBank to Mr. Mann’s Motion to 
Compel). 
As you well know, we won’t be attending the above-
mentioned deposition and I would ask that you quit 
wasting our time.  Perhaps you know of some law that 
you can use to compel our attendance.  Otherwise, 
please do not expect us on the 9th day of January 1998.  
  
 712. Id. 
 713. Id. at *3. 
 714. See KeyBank Natl. Assn. v. Mann (In re Mann), 220 B.R. 351, 358 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998). 
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(Letter from Mr. Mann’s criminal counsel to Key-
Bank’s counsel).  
Defendant’s Motion demonstrates a disturbing lack of 
concern for accuracy – as evidenced by the first page 
where [Mr. Mann’s counsel] misspells the names of 
KeyBank counsel, his own co-counsel, and last but not 
least, the name of the Bankruptcy Judge to whom this 
matter is assigned.  While these errors are obviously 
harmless, the additional inaccuracies and misrepresen-
tations set forth by [Mr. Mann’s] criminal counsel in 
[Mr. Mann’s] Motion are far less amusing and raise se-
rious concerns of attorney misconduct.  (Response of 
KeyBank). 
[KeyBank’s] Counsel interestingly has submitted a 
premature, pedantic motion . . . .  (Motion of Mr. 
Mann for Protective Order). 
[Mr. Mann’s arguments are] downright silly.  Filing a 
Motion to Compel under these circumstances is inex-
cusable.  [And seeking sanctions is] adding yet another 
layer of Kafkaesque absurdity.  (Response of KeyBank 
to Mann’s Motion to Compel). 
Mr. Mann capped off this exchange with the threat that 
KeyBank’s “counsel has been informed that he will 
certainly be called personally to testify in the criminal 
matter.”  (Mr. Mann’s Motion for a Protective Order). 
The rhetorical excesses in this case were not designed 
to resolve the discovery disputes and, not surprisingly, 
they did not accomplish that end.  As between lawyers, 
exchanges of the sort quoted are time-consuming to 
create and aggravating to receive.  Moreover, they 
have a tendency to develop a life of their own as each 
side seeks to raise the bar of verbal intimidation.  From 
the viewpoint of this judicial officer, communications 
like this are not a sign of strength or a mark of steely 
endurance.  They are, instead, an indication that one ei-
ther lacks civility or has chosen not to employ it.  The 
ABA “Guidelines to Litigate By” suggest that judges 
adopt this viewpoint: “We will bring to lawyers’ atten-
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tion uncivil conduct which we observe.”  Consider it 
done.715 
V.  KAFKA’S GREATEST HITS 
While the basic focus of the previous part is on the ways in which 
judges have referred to Kafka, as a matter of writing style, that part also 
gives a good idea of the general categories of cases that have inspired 
judges to put down their hornbooks and head for the fiction shelf.  Crimi-
nal cases predominate, but commitment proceedings and child custody 
disputes have also generated their share of references to Kafka.  In this 
part, I focus on four lines of cases that have perpetuated particularly 
memorable invocations of Kafka in specific areas of the law. 
A. “Kafkaesque judicial nightmare” 
The phrase “Kafkaesque judicial nightmare,” part of the jurisprudence 
of the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”)716 for more than twenty years, 
entered that area of the law in Cinciarelli v. Reagan, a suit brought to re-
cover attorneys’ fees under the EAJA.717  The interesting issue in Cinci-
arelli was whether, and how, to award attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing 
a successful suit for fees under the EAJA.718  As Judge Wright of the D.C. 
Circuit explained: 
The proper application of EAJA in this situation is not as easy to 
discern, however, because EAJA’s requirement that fees be 
awarded only when the government’s position is not substantially 
justified complicates the issue.  Whenever the government defends 
an EAJA claim on the ground that its litigation position in the un-
derlying action was substantially justified and the government 
loses, the court has in effect decided that this position was unrea-
sonable or, at best, barely reasonable.  It would seem to follow in 
most cases that the decision to contest the EAJA application could 
not have been substantially justified because the position that the 
government claimed was “substantially justified” in the underlying 
action will have been shown to have been unreasonable.  In these 
cases the victorious EAJA plaintiff should receive fees for its pur-
  
 715. Id. at 358-59. 
 716. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000). 
 717. 729 F.2d 801, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 718. Id. at 809. 
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suit of the EAJA action.  Of course in cases at the margin – where 
the government’s position in the underlying litigation on the merits 
was not found to be substantially justified but the question was a 
close one – it cannot be said that the government’s decision to con-
test an EAJA fee application is not substantially justified.  An 
award of fees in these marginal situations would seem in tension 
with EAJA’s “substantially justified” test. 
This situation admits of no wholly satisfactory resolution.  If 
we apply a per se rule that the government pays fees for EAJA 
litigation whenever it defends an EAJA suit on the basis that its 
position in the action on the merits was substantially justified and 
loses, we force the government to pay fees in those marginal cases 
when defense of the EAJA suit, though unsuccessful, was substan-
tially justified.  Yet if we require every victorious EAJA plaintiff 
to make a separate claim for fees for bringing the first EAJA suit, 
and permit the government to claim that its first EAJA defense was 
substantially justified on the merits, we face the distinct possibility 
of an infinite regression of EAJA litigation.  A successful EAJA 
plaintiff will bring another suit claiming fees for bringing the 
EAJA suit, and the government will defend on the ground that its 
EAJA defense was substantially justified.  If the plaintiff wins this 
suit, yet a third suit will be required to recover fees for the second 
suit recovering fees.  And if the government contests this suit and 
loses, yet a fourth suit will have been spawned, and so on.  In our 
opinion the per se fee-shifting rule is the least objectionable exit 
from this Kafkaesque judicial nightmare; in most cases a loss on 
the generous “substantially justified” EAJA threshold strongly in-
dicates that the government is clinging to an unreasonable position.  
We need not definitively resolve the question here, however, and 
we decline to do so because no party has briefed or argued it.719 
The phrase “Kafkaesque judicial nightmare” has been used in twenty sub-
sequent opinions pertaining to the issue of awarding attorneys’ fees in-
curred in actions to recover attorneys’ fees.720 
  
 719. Id. at 809-10 (footnote omitted). 
 720. Seven of those opinions were written by U.S. District Court judges, six by U.S. Court of Ap-
peals judges, and two by judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.  One each came 
from the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Claims Court, the U.S. Court of International Trade, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court and the California Court of Appeals.  Moreover, the phrase “Kafkaesque judicial 
nightmare” has had a good long run; it first appeared in 1984 and has been used as recently as 2002, in 
Jolin, Inc. v. Ruegg, 2002 WL 423147 at *10 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2002) (quoting Est. of Trynin, 782 
P.2d 232, 238 (Cal. 1989)). 
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While most judges have been content simply to quote Cinciarelli, a 
few have offered their own embellishments.  In the second reported 
“Kafkaesque judicial nightmare” case, Cornella v. Schweiker, Judge 
Henley of the Eighth Circuit noted that the question of fees for litigating 
fees was “a bit like looking into a mirror only to see another mirror’s re-
flection, and has been described as a ‘Kafkaesque judicial nightmare.’ ”721  
About six years after it was first identified, the “Kafkaesque judicial 
nightmare” hit the big time.  In Commissioner, INS  v. Jean, U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Stevens noted: “As petitioners admit, allowing a ‘substantial 
justification’ exception to fee litigation theoretically can spawn a 
‘Kafkaesque judicial nightmare’ of infinite litigation to recover fees for the 
last round of litigation over fees.”722  With a single sentence, Justice Ste-
vens added a piscine dimension to the nightmare–the spawning–and the 
Supreme Court supplanted the D.C. Circuit as the anchor for the 
“Kafkaesque judicial nightmare” line of cases. 
Substantively, the Kafkaesque judicial nightmare of fees-for-fees liti-
gation under the EAJA has been mentioned by judges dealing with EAJA 
requests arising from a wide variety of underlying suits against the gov-
ernment.  Cinciarelli involved the impermissible termination of the tempo-
rary active duty status of a brigadier general in the Marine Corps re-
serve.723  In Cornella, the plaintiff had sued over the denial of Social Secu-
rity disability benefits.724  Hatian Refugee Center v. Meese arose out of a 
successful challenge to the operation of the “‘Hatian Program’ . . . insti-
tuted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in the summer 
of 1978 to accelerate the processing of the applications made by Haitians 
for asylum.”725  In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Bowen, the plaintiff 
  
 721. 741 F.2d 170, 171 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting Cinciarelli, 729 F.2d at 810). 
 722. 496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990) (quoting Cinciarelli, 729 F.2d at 810). 
 723. Cinciarelli, 729 F.2d at 803. 
 724. 741 F.2d at 171.  Social Security disability benefits were also at issue in Trichilo v. Secretary of 
Health & Human Services, 823 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1987), Seymore v. Secretary of Health & Human 
Services, 738 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ohio 1990), and the class action McDonald v. Bowen, 693 F. Supp. 
1298 (D. Mass. 1988). 
 725. 791 F.2d 1489, 1492 (11th Cir. 1986).  In Hatian Refugee Center, Judge Hoffman characterized 
Judge Wright’s “Kafkaesque judicial nightmare” comment in Cinciarelli as dictum, id. at 1500, an 
observation also made by Judge Garrity in MacDonald, 693 F. Supp. at 1305 n. 4. 
  Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1988) also arose out of the INS response to Hatian 
refugees.  Specifically, 
 
[t]he lawsuit began as a challenge to the practice, instituted by the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS), of holding mass exclusion hearings for the plaintiff class composed 
of Hatian refugees.  It evolved quickly into a broad-based challenge to INS’s policy of de-
taining the class members, during the pendency of their applications for asylum, without any 
possibility of parole. 
 
Id. at 763.  See also Commr., INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990). 
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successfully challenged “an interim final rule concerning the medical care 
and treatment of handicapped infants”726 promulgated by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services.  United Construction Co. v. United States727 
arose from a claim by an asphalt contractor against the United States, 
which had contracted with the plaintiff for the construction of several park-
ing lots.728  In Bonanza Trucking Corp. v. United States, the plaintiff ob-
tained a judgment that enjoined the government from revoking licenses to 
cart bonded merchandise and to operate a container station.729  Streicher v. 
Washington, was a successful challenge to the legality of involuntary civil 
commitments to Saint Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, D.C.730  In SEC 
v. Morelli, the Securities and Exchange Commission brought an unsuccess-
ful civil action for alleged insider trading against several defendants, one of 
whom recovered attorneys’ fees and expenses.731  Both Barrera v. West732 
and Cullens v. Principi733 involved claims for veterans’ benefits.  The in-
teresting thing about the various Kafkaesque judicial nightmare cases in-
volving the EAJA is that many of them amount to a double-dip of Kafka; 
not only is there the nightmare of fees-for-fees litigation, there is often 
something Kafkaesque in underlying case. 
While the “Kafkaesque judicial nightmare” originated in an EAJA fee-
shifting case, it has been invoked in the context of other federal fee-
shifting provisions including those found in the Internal Revenue Code (26 
U.S.C. § 7430),734 the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
(29 U.S.C. § 412),735 the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 
  
 726. 795 F.2d 211, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983)). 
 727. 12 Cl. Ct. 514 (Cl. Ct. 1987).  In United Construction Co., Judge Nettesheim opined that “[t]he 
reasoning of the D.C. Circuit [in Cinciarelli] is impressive.  Id. at 517. 
 728. See United Constr., Inc. v. U.S., 10 Cl. Ct. 257 (Cl. Ct. 1986). 
 729. 669 F. Supp. 430 (Ct. Intl. Trade 1987). 
 730. 1992 WL 73508 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 1992). 
 731. 1995 WL 9387 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1995). 
 732. 13 Vet. App. 418 (Vet. App. 2000). 
 733. 18 Vet. App. 11 (table), 2001 WL 1181761 (Vet. App. 2001). 
 734. See Buchanan v. U.S., 755 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D. Or. 1990) (“an action [by a taxpayer] against 
the United States for wrongful levy by the Internal Revenue Service”).  In Buchanan, Judge Panner 
noted that while “the reasoning of the per se ‘fees for fees’ approach [established in Cinciarelli] is 
sound,” id. at 321, he was obligated to follow the alternative approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit, id.   
 735. Kinney v. Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 939 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff prevailed in suit 
alleging that the union had illegally removed him from elected office in union local and that union had 
imposed unlawful trusteeship on the local). 
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U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B)),736 and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards 
Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988).737 
Curiously, despite having disrupted the slumbers of any number of fed-
eral judges, the Kafkaesque judicial nightmare seems far less daunting to 
state-court judges.  One such fearless jurist, Justice Kaufman of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, has written, in the context of a statutory fee request 
following a will contest: 
One final point deserves mention.  It has sometimes been argued, 
as a reason for denying fees for fee-related services, that permitting 
such awards will result in the “Kafkaesque judicial nightmare” of 
an “infinite regression of [fees] litigation” in which each request 
for fee-related fees is contested and results in yet another request 
for fee-related fees. . . .  Experience in statutory fee-shifting con-
texts suggests that this perceived problem is largely theoretical and 
seldom arises in practice.  In any event, we are confident that trial 
courts, in the exercise of the broad discretion granted them in rul-
ing on fee applications, have the means to resolve this problem 
should it arise.738 
So, it would seem that one judge’s nightmarish walk in the dark is another 
judge’s stroll through a brightly lit park. 
B. “[R]esembles More a Scene from Kafka . . . ” 
“[R]esembles more a scene from Kafka . . .” made its debut in Judge 
Wald’s opinion for the D.C. Circuit in Gray Panthers v. Schweiker.739  At 
issue was the constitutionality of a regulation, implemented by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, under which disputes concerning 
Medicare benefits involving amounts less than $100 would be resolved by 
means of notice and a “paper hearing.”740  In an opinion holding that the 
Secretary’s dispute resolution mechanism did not provide Medicare bene-
ficiaries with due process, Judge Wald explained: 
  
 736. Curtis K. by Delores K. v. Sioux City Community Sch. Dist., 895 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. Iowa 
1995) (parents successfully sued school district, alleging that their disabled children had been excluded 
from school or had been denied due process in the formulation of individualized education programs). 
 737. Schultz v. Amick, 955 F. Supp. 1087 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (plaintiff was prevailing party in action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of application of excessive force by police officers during post-
arrest jail intake). 
 738. In re Est. of Trynin, 782 P.2d 232, 238 (Cal. 1989) (quoting Cinciarelli, 729 F.2d at 810).  
Justice Kauffman’s opinion in Estate of Trynin was subsequently cited in Jolin, Inc. v. Ruegg, 2002 
WL 423147 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2002), which involved requests for fees and costs incurred in a de-
claratory judgment action. 
 739. 652 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 740. Id. at 148. 
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It is universally agreed that adequate notice lies at the heart of due 
process.  Unless a person is adequately informed of the reasons for 
denial of a legal interest, a hearing serves no purpose and resem-
bles more a scene from Kafka than a constitutional process.  With-
out notice of the specific reasons for denial, a claimant is reduced 
to guessing what evidence can or should be submitted in response 
and driven to responding to every possible argument against denial 
at the risk of missing the critical one altogether.741 
Judge Wald’s phrase has had a long and interesting career, appearing in 
fourteen more opinions.742  What is of greatest interest in this line of cases 
is the range of agencies that have been involved in cases that have inspired 
judges to turn to Kafka; while there is only a single Kafaesque judicial 
nightmare–fees-for-fees litigation–there are any number of administrative 
agency processes and procedures that resemble a scene from Kafka. 
Gray Panthers involved Medicare beneficiaries.  Subsequent “resem-
bles more a scene from Kafka” cases have involved recipients of Social 
Security Old Age, Survivors and Disability benefits,743 Social Security 
Supplemental Security Income beneficiaries,744 Medicaid beneficiaries,745 
  
 741. Id. at 168-69 (footnote omitted). 
 742. Six of those opinions were written by judges of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois, five were written by U.S. District Court judges (one in the Northern District of Illinois), two 
by U.S. Court of Appeals judges (both in the Seventh Circuit), and one by a judge of the New York 
Supreme Court.  Unlike the “Kafkaesque judicial nightmare” line of cases, in which the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Jean was a fresh start that relegated Cinciarelli to irrelevance, the “resembles more a 
scene from Kafka” line is bifurcated; Judge Wald’s opinion in Gray Panthers is cited as the source of 
the phrase by all but those in the Seventh Circuit, who now cite to Judge Cummings’s opinion in Chi. 
Cable Communs. v. Chi. Cable Commn., 879 F.2d 1540, 1546 (7th Cir. 1989) and Judge Wood’s opin-
ion in Crosby v. Ward, 843 F.2d 967, 982 (7th Cir. 1988), which, in turn, quotes Gray Panthers. 
 743. Ellender v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).  Judge Cooper held that the Social 
Security Administration violated the due process rights of a class of recipients who were sent notices of 
alleged overpayments that merely advised them of the allegation that they had been overpaid, and the 
amount of the alleged overpayment, but were not told “when the alleged overpayments occurred, the 
amount of overpayment in each time period, the amount of prior repayments, and the reason for the 
overpayment.”  Id. at 600. 
 744. Ford v. Shalala, 87 F. Supp. 2d 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).  Judge Sifton held that the Social Security 
Administration provided inadequate notice to claimants regarding initial or continuing eligibility for 
SSI benefits because the agency’s notices “do not contain all of the financial information and financial 
calculations necessary to explain and understand increases, reductions, suspensions, or terminations of 
SSI benefits.”  Id. at 170. 
 745. Tripp v. Coler, 640 F. Supp. 848 (N.D. Ill. 1986).  Judge Moran ruled that the forms used by the 
Illinois Department of Public Aid to notify Medicaid recipients that their benefits were going to be 
restricted or cut off for overuse were inadequate because those forms: (1) did not identify specifically 
the alleged overuser but, instead, were addressed to “you and/or members of your family” id. at 858; 
(2) gave only “ultimate reasons” for the decision rather than specific ones, id. (citing Dilda v. Quern, 
612 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1980) (requiring reasons for decision that are “specific enough to inform 
the recipient how the agency’s decision was reached” rather than mere “ultimate reasons”)); and (3) did 
“not identify the legal standard by which a recipient’s use is judged as being medically necessary,” id. 
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unemployment insurance claimants,746 persons with tort claims against 
debtors in bankruptcy proceedings,747 unscheduled creditors in bankruptcy 
proceedings,748 a bankruptcy creditor listed in the petition with an incorrect 
address who was subsequently omitted from the debtor’s schedules of 
creditors,749 New York taxpayers whose tax refunds were treated as over-
payments and offset against alleged debts to governmental agencies,750 
“poor, disabled, legal permanent residents who are attempting to become 
naturalized United States citizens.”751  There are, as well, several “resem-
  
 746. Crosby, 843 F.2d at 986 (holding that the Illinois Department of Employment Security violated 
the due process rights of unemployment insurance claimants “by failing to provide them with adequate 
notice of the work search rules of thumb and the precise issues to be determined [during claimant 
interviews] by [DES claims] adjudicators”); see also Barcia v. Sitkin, 2003 WL 21345555 at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2003) (denying defendant’s motion to modify consent decree in case brought by 
unemployment benefits claimants in part because notice of claim reopening provided by New York 
State Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board “does not give a specific reason for reopening the case, 
so claimants have the virtually impossible task of trying to respond to every procedural issue that the 
Board might consider”). 
 747. Pettibone Corp., 151 B.R. at 172-73 (holding that publication notice of bar date is not “reason-
able notice” to a person with a tort claim against the debtor arising two years after publication of bar 
date); see also Kewanee Boiler Corp. v. Smith (In re Kewanee Boiler Corp.), 198 B.R. 519, 529 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that 1988 discharge did not limit products liability claim arising out of 
1989 malfunction of boiler manufactured in 1952). 
  Judge Schmetterer, author of In re Pettibone has already been mentioned (see supra pt. 
IV(D)(2)) for opining that “Franz Kafka would have been able to accept such a legal principle in one of 
his stories; the Bankruptcy Code and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution cannot.”  
151 B.R. at 172. 
 748. In re Walker, 149 B.R. 511, 513 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding that “unscheduled creditor 
[was allowed] to file complaint objecting to discharge or dischargeability after the bar date established 
by the Bankruptcy Rules when that creditor received actual notice of the bankruptcy case, but no actual 
or formal notice of the bar date for filing such claims”); see also OakFabco, Inc. v. American Std., Inc. 
(In re Kewanee Boiler Corp.), 297 B.R. 720, 730-31 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003).  As Judge Schmetterer 
explained in In re Kewanee Boiler Corp.: 
 
A claimant who is not noticed and therefore is not allowed to participate in the Chapter 11 
process is not bound by it.  A holding to the contrary would modify the Bankruptcy Code’s 
required treatment of creditors, and also endorse a Kafka-like view of American law that 
would be unconstitutional under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
 
Id. at 729. 
 749. In re O’Shaughnessy, 252 B.R. 722, 732 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that creditor “was not 
provided timely or reasonable notice of the claims bar date or the date by which its complaint objecting 
to the dischargeability of its debt . . . was to be filed”). 
 750. Butler v. Wing, 677 N.Y.S.2d 216, 223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County. 1998) (holding that pre-
offset notice to taxpayers was inadequate when that notice “only set forth an amount of a claimed 
overpayment, [but did] not provide any information as to the nature of the overpayment” and did “not 
include any information as to the time period for which the [overpayment] claim is being made or the 
basis for the claim”). 
 751. Campos v. INS, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1299 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (finding that INS failed to provide 
plaintiffs with adequate notice of reasons for denying medical waivers of language and civics require-
ments for citizenship and enjoining INS from scheduling final citizenship interviews of plaintiffs). 
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bles more a scene from Kafka” opinions in which the court held that the 
situation before it was not Kafkaesque.752 
C. “Kafkaesque Academic Test” 
The wonderfully evocative phrase “Kafkaesque academic test” has 
been used in fifteen judicial opinions, but never outside the state of Con-
necticut, making it the most localized of the four phrases discussed in this 
part.  The phrase was first penned by Judge Borden of the Connecticut 
Court of Appeals in State v. Crosby.753  In Crosby, the determinative issue 
was the correct application of the Evans doctrine, under which objections 
not made at trial may be revived on appeal, based upon a determination of 
“(1) whether the record supports the defendant’s claim that the trial court’s 
action raises a question of fundamental constitutional dimension; (2) if so, 
whether the trial court’s action was erroneous; and (3) if there was error, 
whether it requires reversal.”754  The Crosby court held that the defendant’s 
claim–that he was denied his constitutional right to confrontation by the 
trial court’s decision to grant the State’s motion in limine to exclude evi-
dence of the narcotics convictions of one of its witnesses755–failed to meet 
the first prong of the Evans test.756  After explaining the court’s decision, 
Judge Borden went on to a more general discussion of the “by now all too 
familiar Evans bypass.”757 
We are aware that this conclusion means that we do not review the 
defendant’s sole claim on appeal.  This highlights a phenomenon 
that we cannot but note with dismay.  That phenomeno[n] is the 
great frequency with which the principal issues in many of the 
criminal appeals before this court arrive necessarily swaddled in 
the hopeful mantle of Evans because trial counsel failed to present 
the appellate issue properly to the trial court in the first place. . . 
  
 752. See e.g. Chi. Cable Communs. v. Chi. Cable Commn., 879 F.2d 1540 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that Chicago Cable Commission provided cable television franchisees with adequate notice of alleged 
violation of local origination regulation because Commission’s notice specifically appraised franchi-
sees of the alleged violations and told franchisees how to respond); In re Marino, 195 B.R. 886, 892 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that due process rights of unscheduled creditor would not be violated 
by denying motion to extend the bar date for filing complaints objecting to dischargeability when 
creditor’s attorney received actual notice of the bankruptcy filing two months before the bar date, but 
did not receive formal bar date notice from the clerk of the bankruptcy court). 
 753. 504 A.2d 1071 (Conn. App. 1986). 
 754. Id. at 1072 (citing State v. Grant, 502 A.2d 945, 948 (Conn. App. 1986)); see also State v. Ev-
ans, 327 A.2d 576 (Conn. 1973). 
 755. Crosby, 504 A.2d at 1072. 
 756. Id. at 1074. 
 757. Id. at 1072 (quoting Grant, 502 A.2d at 948). 
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.     .     . 
[Evans] is not designed to protect defendants or their counsel who, 
“through neglect, inattention or as a trial strategy refrain from 
making proper objection or raising in the trial court any available 
constitutional defenses, confident that if the outcome of the trial 
proves unsatisfactory without making objections and taking excep-
tions and raising any available constitutional issue they may still 
prevail by assigning error or raising the constitutional issue for the 
first time on the appeal.” . . .  Thus, the “Evans trial court bypass to 
this court is a narrow constitutional path and not the appellate 
Champs Elysees.” . . .  Apparently, the defense trial and appellate 
bar has not heeded this “word to the wise” . . . and has continued to 
regard it, if not as a Champs Elysees, at least as a Boulevard Saint 
Michel. 
.     .     . 
The trial of a criminal case, and the ensuing appeal from a judg-
ment of conviction, are not separate and distinct proceedings di-
vorced from one another.  They are part of the continuum of the 
process of adjudication.  Stated in the most elementary terms, the 
trial seeks to determine whether the state has proven the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  The appeal seeks to determine 
whether, in the process of that adjudication, the trial judge commit-
ted error which requires either a new trial or a judgment of acquit-
tal. 
The trial judge presiding over a criminal case is not engaged in 
taking a Kafkaesque academic test which he may be determined on 
appeal to have failed because of questions never asked of him or 
issues never clearly presented to him.  Criminal defendants and 
their counsel, like civil litigants and their counsel; . . .  must take 
some modicum of responsibility for conserving scarce judicial re-
sources.  They must diligently ensure that, “subject to certain 
sharply delineated constitutional exceptions”; . . . an appeal pre-
sents for review rulings which the trial court made, and that the 
appeal is thus truly part of the adjudicative continuum.758 
Several of the subsequent “Kafkaesque academic test” cases follow pre-
cisely the pattern set out in Crosby – an appeal by a criminal defendant that 
  
 758. Id. at 1075. 
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is unsuccessful for failure to meet the first prong of the Evans test.759  The 
phrase has also been used in criminal cases that did not involve application 
of the Evans doctrine760 and has even been used in several civil cases.761 
As noted, the phrase “Kafkaesque academic test” has been used exclu-
sively by Connecticut judges.  Judge Borden was the first, in Crosby, and 
  
 759. See e.g. State v. Banta, 544 A.2d 1226, 1237 (Conn. App. 1988) (quoting Crosby, 504 A.2d at 
1075) (rejecting criminal defendant’s constitutional challenge to state felon-in-possession statute); Huff, 
523 A.2d at 910 (quoting Crosby, 504 A.2d at 1075) (affirming guilty verdict on assault charge over 
defendant/appellant’s claim, unraised at trial, that the trial court erred in failing to instruct jury on the 
definition of “serious physical injury”); State v. Farrar, 508 A.2d 49, 57 (Conn. App. 1986) (quoting 
Crosby, 504 A.2d at 1075) (rejecting defendants’ “chimerical claim” that trial court precluded their 
counsel from interviewing victim and victim’s family members during trial, noting that “defendants’ 
appellate counsel, who was not their trial counsel, has permitted zeal of advocacy to overwhelm any 
modicum of fidelity to the record”); see also State v. Reddick, 545 A.2d 1109, 1112 (Conn. App. 1988) 
(quoting Crosby, 504 A.2d at 1075) (“In State v. Vasquez . . . this court refused to review an identical 
claim [concerning completeness of Miranda warnings] which had not been raised below.”); State v. 
Vasquez, 520 A.2d 1294, 1296 (Conn. App. 1987) (quoting Crosby, 504 A.2d at 1075) (declining to 
review criminal defendant’s claim of error, based upon allegedly defective content of Miranda warn-
ings because issue was not raised in the trial court and defendant made no Evans argument). 
 760. See e.g. State v. Gebhardt, 851 A.2d 391, 395-96 (Conn. App. 2004) (quoting State v. Hansen, 
510 A.2d 465, 467) (Conn. App. 1986) (declining to review criminal defendant’s claim that certain 
evidence excluded at trial was actually admissible, when defendant’s argument on appeal was not made 
to the trial court); Hansen, 510 A.2d at 467 (quoting Crosby, 504 A.2d at 1075) (holding that failure to 
raise issue at trial did not deprive criminal defendant of right to appeal on that issue when the control-
ling law changed, in his favor, after trial).   
  In Gebhardt, Judge Flynn opined that deciding to review a claim not made before the trial judge 
“would be nothing more than a trial by ambuscade of the trial judge.”  851 A.2d at 396 (quoting State v. 
Charles, 745 A.2d 842, 846 (Conn. App. 2000)). 
 761. See e.g. Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 745 A.2d 178, 188 (Conn. 2000) (quoting Skryzpiec v. 
Noonan, 633 A.2d 716, 726 n. 13 (Conn. 1993)) (declining to consider, on appeal, plaintiff’s claim that 
she was wrongfully discharged for refusing to work under allegedly unsafe conditions when her wrong-
ful discharge claim at trial and intermediate level of appeal was based upon retaliatory discharge); 
Skrzypiec, 633 A.2d at 726 n. 13 (quoting Misiurka v. Maple Hill Farms, Inc., 544 A.2d 673, 675 
(Conn. App. 1988)) (affirming trial court’s admission of trial testimony when party opposing admission 
argued, at trial, that the testimony was irrelevant but argued, only on appeal, that the testimony was 
highly prejudicial); Hunte v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 792 A.2d 132, 138 (Conn. App. 2002) (quoting 
Brehm v. Brehm, 783 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Conn. App. 2001)) (declining appellate review of “plaintiff’s 
claim that it was inequitable for the [trial] court to render judgment in favor of the defendant . . . be-
cause the record does not contain a written memorandum of decision on this issue or a signed copy of 
an oral decision . . .”); Brehm, 783 A.2d at 1071 (quoting Burnham, 745 A.2d at 187) (declining to 
review ex-husband’s claim that trial court imposed unlawful conditions on his ability to open the judg-
ment in his divorce proceeding because “the defendant did not raise this claim before the trial court”); 
Misiurka, 544 A.2d at 675 (quoting Zeller v. Mark, 542 A.2d 752, 754 n. 4) (Conn. App. 1988) (declin-
ing to review plaintiff/appellant’s claim that trial court erred in granting intervening plaintiff’s motion 
for apportionment because appellant “failed to state distinctly the reasons for his objection to the trial 
court thereby denying the trial opportunity to re-examine its ruling at a time when it could still be 
modified and any defect cured”); Zeller, 542 A.2d at 754 n. 4 (quoting Crosby, 504 A.2d at 1075) 
(affirming trial court’s decision to strike plaintiff’s claim of slander and declining to consider, on ap-
peal, additional allegedly slanderous statement that was neither included in the complaint nor otherwise 
presented to the trial court); DiSorbo v. Grand Assocs. One Ltd. Partn., 512 A.2d 940, 943 (Conn. App. 
1986) (quoting Hansen, 510 A.2d at 467) (affirming trial court’s ruling that certain evidence was inad-
missible as irrelevant when party seeking reversal offered new theory of relevance and admissibility on 
appeal that was not argued at trial). 
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he was followed by five of his colleagues on the Connecticut Court of Ap-
peals762 and by two Justices of the Connecticut Supreme Court.763  While 
Judge Borden was the first to use the phrase, and was the first to use it to 
describe a situation that did not involve application of the Evans doctrine, 
it was Judge Spallone, in DiSorbo, who first used the phrase in a civil case.  
Subsequently, Judge Borden followed suit, noting, in his first and only use 
of the phrase outside the criminal context, that considering on appeal a 
statement that was neither included in a slander plaintiff’s complaint nor 
presented to the trial court “would amount to an improper variation on that 
‘Kafkaesque academic test.’ ”764  In light of Judge Borden’s initial author-
ship of the phrase and its origins in criminal law, it is interesting to note 
that when it finally made its way into an opinion from the Connecticut 
Supreme Court,765 Justice Norcott used the phrase in a civil case and at-
tributed it to an opinion by Judge O’Connell766 rather than to any one of the 
six opinions by Judge Borden767 that contained the phrase.  It may be, 
however, that the phrase is finally returning to its roots; after a string of 
four uses in civil cases, the most recent use of the phrase appears in a 
criminal case.768 
D. “Kafkaesque Spectre of an Incomprehensible Ritual . . .” 
Two of the first ten judicial references to Kafka came in cases involv-
ing a criminal defendant’s right to an interpreter.769  In a per curiam opin-
ion of only slightly more recent vintage, on the same topic, the First Circuit 
explained: 
The necessity for an interpreter to translate from a defendant’s na-
tive language into English when the defendant is on the stand, and 
from English into the defendant’s native language when others are 
testifying, has been elevated to a right when the defendant is indi-
gent and has obvious difficulty with the language, . . . .  Clearly, 
the right to confront witnesses would be meaningless if the ac-
cused could not understand their testimony, and the effectiveness 
  
 762. Judges Spallone (twice), O’Connell, Stroughton, Lavery, and Flynn (twice). 
 763. Justices Norcott and Sullivan. 
 764. Zeller, 542 A.2d at 754 n. 4. 
 765. Skrzypiec, 633 A.2d 716. 
 766. Misiurka, 544 A.2d 673.  In fairness to Justice Norcott, however, at the time he wrote Skrzypiec, 
Misiurka was the most recent civil case to use the phrase, and Misiurka did, in fact, quote Zeller, Judge 
Borden’s first (and only) opinion to use the phrase in a civil case. 
 767. Banta, 544 A.2d 1226; Zeller, 542 A.2d 752; Huff, 523 A.2d 906; Hansen, 510 A.2d 465; 
Farrar, 508 A.2d 49; Crosby, 504 A.2d 1071. 
 768. Gebhardt, 745 A.2d 178. 
 769. See supra pt. IV. 
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of cross-examination would be severely hampered. . . .  If the de-
fendant takes the stand in his own behalf, but has an imperfect 
command of English, there exists the additional danger that he will 
either misunderstand crucial questions or that the jury will miscon-
strue crucial responses.  The right to an interpreter rests most fun-
damentally, however, on the notion that no defendant should face 
the Kafkaesque spectre of an incomprehensible ritual which may 
terminate in punishment.770 
After framing the issue in the foregoing manner, the court of appeals af-
firmed the appellant’s conviction.771  In doing so, the court characterized 
the appellant as “a foreign-born national with a limited ability to speak and 
comprehend English”772 who had “admitted to the court some ability to 
communicate and understand”773 and who had “some ability to understand 
and communicate, but clearly ha[d] difficulty.”774  After wondering “how 
high must the language barrier rise before a defendant has a right to an 
interpreter,”775 the court ruled against the appellant, basing its decision on 
the wide discretion that must be granted to the trial court in determining 
whether a defendant needs an interpreter,776 and its finding that the trial 
court demonstrated its sensitivity to the appellant’s plight by: (1) appoint-
ing interpreters for the appellant’s co-defendants, who had moved the court 
for such relief;777 (2) asking the appellant’s “counsel whether the appellant 
was able to communicate and understand English, to which appellant’s 
counsel responded in the affirmative;”778 and (3) telling “the appellant that 
if, at any point in the proceedings, there was something he did not under-
stand, he need only raise his hand and the testimony would be repeated.”779  
In short, the Carrion court, like the court in United States v. Desist,780 iden-
tified a set of circumstances that did not create the Kafkaesque spectre of a 
criminal trial conducted in a language incomprehensible to the defen-
dant.781 
  
 770. U.S. v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973). 
 771. Id. at 15. 
 772. Id. at 14. 
 773. Id. 
 774. Id. 
 775. Id. 
 776. Id. at 14-15 (citing Perovich v. U.S., 205 U.S. 86, 91 (1907); U.S. v. Sosa, 379 F.2d 525, 527 
(7th Cir. 1967); U.S. v. Barrios, 457 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1972)). 
 777. Id. at 15. 
 778. Id. 
 779. Id. 
 780. 384 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1967). 
 781. Several other courts have issued decisions similar to Carrion, acknowledging that trial in a 
foreign language is Kafkaesque, but then explaining why the case before it was not Kafkaesque.   
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Conceptually, the finely turned phrase in Carrion, “Kafkaesque spectre 
of an incomprehensible ritual that may terminate in punishment,” has much 
in common with the first phrase discussed in this section, “Kafkaesque 
judicial nightmare.”  Just as there is a single Kafkaesque judicial night-
mare–fees-for-fees litigation–the phrase under discussion here has been 
applied to a single factual circumstance: the trial of a criminal defendant in 
a language he or she does not understand.  However, several of the 
“Kafkaesque spectre” cases following Carrion have added shadings and 
nuances to the right established in that case.782 
For example, in Martinez v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals held 
that “[w]hen no interpreter was present for voir dire both Martinez’ right to 
the assistance of counsel and his right to be meaningfully present at every 
stage of the proceedings were placed in jeopardy.”783  Judge Garrard ex-
  
  Cmmw. v. Garcia, 399 N.E.2d 460 (Mass. 1980), is a case in which a criminal defendant who 
had a qualified interpreter throughout his probable cause hearing, suppression hearing, and trial, con-
tended “that he could not understand what transpired at trial.”  Id. at 470.  In affirming the defendant’s 
conviction, Justice Quirico noted that judgment of the fluency of a defendant is “uniquely within the 
province of the trial judge, who is in direct contact with the defendant,” id., explained that “[u]nless the 
record reveals blatant insensitivity to a language problem with the result that the defendant was de-
prived of a fair trial, an appellate court will not disturb” the trial court’s exercise of discretion with 
regard to providing an interpreter, id., and held that “[t]he record in the present case amply demon-
strate[d] the judge’s continued sensitivity to [the defendant’s] language problem,” id.  Specifically, the 
trial judge vanquished the Kafkaesque spectre by conducting a hearing in which he directly questioned 
the defendant.  Id. at 471. 
  Ko v. U.S., 722 A.2d 830 (D.C. 1990), decided under both federal constitutional principles and 
the District of Columbia’s Interpreter Act, id. at 834, involved “fourteen different witnesses who used 
the Cantonese, Mandarin or Fukinese dialects,” id. at 831, and who testified through six interpreters, 
some retained by the prosecution, others appointed by the trial court, id. at 835.  At issue on appeal 
were the procedures the trial court used to assess the competence of interpreters and the fact that some 
of the interpreters were paid by the prosecution, thus calling into question their impartiality.  In ruling 
“that the trial judge managed to resolve complex interpretation issues without compromising minimal 
requirements of fundamental fairness,” id. at 836, the appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument 
that the District of Columbia Interpreter Act “required the trial judge to make a separate on-the-record 
determination, with respect to each of the fourteen witnesses who testified through an interpreter, that 
the particular interpreter was able to proved ‘effective communication’ with that witness,” id. at 835. 
 782. Unlike the other three lines of cases discussed in this section, in which the original source of the 
phrase invoking Kafka was ultimately eclipsed by a subsequent opinion which became the reference of 
choice, the “Kafkaesque spectre” line marches in lockstep; each opinion that uses the phrase cites 
Carrion as the source. 
 783. 449 N.E. 2d 307, 310 (Ind. App. 1983).  In addition to recognizing the sixth-amendment rights 
of a criminal defendant who does not speak English, Judge Garrard also noted: 
 
Furthermore, however, it would be fundamentally unfair within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment to subject to trial and conviction one who had no comprehension of what 
was occurring.  From the state’s viewpoint it would be no more than an “invective against 
an insensible object” and from the accused’s “a babble of voices” or “the Kafkaesque spec-
tre of an incomprehensible ritual which may terminate in punishment.” 
 
Id. at 309 (citations omitted). 
  Martinez was ultimately reversed on appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, which identified 
evidence in the record showing the defendant’s ability to speak English and held that “[t]his record 
 
File: Potter-Macroed Created on: 4/26/2005 12:02:00 PM Last Printed: 5/18/2005 10:50:00 AM 
2005 ORDEAL BY TRIAL 327 
plained that “there can be no doubt that it [impaneling the jury] is a critical 
stage of the proceedings”784 and went on to observe: 
While it remains arguable that Martinez was not substantially 
harmed since he understood some English and his counsel did voir 
dire the jury, we think the same cannot be said for preserving the 
integrity of our judicial system.  Our courts have already noted that 
we should be concerned with providing not only justice, but with 
satisfying the appearance of justice.785 
In State v. Neave, Justice Day of the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of interpreters for criminal defendants in the following way: 
We do not hold that there is federal constitutional right to an inter-
preter.  We do hold that as a matter of judicial administration, and 
to avoid questions of effective assistance of counsel and questions 
of whether inability to reasonably understand testimony resulted in 
a loss of an effective right to cross-examination, or whether the 
right had been waived by a defendant or his attorney with the de-
fendant’s assent and how such assent was demonstrated, we adopt 
the rule herein announced.  We also conclude that it removes the 
feeling of having been dealt with unfairly which is bound to arise 
when part or all of a trial is incomprehensible because of a lan-
guage barrier. 
The languages that were part of immigrant communities in this 
country from continental Europe have largely disappeared as suc-
ceeding generations used English as their primary or in most cases 
their only language.  But today new groups from the southern por-
tions of our own hemisphere and from portions of Asia seek to 
make their home among us and still speak and understand only 
languages other than English.  Fairness requires that such persons 
who may be defendants in our criminal courts have the assistance 
of interpreters where needed.  If the defendant is personally unable 
  
does not demonstrate that Defendant was harmed by not having had the trial court sua sponte appoint 
an interpreter prior to trial.”  Martinez v. State, 451 N.E.2d 39, 41 (Ind. 1983).  Curiously, however, the 
Indiana Supreme Court reported that “[d]efendant did have a court appointed interpreter throughout the 
trial, beginning with the selection of the jury,” id. (emphasis added), while the court of appeals reported 
that “no interpreter was present on February 22 when the jury was picked,” 449 N.E.2d at 308. 
 784. Id. at 310 (citation omitted). 
 785. Id. at 310-11 (citing Faretta v. Cal., 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Mayberry v. Pa., 400 U.S. 455, 465 
(1970)). 
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to pay for the services of an interpreter, one will be provided at 
public expense.786 
The interesting twist in Neave is the court’s decision to ground the right to 
an interpreter on the concept of judicial administration rather than on con-
stitutional principles. 
In State v. Woo Won Choi, the Washington Court of Appeals accepted 
review because, in its view, the right to an interpreter and thus, to be free 
from the Kafkaesque spectre, “is of constitutional stature.”787  However, 
where the defendant’s attorney “advised the court that he had had ‘many, 
many meetings’ with [the defendant], that he was confident that [the de-
fendant] could understand and answer questions, that [the defendant’s] 
brother was present to assist, and that counsel would advise the court if 
problems occurred,”788 the court of appeals found “no error in the [trial] 
court’s relying on counsel’s representation in concluding that [the defen-
dant] did not need an interpreter.”789  That is, under the circumstances, the 
court of appeals did not establish a requirement that trial courts must, on 
their own inquire into the language skills of criminal defendants.  The trial 
court in United States v. Mosquera was faced with the dilemma of provid-
ing eighteen Spanish-speaking defendants in a complex narcotics and 
money-laundering case with adequate access to charging documents, 
pleadings, and other materials that were written in English.790  In an at-
tempt to provide sufficient access, and over the government’s objection, 
Judge Weinstein entered the following order: 
Every non-English speaking criminal defendant shall be provided 
in this case with a translation of the indictment and relevant por-
tions of the statutes referred to in the indictment. 
Where a plea of guilty is entered in this case, such a defendant 
shall be provided with a translation of 1) the statutes referred to if 
they are different from those in the indictment, and 2) the written 
plea agreement. 
Any pre-sentence report in this case shall be provided to de-
fendant in translation whether there is a plea or finding of guilt at 
trial. 
  
 786. 344 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Wis. 1984) (footnote omitted). 
 787. 781 P.2d 505, 508 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1989). 
 788. Id. at 509. 
 789. Id. 
 790. 816 F. Supp. 168, 170 (E.D.N.Y 1993). 
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Other documents shall be translated in accordance with this 
order or as otherwise ordered by the court.  With each translation, 
the government may include a statement indicating that the transla-
tion is solely for the benefit of the defendant and that there may be 
errors in the translation which may not form the basis for appeal 
since the original document in English governs.  We need not ad-
dress at this time the more complex issue of whether the govern-
ment is required to translate additional documents that may be 
needed for trial.  In the instant case, that problem has been ad-
dressed by the appointment of an Administrative Coordinating 
Counsel, who is funded by CJA.  She can decide, subject to court 
supervision, for all defendants, which documents require transla-
tion.  Costs will be paid by CJA unless the court orders other-
wise.791 
In People v. Escalante, a criminal defendant forced to sit through the 
cross examination of two government witnesses without his translator was 
allowed to argue the issue on appeal, despite failing to raise it in his post-
trial motion, as a matter of plain error.792  Finally, in State v. Lopes, the 
  
 791. Id. at 178. 
 792. 627 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1994).  In his opinion, Judge Bowman described the 
factual circumstances of the case in the following way: 
 
The court appointed an interpreter for defendant at the preliminary hearing.  An inter-
preter participated at all of the pretrial proceedings.  At trial, defense counsel and the court 
engaged in the following colloquy: 
 
“MR. STEINBERG [Defense counsel]: * * * Nicole Okerblad [the interpreter] is leav-
ing Kaneville.  I talked to her babysitter [sic] at 10 after 1:00.  It’s my understanding that the 
distance is not that great.  The babysitter [sic] said we should be seeing her at any minute. 
 
THE COURT: Let’s go ahead and see –   
 
MR. STEINBERG: Well, I’d prefer to have an interpreter here.  
 
THE COURT: Well, I know you would, but I’m not waiting for anybody. 
 
*    *    *    *    *    * 
 
MR. STEINBERG: Judge, for the record the defendant is now present.  Nicole Oker-
blad is not here and I would object for the record that this proceeding is happening without 
the interpreter. 
 
THE COURT: Well, the matter’s been set for trial.  It’s not my job to make sure an in-
terpreter is present.  If she shows up, fine.  If she doesn’t, I’m not going to worry about it.  
Objection is on the record.  Let’s go ahead.” 
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Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that a criminal defendant who does not 
understand English has a right to a court-appointed translator, even if he or 
she is not indigent.793 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There is no easy way to summarize this article, given the panorama of 
situations that have inspired judges to refer to Franz Kafka and the kaleido-
scopic compendium of ways they have found to do so.  However, two 
things are certain.  First, as part of the judicial lexicon, Kafka is here to 
stay; during the time it has taken to research and draft this article, well over 
a dozen new cases with Kafka references have been reported.  Second, no 
judge has ever invoked Kafka to help him or her say something nice about 
a bureaucracy, a legal argument, or another tribunal.  In other words, hun-
dreds and hundreds of judges who probably collectively agree on little else, 
all recognize that something Kafkaesque is something to be avoided in 
their courtrooms and corrected, if possible, in the world outside the court-
house.  Thus, it would seem that Kafka’s works, and in particular his novel 
The Trial, belong on the short list of required readings for all of us who 
have a hand in the justice system.  The better we understand the workings 
of Kafka’s nightmare world, the better able we will be to keep from repli-
cating it with our own work. 
 
  
Id. at 1228 (brackets in the original).  Based upon the foregoing scenario, the appellate court ruled that 
“the [trial] court’s refusal to wait for the interpreter constituted an abuse of discretion which violated 
defendant’s sixth amendment right to be present at trial and confront the witnesses against him.”  Id. 
 793. 805 So. 2d 124, 128 (La. 2001).  Of course, the effect of this ruling is blunted, at least some-
what, by a Louisiana statute which makes “[a] defendant who is convicted of an offense . . . liable for 
all costs of the prosecution or proceeding,” id. at 129, including “the costs for any necessary foreign 
language interpreter,” id.  Whether it is Kafkaesque to require a criminal defendant to pay for the 
proceeding that resulted in his or her conviction is a question for another day (and, presumably, another 
author). 
